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Abstract
This research provides an up-to-date perspective on the impact of the fourth M&A
wave in the UK, on the target CEOs and the acquiring shareholder wealth around the
takeover announcement. The novelty of this study stems from the characteristics of
the recent M&A activities. Beyond being the most important M&As waves in history,
recent M&As are characterized by many interesting features such as the large
cross-border takeovers, the use of equity as opposed to debt as in the 1980s and a
preference for friendly, strategically motivated deals instead of hostile financially
motivated deals. Another distinctive feature of recent years is the increased focus on
improving internal corporate governance mechanisms in order to maximise firm
value. In addressing of these characteristics, we distinguish between cross-border and
domestic deals, takeovers on the rising side (the takeover active period) and the
slumping side (the takeover less active period) of the M&A wave. Both univariate
tests and multivariate tests are employed in our empirical study.
We find a significant negative relation between the probability of post-takeover
target CEO turnover and pre-takeover performance in the full samples. This indicates
the disciplinary function of UK takeovers in the recent M&A wave. Such a relation
only exists on the rising side of the M&A wave, implying that such disciplinary
takeovers are confined only to the active period. However, a lower CEO turnover
follows cross-border takeovers, indicating that the local CEO's experience and
knowledge of the business and of the environment appear to be valuable to foreign
acquirers. There is some evidence to point that better governance, such as greater
blockholder ownership and a greater proportion of non-executive, lowers the
probability of CEO turnover in the takeover active period. The results are similar to
findings by Kini et al. (2004) suggesting that takeovers play less of a disciplinary
role in the more recent M&A wave and act as a court of last resort when other
governance mechanisms are weak.
Focusing on the short-term return, we find significant losses for acquiring firms
around the takeover announcement. The losses mainly existed in UK domestic
takeovers, while the returns for foreign acquirers are not significantly different form
zero. Legal difference and culture difference are positively associated with the gains
of acquiring firms. Moreover, we find no relationship between acquirer's returns and
the intensity of M&A. High-tech takeovers brought lower abnormal returns to
acquiring firms than non-high-tech takeovers, which is even worse after the crash of
global IT industry in 2000. Further, we find that the acquiring firms have better
returns, when target firms have post-takeover CEO turnover, a greater proportion of
non-executive and a lower blockholder ownership. The results indicate the
significant influence of the target governance on acquirer's gains.
Xlll
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Objective of the research
Companies view mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as one of several important means
to achieve certain strategic and business objectives. Billions of dollars are invested in
making acquisitions. The transactions are always significant not only to the
companies, but also to many other constituencies, such as shareholders and managers.
This research observes the impact of the corporate control market on target CEOs
and the wealth of acquiring shareholders in mergers or acquisitions of UK target
firms between 1998 and 2002.
This study is an update UK study on the M&A cycle and it is the first to address the
distinctive features in the fourth M&A wave in the UK. The UK wave pattern is
almost consistent with those of US takeovers, which go back to the 1890s. The early
M&A waves were characterized respectively as: the monopoly wave during 1890-
1905, the oligopoly wave in the 1920s, the growth wave in the 1960s, the "greed"
wave in the 1980s, and the globalisation wave in the 1990s (Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002), Sudarsanam (2003)). The active merger movement in the UK can be traced
back to the 1960s, and UK waves share similar features with US waves. The fourth
M&A wave in the late 1990s had distinctive features, such as dominant friendly
deals, increased international transactions and high-tech takeovers. These
characteristics made the recent M&A wave very special and worthy of further
investigation.
This research investigates controversial issues in M&A activities. The special
characteristics of the fourth UK M&A wave make these issues more interesting. One
question is to what extent the market for corporate control, that is takeovers, serves
1
as an effective external disciplinary mechanism to remove poorly-performing target
managers who are not able or not willing to maximize shareholders' interests. The
conflict between managers and shareholders is known as the agency problem.
Several mechanisms have been suggested to decrease such agency problems, when
managers pursue their own interests instead of looking after their shareholders and
improving the firms' value. This is especially so when internal mechanisms have
failed to discipline ineffective managers, and the corporate takeovers are considered
as "a court of last resort" to replace such managers (Jensen (1986)). This study
examines the effect of the market for corporate control on target CEOs and even
traces the change of CEOs career following takeovers for two years.
Another inconclusive issue in the literature is the impact of takeovers on the wealth
of acquirers' shareholders. The major gain of target shareholders is unambiguous, as
the acquisition premium is paid to target shareholders to abandon their ownership.
But the sizes of returns to the acquiring firm are very disputable. Empirical research
shows mixed results for the wealth effect to acquiring shareholders. Some receive a
small positive abnormal announcement return (Franks and Harris (1989), Moeller
and Schlingemann (2005)), while other studies observe zero or negative
announcement returns (Schwert (2000)). In the recent M&A wave, the "new
economy" bubble in the 1990s brought excitement into M&A activities. Whether
acquiring shareholders can benefit is a very appealing research theme. In particular,
this study considers the effect of internal corporate control mechanisms on the wealth
of acquiring shareholders.
Research on M&A activities has been carried out for decades. Such research
documents the characteristics of M&A activities from various dimensions, such as
the motives for takeovers, the effects of takeovers, etc. However, there are only a
dozen studies that look at the corporate control market, which may be due to the
2
limitation of data. Research shows low survival rates of target managers following
takeovers, but these studies normally suffer a very small sample which reduces
replication. Further, no research considers the effect of target manager departure and
the later career development of these target managers following takeovers. When
considering the relation between post-takeover CEO turnover of target firms and pre-
takeover performance, few studies look at both accounting and market-based
performance measures which provide different perspectives on target performance.
Moreover, acquiring shareholders' gains remain controversial, although hundreds of
papers research the effect of takeovers on shareholder wealth. Especially in the
recent M&A wave with many distinctive characteristics, international transactions
are becoming essential. But there is an absence of an updated empirical work in this
area. As far as we know, no research looks at international takeovers into the UK and
related issues, such as the effect of legal system and cultural differences. These
issues have become non-negligible nowadays. Additionally, the "new economy", due
to the boom of the internet and the telecommunications industries in the 1990s,
pushed the M&A wave to a new high. But few researchers have studied the
difference of each stage of the M&A wave, which may have many implications for
the latest investment. Also, the effect of well-developed internal corporate
governance is seldom examined empirically under the consideration of the context of
M&A, which is incompatible with the fast improvement of corporate governance in
recent years.
1.2 Features of this research
To address these gaps in the literature, we use both univariate and multivariate tests
to examine the impact of the recent UK corporate takeover market on target CEOs
and acquiring shareholders' wealth. This research has the following features.
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Firstly, unlike previous studies, this study comprehensively collects and investigates
thoroughly potential determinants of target CEOs departure and acquiring
shareholders' wealth. These determinants are grouped into four sections: CEO
characteristics, target governance characteristics, target firms' and acquiring firms'
characteristics. This research attempts to identify the significant determinants related
to target CEO departure and acquiring shareholders' wealth.
Secondly, this study focuses on mergers or acquisitions of UK target firms that
occurred from 1998 and 2002. It is distinguished from previous studies because we
consider major features of the fourth UK M&A wave. In the recent wave of the
1990s, both the number and total transaction value were much higher than ever
before. During the period of 1993-2002, about 32,000 total completed M&A deals
are recorded for the UK (Thomson Financial Securities Data). The value of M&A
deals in the UK rose from a mere $36 billion in 1993 to $415 billion in 2000 before
the market crashed. There were several multi-billion-dollar deals during the boom. In
addition, international transactions grew dramatically and they accounted for more
than one-third in the recent M&A wave. Cross-border takeovers have distinctive
characteristics, compared to domestic takeovers. The new markets open more
opportunities, the high technologies allow firms to improve and extend their product,
and international clients increase their market scales. Some of the largest
international deals in history were done during that period. In 1999, UK mobile
telephone company Vodafone undertook a hostile acquisition of the German telecom
company Mannesmann with a total transaction value of over $202 billion.
Meanwhile, cross-border transactions face greater difficulties in view of severe
information asymmetry in the takeover process, serious lack of experience in the new
market and more complex integration across different cultural backgrounds.
Vodafone wrote off several billion dollars to take account of impaired goodwill two
years later after the completion of the takeover. Under the consideration of the
4
increasing importance of international transactions in the recent M&A wave, we
construct a comparison between cross-border takeovers and domestic takeovers.
Acquiring firms from 15 different countries are examined and the legal system and
cultural problems in international transactions are also investigated in order to
provide insight into the effects of international takeovers.
Thirdly, few studies attend to the different effects of each stage of the M&A wave. In
the recent M&A wave, the environments were dominated by friendly and
strategically-oriented takeovers. In the 1990s, more than 90% of M&A deals
occurred as friendly takeovers. Coincident with industries' technology shocks, the
stock market was booming with high technology, media and telecoms in the late
1990s. More than 40% of worldwide merger deals occurred in the high-tech section
in 2000. It is argued that high M&A activity is correlated with the high stock market
period (Maksimovic and Philips (2001), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), Crook
(1995, 1996)). The general high market valuation makes stock payment more popular
in this period. Meanwhile, managerial hubris is normally more serious in such high
stock markets, which coincides with high takeover markets (Key (1997), Tse and
Soufani (2001)). The fourth M&A wave in the UK reached a peak in 2000. The "new
economy" bubble in the stock markets burst, resulting in a dramatic decline in M&A
activities. During the period 2000-2002, the total number of deals and the total value
of deals decreased by 37% and 70% respectively. In particular, the high-tech
takeovers especially in the media and telecoms shrank significantly. Corporate equity
lost attractiveness as the payment in transactions. The whole market seemed to cool
down, and managers of companies and shareholders seemed to be more rational
following the collapse. Hence, these distinct features in different stages of the M&A
wave could have significant impacts on takeovers. This study focuses on the
difference between the rising-side takeovers and the slumping-side takeovers in the
M&A wave, which is the first time these have been attempted for a UK M&A study.
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Fourthly, internal corporate governance mechanisms have been well developed in the
1990s (Kini et al. (2004)). A series of reports' in the UK have demonstrated
increased focus on improving internal corporate governance mechanisms in order to
maximise firm value. The target board, larger blockholders and non-executive
directors (outsiders) have to start playing more important roles in monitoring
managers of companies and aligning the interests of the managers to those of the
shareholders. But few studies take this issue into account. Ignorance of corporate
governance may lead to missing an important piece of research in M&A. Therefore,
we investigate the influence of these improved corporate governance mechanisms in
the takeover market.
1.3 Summary of main findings
This study extends the literature on corporate takeovers by examining the recent UK
takeover market. The main focuses are the disciplinary role of recent takeover
activities in the UK and their effect on acquiring shareholders' wealth. The novelty
of this study stems from the special features of the fourth M&A wave. The research
carried out in this thesis leads to a number of main findings, which may be
summarized as follows:
The disciplinary role of takeovers
• The disciplinary function of the UK takeover market is indicated by the
significant negative relationship we find between post-takeover target CEO
turnover and pre-takeover target performance. Our results are consistent with
the findings ofMartin and McConnell (1991), and Denis et al. (1997) in the US
takeover market. We also find that such a negative turnover-performance
1
Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report (1998), Turnbull (1999) and
Higgs Report (2003)
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relationship exists in both cross-border and domestic takeovers. In particular,
such a turnover-performance relation is discovered in the active takeover period
of Jan 1998-May 2000. This result suggests that UK disciplinary takeovers are
more operative in the intensive periods of a M&A wave, which is in line with
the study ofMikkelson and Partch (1997) for the US merger wave.
• Compared with domestic takeovers, a lower target CEO turnover rate follows
cross-border takeovers, 52.24% vs. 65.33% in one year after the takeover
announcement. This indicates that target CEOs may be more valued in
international transactions. Foreign acquiring firms face more challenges and
more difficulties than domestic acquirers, so that they have to take advantage of
target CEOs for their special knowledge of the local business and local
environment. Such target CEOs are more likely to be retained in the new firms.
The negative effect of cross-border takeovers on target CEOs are statistically
significant, especially during the later period of June 2000-Dec 2002 when
international takeovers were more active.
• We find that cultural differences play an important role in cross-border
takeovers. Four different dimensions of Hofstede's index provide evidence that
acquiring firms from masculine countries are more likely to maintain target
CEOs. Those masculine acquirers are more stressed by the competition and
performance, so they may need target CEOs to help the integration of the target.
This is observed mainly in the less active takeover period.
• Alternative target corporate governance mechanisms are found to have no
significant influence for the whole sample in the context of corporate takeovers.
However, in the less active takeover periods, blockholder ownership and the
proportion of non-executives on target boards have a significant negative
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relation with post-takeover target CEO turnover. This indicates that corporate
takeovers substitute blockholders and non-executives of target firms to
discipline the inefficient target CEOs.
• Some CEO characteristics and deal characteristics are significantly associated
with target CEO turnover following takeovers. For example, CEO duality
reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover because of the large influence of such a
CEO with the joined title and the responsibility of company CEO and chairman.
Stock payment also has a negative relation with CEO turnover, because stock
payment may provide more security to target CEOs. But hostile takeovers are
followed by higher target CEO turnover, which suggests that hostile takeovers
are still play a disciplining role in the recent takeover market.
The announcement effect on the acquiring shareholders' wealth
• For the whole sample, acquiring firms have a significant negative
announcement abnormal return of -0.92%, and losses accumulate to -3.88%
over the period of (-30, +30) around the takeover announcement. Our results
are consistent with previous studies by Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996)
and Draper and Paudyal (1999) that acquiring firms have a small but significant
negative return about the takeover announcement.
• UK domestic acquiring firms suffer a significant loss of -6.31% over (-30, +30)
around the takeover announcement, which is significantly lower than that for
foreign acquiring firms over the same period. Multiple regressions show a
significant positive relation between cross-border takeovers and acquirers'
returns around the takeover announcement. This provides partial support for the
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existence of imperfections in markets, which give multinational firms an
advantage of international diversification over local firms.
• We find no significant relation between the intensity of M&A activities and
acquirers' returns around the takeover announcement. However, the CAARs of
acquirers over (-10, -1) are significantly lower on the rising side than on the
slumping side of the merger wave. This suggests that the market reactions
shortly prior to announcement were affected by the M&A activity eras. This
result is in line with the argument of Jensen (2004) that overvaluation in the
boom market may encourage managers to make takeovers that may not create
profit in the future, which lead to acquiring shareholders' losses.
• In line with the positive impact of cross-border takeovers, "legal difference"
and "culture difference" have a positive association with the gain of acquiring
firms. Foreign markets seem to be more confident of the benefit of better
investor protection supplied by the Scandinavian and Germanic civil law
system and of the learning benefits provided by the culture differences. Such
significance appears on the slumping side of the M&A wave which was more
dominated by international transactions than the rising side.
• Target governance has a significant influence on acquirers' gains, especially on
the slumping side of the M&A wave. When the rumours or news about target
CEO departure came out around the takeover announcement, acquiring firms
had better abnormal returns. This indicates that market reactions are more
positive to disciplinary takeovers than to those without target CEO departure.
The proportion of non-executives on target boards is positively related to
acquirers' returns, suggesting that effective monitoring by outsiders leads to a
good deal. But target blockholders' ownership has a negative association with
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acquirers' returns. High premia asked for by large target blockholders may lead
to losses for acquiring firms.
• Takeovers in high-tech industries brought lower abnormal returns to acquiring
firms than those in non-high-tech industries. Such a situation became worse
after the crash of the global IT industry in 2000. Considering the high risk and
uncertain future of high technology, it is understandable that markets have less
confidence. In line with previous studies, stock payment is positively associated
with acquirers' gain, while multiple bidders and higher premium is negatively
related to acquirers' returns around the announcement. This suggests that a
higher offer price bid up by multiple bidders and higher premium lead to worse
returns to acquiring firms.
• A significant positive relationship is found between target pre-takeover
performance and acquirers' returns around takeover announcements. Better-
performing targets may increase market confidence about such takeovers.
Moreover, growth acquiring firms have significantly better announcement
returns than value acquiring firms. This indicates that markets are more likely
to support growth acquiring firms and have positive reactions to their takeovers.
1.4 A guide to the thesis
As mentioned earlier, the issues concerning target post-takeover CEO turnover and
the wealth effects on acquiring shareholders in the recent UK M&A wave provide
the focus of the present thesis. It is organised into the following chapters.
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical background of corporate governance in the
takeover contest, followed by a literature review on target CEO turnover in both the
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US and UK takeover market. Some shortcomings in previous studies encourage us to
improve research on the disciplinary role of takeovers. Moreover, the hypotheses are
developed to clarify the relationship between post-takeover target CEO turnover and
its potential determinants.
Chapter 3 provides empirical tests of the effect of recent M&A activities on target
CEOs. As the M&A boom at the end of the 1990s was part and parcel of
globalization, target CEOs are traced separately following cross-border and domestic
takeovers. The potential determinants and their relationships with the probability of
post-takeover target CEO turnover are compared in the context of cross-border and
domestic takeovers. We observe many significant differences between international
and domestic transactions. Meanwhile, this chapter contrasts characteristics of target
firms with and without CEO turnover.
Chapter 4 looks further into the features of the fourth M&A wave in the UK and
compares target CEO turnover following takeovers on the rising side and following
those on the slumping side of the recent M&A wave. It highlights the change in the
disciplinary role of takeovers with the intensity of takeover activities. Also, the
potential determinants of target CEO turnover are compared in two different takeover
periods, suggesting that different determinants are significantly related to the
likelihood of target CEO departure.
Chapter 5 presents the literature review on abnormal returns for both target and
acquiring shareholders, especially short-term returns to acquiring firms around the
takeover announcement. It shows the inconclusive nature of the evidence on
acquirers' returns. Moreover, the chapter reviews the common methodologies and
statistical tests in event studies. It notes the best performance of the market model
and the advantages ofboth parametric and non-parametric statistical tests.
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Chapter 6 examines the abnormal returns to acquiring firms around the takeover
announcement. The wealth effects on foreign acquirers and domestic acquirers are
distinguished. Additionally, the investigation is carried out on how the acquiring
shareholders wealth effects vary according to deal characteristics, target corporate
governance characteristics, and target and acquiring firm characteristics.
Chapter 7 compares acquirers' returns around the announcement of takeovers
occurring in the rising side with those on the slumping side of the M&A wave. The
investigation takes account of the effect of the economic boom and the collapse of
the stock market in 2000, which was coincident with the intensity of takeovers. The
comparison of two eras of takeover activities runs through the whole analysis.
In conclusion, Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions of this study and the findings
of this research. Further, this study suggests a number of interesting avenues for
further research in international takeovers and M&A waves.
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Chapter 2 Discipline Takeovers &
Target CEO Post-takeover Turnover
2.1 Introduction
Many financial economists argue that takeovers serve as a useful external control
mechanism for removing inefficient managers who cannot or will not maximize
shareholders' interests (Jensen (1988), Weisbach (1993), Frank et al. (2001)). To
some, takeovers are an important method of correcting managerial failure. Jensen
(1986) suggests that the corporate takeover "serves as a court of last resort... when
the corporation's internal controls and board level control mechanisms are low,
clumsy or deficient."
Compared with previous M&A waves, the recent M&A activities are characterized
by many interesting features, such as large cross-border takeovers, the use of equity
as opposed to debt in the 1980s, and a preference for friendly, strategically motivated
deals instead of hostile financially motivated deals. In such an environment, the issue
is the extent to which recent takeovers still play a disciplining role. We attempt to
answer this question in the context of the recent UK takeover market over the period
1998 to 2002. Additionally, the recent M&A wave reached a peak in 2000 with the
boom of "new economic" bubble optimism and it slumped with the subsequent stock
market collapse. A further question is, therefore, whether the rising (active) and
slumping (less active) M&A periods affect the disciplinary function of takeovers.
Specifically, we identify potential determinants that significantly affect CEOs'
turnover and compare them in the different context of domestic and cross-border
takeovers, the rising side and the slumping side of the M&A wave. Compared with
previous studies on takeover markets, this study includes a comprehensive list of
factors that might have an effect on the post-takeover CEO turnover of target firms.
These factors represent the CEO's personal characteristics, target governance
characteristics, deal characteristics and target firm characteristics.
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Furthermore, some researchers argue that corporate governance mechanisms are
more developed in recent years (Kini et al. (1995, 2004)). Our study provides a
comparative assessment of the managerial disciplining provided by three principal
parties suggested by the literature, namely blockholders, the target board, and
debtholders of target firms. Weir and Jones (1999) suggest that "If the internal
mechanism fails.... then the final external governance sanction, namely the market
for corporate control, comes into play." Thus, the question is whether internal or
alternative mechanisms come to play a disciplinary role when takeovers occurred.
The relationship between post-takeover CEO departure and three target corporate
governance mechanisms is tested in the context of the UK takeovers market in the
following chapters.
In this chapter, we review the relevant literature in section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides
our hypotheses. The conclusion is in section 2.4.
2. 2 Literature Review
Literature on the theoretical background is reviewed in the first section. Then, we
review empirical evidence on target post-takeover CEO turnover, in both the US and
the UK.
2.2.1 Theoretical background
Jensen and Smith (1985) argue that the modern corporation is "a legal entity that
serves as a nexus for a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts among disparate
individuals". In the theoretical profit-making firm, the goal of managers is assumed
to maximize the returns on wealth that shareholders invested, so that the most
important contract is between the shareholders who risk their wealth in the firm and
the managers. Thus, managers are acting as agents for shareholders. Fama and Jensen
(1983) suggest that, for the financial economist, this relationship creates efficient
management, because it allows for specialization: the shareholder specializes in risk-
bearing, while the managers specialize in the management function. However, when
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managers act in their own interest rather than in the interests of shareholders, a
conflict between managers and shareholders arises. Since Jensen and Meckling
(1979), researchers find that the employment of management impedes shareholder
wealth maximization because the best interests ofmanagers may differ from the best
interests of shareholders. Many studies have discovered the potential for this conflict,
and it is known as the agency problem.
Several mechanisms are suggested in the literature to reduce these agency problems.
In general, the parties disciplining management of a poorly performing firm are
divided into the internal and external control mechanisms. Normally, internal
mechanisms include large blockholders and the nonexecutive directors (outsiders). In
addition, there is the managerial shareholding. If a substantial proportion of the
wealth of executive managers consists of shares in a company, this may lead them to
have incentives which are congruent to those of shareholders. So it is helpful to
mitigate the agency problem in the firm. In addition, concentrated shareholdings by
large shareholders, and in particular blockholders and institutions, can increase
managerial monitoring and so such shareholders may replace management when the
firm's performance is poor. Moreover, nonexecutive directors, i.e., outside directors,
may act on the shareholders' behalf and remove the managers who perform poorly in
their view.
For external mechanisms, creditors, the managerial labour market and the market for
corporate control may play an external disciplining role. The disciplining of
management in poorly performing firms may take place, when there is financial
distress, requiring equity issues and capital restructures (Frank et al. (2001)). The
labour market for managers can motivate managers to improve their reputation
among prospective employers (Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)). This not only creates a
powerful disciplinary force on poorly performing managers, but has a significant
negative effect on the future careers of these managers. Finally, another important
external disciplinary mechanism is takeovers. Bidders may discipline the
management of the acquired firm.
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Poorly performing firms may be valued below their potential in the marketplace and
individual shareholders have difficulty in replacing inefficient managers. These firms
may become attractive targets for bidders. In the process of a takeover, the conflict
between shareholders and managers is exceedingly high. Target firms' managers may
be faced with a conflict of interest between their responsibilities and their own
potential career and wealth changes. In the case that a bid offer is in the best interests
of their shareholders, managers may find themselves unemployed if the bid is
successful. In fact, high rates of management turnover after a takeover are well
documented in the literature. Thus, problems arise.
Following Berle and Means (1932), Manne (1965) introduced the theory of the
market for corporate control. Manne views takeover as a useful mechanism for
encouraging managers to pursue shareholders' wealth maximization strategies.
According to Manne, corporate control is a valuable asset actively traded on a market.
The operation of this market depends upon the link between a firm's share price and
the performance of its management. Poor performance relative to some benchmark
causes a firm's share price to fall below its value under efficient management,
allowing a transfer of control by encouraging takeover bids from prospective new
management teams. Later, a series of papers by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) refined this theory. In a disciplinary takeover, the
acquirer obviously believes that internal control mechanisms have failed to
effectively monitor top management. From time to time, the takeover market
provides additional discipline to management. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) view
takeover activity as one of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between
managers and shareholders. According to Jensen (1986), "when the corporation's
internal controls and board level control mechanisms are slow, clumsy or deficient",
or when other mechanisms fail to influence managerial performance, the external
market for corporate control comes into play and acts as a "court of last resort" to
replace ineffective management. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) suggest that the
takeover market serves as a substitute for internal control mechanisms in applying
discipline to ineffective management. The takeover process itself has been
considered as a mechanism for resolving owner-manager conflicts. The takeover
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market provides a source of external discipline to target CEOs which substitutes for
another discipline. Through this mechanism, takeovers of inefficiently managed
companies (or companies in which non-value-maximising behaviour dominated)
would result in the replacement of the CEO and lead to a more efficient use of the
target firm's resources.
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence on CEO Turnover
If takeovers perform a disciplining role on target CEOs, we would expect that
following takeovers a significant proportion of CEOs depart their companies. A
number of studies have investigated whether this departure occurs. We review US
studies, followed by studies for the UK.
2.2.2.1 US Studies
Walsh (1988) investigates the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the top
management of target firms after takeovers. He examines a relatively small sample of
55 takeover bids that occurred between 1975 and 1979, and finds a one-year top
executive departure rate of 25%. This increases to 59% by the time the target
company has been combined with the acquiring company for five years. Walsh (1989)
increases his sample to 102 US target companies and finds a similar top manager
post-takeover turnover rate. Walsh and Ellwood (1991) test the relationship between
the target firm's performance history and its subsequent top management turnover by
using a same sample of 102 US target firms. Their results show that the target firm
top management turnover rate is higher than the control group, but there is no
relationship between targets' previous stock performances and their subsequent top
management turnover. In these studies, Walsh uses a survey to collect data about
target management, which reduces his research sample size. Moreover, Walsh and
Kosnik (1993) collected data on target firms involved in takeovers between 1979 and
1983. Their research data concerned competitors of these target firms and a control
group of firms matched by size of sales. The analysis provides only minor support
for the discipline function of takeovers, which happened only among target firms
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with histories of sustained poor performance. But their conclusion is only based on a
small sample of 59 target firms.
Based on a larger sample of 253 takeovers, Martin and McConnell (1991) examine
the role of corporate takeovers in disciplining top managers of poorly performing
target firms over the time period of 1958-1984. They find a high turnover rate of
41.9% for the targets' top executives in the year following a successful tender offer
and 19% during the second post-takeover year, which is much higher than that prior
to the takeover. By using two measures of corporate performance, the traditional
market model and industry-adjusted returns, their results show that firms with post-
takeover top manager turnover were significantly under-performing other firms in
their industries prior to takeovers as well as other target firms with no post-takeover
change in the top executive.
Agrawal and Walking (1994) sample 182 Forbes 800 firms that became targets over
the period 1980 to 1986, both successful and unsuccessful. They find a 55%
unemployment rate for the target executives (over the 3-year period surrounding the
bid), which is similar to the turnover rate in Martin and McConnell (1991) who
analyze targets of successful tender-offer bids. The unemployment rate for the
nontarget sample is only 30% over the same 3-year period. The unemployment rate is
higher in successful acquisitions than in unsuccessful bids, 65% vs. 44%.
Kini, Kracaw and Mian (1995) investigate 244 successful tender offers announced
between 1958 and 1984. They find a significant increase in CEO turnover occurs
following successful takeovers, from 29.9% before takeovers to 57.8% in the three-
year post-takeover period. In addition, they test the relation between corporate
takeovers and the board of directors to discipline top managers. Their results show an
inverse relation between post-takeover CEO turnover and pre-takeover market-
related performance. Such a relationship is concentrated in targets with inside-
dominated boards of directors, compared with outsider-dominated boards of directors.
Ghosh and Ruland (1998) study 212 acquisitions over the period 1981 to 1988. The
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mean turnover rate of target firms' top executives is 29.10% following acquisitions.
Moreover, they investigate how managers' preferences affect the payment for
corporate takeover. A strong positive association between target managerial
ownership of target firms and the likelihood of stock transaction suggests that target
managers are more likely to retain jobs in new firms, when they receive stock
payment.
Harford (2003) studied a sample of 1,091 directors from boards of 91 Fortune 1000
firms receiving takeover bids between 1988 and 1991. The fraction ofCEO turnover
is 73% in his samples, which is lower than other insider directors (81%), and outsider
directors (90%). He finds that, following completed offers, target CEOs hold fewer
directorships in the future than the control group. There is no significant relation
between CEO turnover and the firm's perfonnance in his sample.
Hartzell et al. (2004) analyse benefits received by target CEOs in a sample of 311
completed US acquisitions between 1995 and 1997. They find that 57% of target
CEOs join the board of directors of the buyer. When CEOs do not become officers in
the combined firm, they obtain approximately $5 million in additional cash pay.
Their results show a very large incidence of job losses for target CEOs and survival
rates for CEOs remaining with the acquirer are quite low, with annual turnover
roughly three times the non-merger rate observed in the literature.
Based on a sample of 279 takeovers, Kini et al. (2004) compare the US takeover
market over two periods: 1979 to 1988 and 1989 to 1998. 46% of target CEOs
departed the new combined firm after takeover in the earlier period. The CEO
turnover rate increases to 60% in the later period. They find a weakly significant
negative relation between the probability of post-takeover CEO turnover and pre-
takeover performance during the earlier sample period. The results suggest that the
role of the takeover market as a performance-related discipline has changed from the
1980s to the 1990s.
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2.2.2.2 UK Studies
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) examine a sample of 274 UK target firms involved in
takeover bids from 1980 to 1989. They report a CEO post-takeover departure rate of
40.14% in the 12 months after the completion day and of 25.7% in the second year
after the takeover. These are both much higher than the turnover rate prior to
takeovers. In their sample, target firms with CEO turnover in the first two years after
a bid experienced lower returns prior to the takeover than those targets without post-
takeover CEO turnover. This provides some support for the disciplinary function of
takeovers on non-wealth maximizing management.
Franks and Mayer (1996) focus on the disciplining function of hostile takeovers in
the UK over the period 1985 to 1986. Of the 80 hostile bids, a 90% departure rate for
all executives follows 31 UK successful hostile takeovers, and 50% of the directors
resigned after 34 accepted bids. By using four measures of pre-bid financial
performance (share price returns, changes in dividends per share, cash flow rate of
return on assets and Tobin's Q ratio), they find little evidence of poor performance of
target firms prior to bids. Thus, they conclude that hostile takeovers do not perform
the function of disciplining ineffective target management.
Dahya and Powell (1998) investigate the impact that 262 successful hostile and
friendly takeovers have on the rates of top management changes for UK target firms.
The rate of top executive departures is 54.5% in the 12-month post-takeover period
for hostile targets and it is nearly triple that for friendly targets. In addition, all
hostile targets experienced at least one executive change following the first bid,
while only 76% of the friendly targets experienced a director resignation. Following
hostile takeovers, acquiring companies seem to perform a greater degree of
disciplining at all levels compared to friendly takeovers.
Weir and Jones (1999) compare director turnover in 74 acquired UK public limited
companies during the period 1991 to 1994 and 74 matched non-acquired firms. Their
results show that the acquired firms experienced a significantly greater average
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turnover of directors than did the non-acquired firms. Moreover, they find weak
evidence that acquired firms performed poorly prior to takeovers by using after-tax
profit margin.
Some argue that, even among firms that are not taken over, corporate takeover
activities can play a role in the discipline of ineffective management in poorly
performing firms. For instance, Denis and Denis (1995) find that takeover-related
pressures often cause the forced resignation of top management and lead to
improvements in performance. Mikkelson and Partch (1997) compare top
management turnover in unacquired firms in two five-year periods: the active
takeover market of 1984-1988 and the less active market of 1989-1993. They find
that turnover frequency is much higher in the active takeover years than that in the
less active period. Furthermore, they find a significant relation between top
management turnover and firm performance in the period of active takeover.
Moreover, Denis and Kruse (2000) examine the incidence of disciplinary events by
comparing active (1985-1988) and less active (1989-1992) takeover periods. They
document a significant decline in the frequency of nonroutine turnover of top officer
from the active to the less active takeover period (42% to 31%). These results
suggest that takeover activities affect the intensity ofmanagerial discipline.
In summary, there is a relatively large percentage of job losses for target top
management following takeovers in both US and UK target firms. The annual
turnover rates of target top managements are generally higher than the normal (non-
merger-related) rate observed in the literature. Few target CEOs became top
executives in the acquiring firms, and survival rates for target CEOs who remained
within the acquirer are quite low. Some papers even show that the vast majority of
target CEOs who exited the firm did not obtain further employment (Hardford
(2003)).
2.2.2.3 The Shortcomings of Previous Studies
There is some research that examines the impact of M&A on target management
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following takeovers, but previous studies have some shortcomings. Firstly, the
sample sizes in some papers are small. In the study of Walsh (1988), the sample
included 55 takeover cases. Especially, for UK studies, Franks and Mayer (1996)
studied 80 hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986. Weir and Jones (1999) examined 74
target firms between 1991 and 1994. Generally, the small sample might not be
representative.
Secondly, very few papers consider personal details about CEOs and their later
career change following takeovers. Actually, such an investigation would provide
more information about the effect of takeovers on target managers. Also, the intensity
of M&A activities may affect the disciplinary role of takeovers (Mikkelson and
Partch (1997)), but little research has studied the impact ofmerger cycles. As far as
we know, no UK research has been done in these fields.
Thirdly, the research time period in the latest study is the end of the 1990s (Kini et al.
2004) for US studies. For UK studies, the latest research period is the middle of the
1990s, e.g. 1991-1994 in the study of Weir and Jones (1999). The evidence from
some studies (Kini et al. 2004) shows that the disciplinary role of takeovers changes
over time. In particular, the recent M&A wave reached a peak in 2000 and had very
distinctive features. For example, the increasing international transactions face a
much more complex situation than domestic transactions, which may affect the
disciplinary role of takeovers. The study of the corporate control market needs more
up-to-date research, especially for the current role of takeovers in the UK.
Fourth, most papers measure target performance using either capital market returns
or accounting ratios. But different measures provide a different perspective of target
performance. Only one measurement may not present a whole perception of target
performance. For a comprehensive investigation, it is better to employ both
approaches to get a better picture of company performance.
Fifth, the data sources vary in early studies. The series of papers by Walsh (1988,
1989, and 1991) employ surveys to get the information about target managers. The
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use of a survey is still a controversial methodology in financial research. Although
surveys have high coverage and good ease of access, it suffers a low response rate
and high likelihood ofbias. More reliable data sources should be used.
According to the above literature review, there are obvious gaps in UK studies. This
thesis tries to improve these issues later in the empirical study.
2.3 Hypotheses
From the literature, we understand that some factors may be related to CEO turnover.
These factors are divided into four groups: CEO characteristics, target governance
characteristics, deal characteristics and target firm characteristics. In this section, we
review the relation between CEO turnover and these factors, and then develop our
hypotheses.
2.3.1 CEO Characteristics
a i. CEO Age
Hai: The target company's CEO turnover is related to the CEO's age.
The strong relationship between CEO turnover and her/his age is recorded in some
previous studies (Weisbach (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Goyal and Park
(2002)). In general, the experience and reputation of a CEO grows with his/her age.
After the takeover, in particular cross-border M&A, the benefit that a CEO may
bring into the new company might reduce the possibility of the CEO's forced
departure. Harford (2003) examines the effect of takeovers on board directors of US
target firms from 1988 to 1991. He finds a significant positive relationship between
CEO age and the possibility of remaining on the surviving board after takeover. His
results show that an older director has a greater chance of surviving after a takeover
event than a younger director. We suppose that CEOs with richer work experience
are less likely to be replaced. Work experience is positively related to a CEO's age,
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so that the possibility of CEO turnover would negatively relate to a CEO's age.
Hence, CEO age is included as a variable in our analysis.
However, another situation is that CEO turnover may be caused by her/his reaching
retirement age. Then a positive relation between CEO turnover and her/his age exists.
In the study of Mikkelson and Partch (1997) on post-takeover managerial turnover,
pooled logistic regressions show a significant and positive relation between CEO
turnover and CEO age > 59. Goyal and Park (2002) investigate CEO turnover rate by
using a sample of 455 CEO turnovers from 1992 to 1996. In logistic regressions
explaining CEO turnover rate, they find the coefficients on CEO age and the dummy
for CEO ages of 63 to 65 are positive and statistically significant at least at the 1%
level. These results might suggest that the probability of CEO turnover increases
when CEO age is near the normal retirement age.
<12: CEO-Founder
Ha2: The target company's CEO turnover is related to whether the CEO was the
founder of that target firm.
There are some cases in which the CEO of a target firm is the founder of the firm.
After years of development, the organization has achieved a level of complexity and
its larger size may require a change in top management to help their further
expansion. Sometimes, such firms also face the problem of no obvious family
executive succession. Some founding CEOs decide to sell their firms. However,
founding CEOs have a good knowledge of the firm and a specific expertise that
might be valuable to the acquiring firm.
In the study of Denis and Sarin (1999), 13% of CEOs are founders of firms in their
samples. Denis et al. (1997) document the nonroutine top executive turnover in 1,394
US firms over the period of 1985-1988 and 6.1% of top executives are firms'
founders. He finds an insignificant relationship between the probabilities of top
executive turnover and if a top executive is a member of the founding family.
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According to the theory, the relationship between the CEO being a founder and the
probability ofhis/her departure may be positive or negative.
ay. CEO Tenure
Ha?: The target company's CEO turnover is related to the CEO's tenure.
Most previous studies use tenure to measure the years that a CEO had held his
position. A significant relationship between CEO turnover and tenure is documented
in the literature. But the results of studies which relate CEO turnover and tenure to
his/her tenure are mixed.
On the one hand, CEO tenure could affect CEO turnover negatively, since the tenure
of a CEO is usually used in the literature as one of the measures of a CEO's
experience. CEOs with the company longer have detailed knowledge of the nature of
the business. In particular, for the foreign acquiring company, the good knowledge in
both the UK business environment and target business might benefit their need for
integrating the new firm. Therefore, such CEOs are more likely to keep their seat in
the new firm, which suggests that CEO turnover is negatively related to a CEO's
years with the company. Moreover, Salancik and Meindl (1984) argue that CEOs
with longer tenure could have established a power base over time, indicating the
negative relationship between CEO turnover and CEO tenure.
On the other hand, the longer tenure may indicate that a CEO is close to her/his
retirement. CEOs with long tenure may feel more associated with the management
style with the target firms than those with less tenure, so that it is more likely that
they are less satisfied with the new or changed process in the new firm. In such a
case, CEO turnover would be positively related with CEO tenure. Goyal and Park
(2002) test the relation between CEO leadership and CEO turnover rate, and CEO
tenure is included as a control variable. Their logistic analysis shows a strong
positive relation between CEO tenure and CEO turnover at 1% level of statistical
significance. Using a sample of Italian target firms, Brunello et al. (2003) find a
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significant positive effect of CEO tenure on the probability of CEO post-takeover
turnover at the 10% significance level.
However, some studies do not find a significant relation between CEO tenure and
CEO turnover. Denis et al. (1997) examine the rate of nonroutine top executive
turnover in 1,394 US firms. Their logistic models show that CEO tenure is not
significantly negatively related with the probability of CEO turnover. The study of
Harford (2003) shows that "years as director" has a negative impact on the
probability that a director will remain on the surviving board in the new merged firm.
But this regression result is also not statistically significant.
Previous studies show mixed results about the impact of CEO tenure on CEO
turnover. Therefore, we expect either a positive or a negative relationship between
CEO tenure and the probability ofCEO departure.
<24: CEO reputation
Ha4: The target company's CEO turnover is related to the CEO's reputation.
To some extent, the experience and stature of a CEO could be marked by his/her
reputation identified by the number of additional board appointments which he/she
holds. A higher reputation index for a CEO provides his/her expertise as a corporate
leader, which is supported in the literature. Some researchers even use a proxy for the
reputation of directors to characterize the quality of each firm's board. For example,
when directors hold multiple outside directorships, shareholders of target firms
receive a larger premium in tender offers (Cotter et al. (1997)) and acquiring firms
receive relatively higher returns in M&As (Brown and Maloney (1999)). Therefore, a
CEO with a good reputation would be more likely to be retained in the new company.
Shivdasani (1993) studies boards and their role in corporate governance by using the
takeover market during the takeover wave of the 1980s. One of his findings is that
the firm would be less likely to be acquired in a hostile takeover, when outside
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directors have more additional directorships. The interpretation of this finding is that
better management of the company shows a higher quality of directors. These
directors would be asked to be on more boards, which is considered as higher
reputation. These directors even decrease their firm's likelihood of becoming a
takeover target by doing good jobs as directors.
From another popular view, however, the attention a CEO pays to the firm may
reduce with a higher number of additional directorships that the CEO holds in other
companies. By doing a poor job, such CEOs may increase the likelihood that their
firm becomes a takeover target. Thus, the replacement of their job is a predictable
result. This indicates a positive correlation between CEO turnover and CEO
reputation. However, Ferris et al. (2003) do not find any evidence that inadequate
management or poor corporate performances are caused by multiple directorships. In
the study of Kini et al. (2004) on US target firms over the period 1979 to 1998, each
director in the target firm's board held an average 1.05 additional directorships. The
average additional directorship held by all CEOs is 1.34, which is higher than 0.59
for inside directors and 1.11 for outside directors. They study the board reputation,
and their logistic models show no significant relation between board reputation and
post-takeover CEO turnover.
The implications of multiple directorships are still debatable, and the relationship
between CEO reputation and CEO turnover may be positive or negative. We follow
the previous evidence and use the number ofmultiple directorships as a proxy to test
how the reputation of the CEO affects CEO turnover.
2.3.2. Target Governance characteristics:
b\: CEODuality
Hbi: The target company's CEO turnover is related to CEO duality.
Most previous research associates lack of board independence with CEO duality.
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Jensen (1993), and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that internal control systems
fail if the CEO holds the position of Chairman of the board. Following the logic of
corporate control, CEO duality may lead to a lack of board independence. The board
cannot effectively perform its functions that includes monitoring and firing CEOs.
According to Jensen (1993, p866), CEO duality makes it "extremely difficult for the
board to respond early to failure in its top management." Several corporate
governance activists have also held a similar view about the combination of the CEO
and chairman responsibilities (Fama and Jensen (1983), Kini et al. (2004)). In such
cases, takeover may play a role in disciplining the ineffective management of target
firms. Therefore, such CEOs with combined titles are more likely to be removed
after takeovers. This suggests a positive relationship between post-acquisition CEO
turnover and CEO duality. However, the combination of CEO and Chairman may
strengthen the leadership of a target CEO. It may increase the power of CEOs, which
leads to more predominance in the negotiation. They may negotiate for their own
benefit including a job in the new firm. Hence, CEO duality may be negatively
related to post-takeover CEO turnover.
Most previous research studies the relationship between the duality of CEOs and the
internal control mechanism and finds a significant positive effect of CEO duality on
CEO turnover (Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993), Brickley et al. (1997), Goyal
and Park (2002) and Kini et al. (2004)). Goyal and Park (2002) study the relation
between board leadership structure and CEO turnover by using a sample of 455 CEO
turnovers from 1992 to 1996. They find that CEO duality has a significant positive
effect on CEO turnover. Moreover, CEO turnover is significantly less sensitive to
firm performance in firms with combined CEO-Chairman titles than in firms with
separate titles. The likelihood of CEO turnover with separate titles is double that of
those with combined positions, when stock return declines by one standard deviation.
Kini et al. (2004) compare the US takeover market during 1979-1988 and 1989-1998.
They find that a significantly positive relation exists between the likelihood of CEO
turnover and duality for the period 1989 to 1998, while no significant relation is
found for the earlier period. So the sensitivity of CEO turnover to duality is
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significantly different over the two time periods. Moreover, Franks et al. (2001)
examine the corporate control market in the UK from 1988 to 1993. Their pooled
logistic regressions show no evidence that the separation of CEO and Chairman has
an influence on executive board turnover.
However, Hillier et al. (2003) examine forced CEO turnovers in a sample of UK
firms between 1993 and 1998. They find that splitting the function of CEO and
Chairman significantly increases the likelihood of CEO turnover, suggesting a
negative relationship between CEO duality and CEO turnover.
Overall, in the hypothesis of the theory and evidence, the relationship between CEO
duality and the probability ofCEO turnover may be positive or negative.
b?: CEO ownership
Hb2: The target company's CEO turnover is negatively related to the fraction of
company shares owned by the CEO.
The potential conflicts of interests between top management and shareholders are
created by the separation of ownership and control of the firm. Boards with
significant managerial ownership are more likely to align the interests of the two
groups (Core et al. (1999)). Such managers with significant company shareholdings
are more likely to behave in the interests of shareholders (Rosenstein and Wyatt
(1997)). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) argue that shareholders benefit ifmanagers
are encouraged to have firm-specific capital. Furthermore, Franks and Mayer (2001)
suggest that "concentrated ownership may be more effective", when the company is
in the hands of principals than it is with agents. This means that the agency problem
is moderated by the supervision of the CEO holding a high fraction of a company's
shares. This would lead to better performance and even decrease the probability of a
takeover. However, equity ownership can insulate a CEO from the internal
monitoring efforts by increasing her/his power. Managerial ownership is likely to be
correlated with the power of the top executive through the voting control (Denis et al.
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(1997)). Increases in managerial ownership may make it more difficult to remove a
CEO from the company. To the acquiring firm, it will be costly to remove them. This
implies a negative ownership effect on the CEO turnover.
Previous empirical studies show strong evidence of the relationship between CEO
ownership and CEO turnover. Using a sample ofUK firms, Hillier et al. (2003) find
a strong negative relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and CEO
ownership. In addition, Brunello et al. (2003) test a sample of 60 Italian firms over
the period 1988-1996. Their findings show a significant negative relationship
between CEO turnover and CEO ownership. In the study by Kini et al. (2004) of a
sample of US target firms subject to successful tender offers, their logistic
regressions show a significant and negative coefficient on CEO ownership. This
indicates that the likelihood of CEO turnover is low in target firms in which the CEO
owns a large proportion of the firm's shares.
Moreover, Denis et al. (1995, 1997) test the relation between the ownership structure
of target firms and top executive turnover using a sample ofUS firms. They find that
after controlling of poor stock performance, the ownership by officers and directors
is significantly and negatively related to the probability of top executive turnover.
This indicates that greater ownership increases a CEO's ability to retain his/her
position. Mikkelson and Partch (1997) examine managerial turnover in the US
takeover market during 1984 to 1993. They find that directors' and officers' stakes
have a significant and negative relationship with CEO turnover. However, Goyal and
Park (2002) examine CEO turnover amongst a US sample over the period 1992-1996,
and focus on the officers and directors who own above 25% of shares of the company.
They find a non-significant negative effect of ownership on CEO turnover.
According to the theory and evidence, we expect a negative relationship between
CEO ownership and post-takeover CEO turnover.
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by Blockholder ownership
Ift>3: The target company's CEO turnover is negatively related to the percentage
ownership by blockholders.
Some previous studies have documented that the existence of blockholders acts to
discipline the management of poorly performing firms (Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
Denis et al. (1997) and Franks et al. (2001)). In general, blockholders are expected to
align the interests of shareholders and monitor the performance of the CEO. They
adjust inappropriate decisions the CEO makes, which may lead to better performance.
Franks et al. (2001) list the shareholders, in particular large shareholders, as an
important disciplinary mechanism for removing management in poorly performing
companies. Denis et al. (1997) argue that blockholders and institutions that own
amounts of the firm's equity may reduce the degree of entrenchment. Thus,
blockholders may intervene directly and replace ineffective management. Such a
disciplinary function would be more effective when blockholders have a larger
fraction of a company's shares. Thus, the higher the blockholder ownership, the
lower the CEO turnover rate.
However, the evidence on the effect of blockholder ownership on CEO turnover is
mixed. In the takeover market, Kini et al. (2004) find a significant negative
relationship between blockholder ownership and CEO turnover, and such a
relationship is relatively strong in the 1980s when takeover activities were relatively
active. But Brunello et al. (2003) find an insignificant negative impact of the largest
shareholder, and the second largest shareholder on the probability ofCEO turnover in
Italian takeovers. More recent research on the UK capital market by Franks et al.
(2001) tests five disciplinary mechanisms. Their results show that holders of
substantial share blocks exert little discipline. Goyal and Park (2002) find that the
ownership by institutions and by blockholders is insignificantly positively related to
CEO turnover.
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Overall, we expect that the ownership of target firms' blockholders have negative
effect on CEO turnover.
b4. Board size
Hb4: The target company's CEO turnover is positively related to the size of the target
board.
Previous works by Denis et al. (1997), Franks et al. (2001) and Kini et al. (2004)
consider the board as an internal monitoring mechanism. Following Core et al.
(1999), the effectiveness ofmonitoring by the board of directors can be measured by
some characteristics of the board. Previous literature gives us a picture that board
size affects the corporate management. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that
larger boards are less effective at monitoring and disciplining managers, which leads
to the case that the CEO has more influence on a larger board. Hermalin and
Weisbach (2001) suggest that a larger board might make some free-riding problems
worse. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) find that the board size has a
significantly negative effect on Tobin's q, after controlling for other variables that are
likely to affect q. The idea is that agency problems increase with the size of the board.
If the board gets to be too big, the board becomes more symbolic and less effective at
monitoring management. The CEO in such a board is more likely to be removed
following the takeover. Thus, the size of the board of directors is expected to be
associated with the effectiveness of board monitoring.
Based on a sample of US companies, Yermack (1996) and Wu (2000) analyze the
effect of board size on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance.
Both find a significant negative relationship. Their results suggest that firms with
smaller boards have a stronger turnover-performance relation to firms with larger
boards, which is consistent with smaller boards being more effective at monitoring
CEOs than larger boards.
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Moreover, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) compare the US takeover market in a
takeover active period (1984-1988) with a less active period (1989-1993). They find
that the board size decreased slightly in the later period, and the rate of CEO turnover
also reduced from 39.2% to 34.4%. This indicates that takeovers play a disciplinary
role, when a board is relatively weak. However, pooled logic regression results show
no significant relation between board size and CEO turnover of target firms.
On the whole, we expect that the size of target board has a positive relationship with
CEO turnover.
b$: Board composition
Hbs: The target company's CEO turnover is related to the proportion of outsiders in
the board.
Another characteristic of a board is its composition. Core et al. (1999) suggest that a
board's composition could measure the effectiveness of monitoring management.
Outside directors are expected to act in shareholders' interests and monitor the
performance of top management. Although we know little about the incentive of
board directors, some shareholder activists consistently advise that the board should
consist of more outside independent directors. Jensen (1986) suggests that the
takeover market would have less of a role as a disciplinary device, when the board is
dominated by outside directors. More outsider directors may result in more effective
internal control. However, recent popular discussion holds the passive view on
outside directors. Some researchers argue that outside directors may become less
effective as they hold "too many" directorships (Shivdasani (1993), Core et al.
(1999)). In such cases, the internal control is presumably weak. To substitute for less
effective internal discipline exerted by outside directors, the takeover market
provides a source of external discipline.
Some studies research the disciplinary function of outsider directors, but there are
mixed results on the relationship between the composition of the board and CEO
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turnover. Kini et al. (1995) examine the relation between corporate takeovers and the
board of directors as an alternative control mechanism to discipline top management.
They find a significant inverse CEO turnover-performance relation for target firms
with inside-dominated boards of directors, but no significant relation for target firms
with outside-dominated boards. The current study of Kini et al. (2004) finds that the
probability of post-takeover CEO turnover is significantly and negatively related to
the proportion of outside board directors of target firms, indicating that the
probability of CEO turnover is higher when the target board is less dominated by
outside directors.
However, Weisbach (1988) and Denis et al. (1997) do not find a relation between
CEO turnover and performance in firms with outside-dominated boards. Mikkelson
and Partch (1997) compare the active and less active takeover period. Their analysis
uncovers no reliable relation between management turnover and board composition.
By using a sample of UK firms, Franks at al. (2001) find little evidence about the
relationship between CEO turnover and the proportion of nonexecutives on the board
of firms.
In general, our hypothesis is that post-takeover CEO turnover is related to the
proportion of outsiders but their relationship may be positive or negative.
2.3.3 Deal characteristics:
ci: Cross-border/domestic takeover
Hcj: Target companies' CEO turnover rate is likely to be different between domestic
M&As and cross-border M&As.
The literature presents some hypotheses for the cross-border effect. While cross-
border takeovers have many of the same influences and motivations as domestic
takeovers, they present some opportunities that are different from domestic takeovers.
The acquirer benefits from valuable opportunities like increased market
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diversification and favourable government policies (Moeller & Schlingemann
(2005)). Meanwhile, the prospect of takeover by firms in other countries may cause
an increase in the level of competition in the market for corporate control. Some
researchers argue that the possibility of an overseas acquiring firm could lead to an
increase in hubris and agency problems resulting in culture clashes and lower bidder
returns (Roll (1986), Denis et al. (2002), Moeller & Schlingemann (2005)). But some
features of cross-border takeovers may protect current top management from being
removed. In a cross-border deal, the transmission of information becomes more
difficult. Thus, the information asymmetry might make an acquiring firm more
dependent on the management of target firms. Moreover, a less well developed
capital market in the country of the acquiring firm, a different legal system and
cultural differences make cross-border management more difficult. Target firms'
CEOs have good experience in the domestic environment, and their skills and firm-
specific knowledge might match well with the needs of the buyer. Thus, these CEOs
are more likely to be retained after takeovers. Hence, the turnover rate of target
CEOs might be lower in cross-border takeovers than in domestic takeovers. Some
researchers point out that the acquiring firms' intention is often to acquire and
successfully integrate a team of skillful managers (Pitts (1976), Walsh (1988)).
Indeed, the managerial skills of the target firm's CEO may be a key attraction of the
merger.
However, some foreign acquiring firms may strengthen their control of target firms,
so that they prefer using their own managers instead of target CEOs. Harford (2003)
examines the directorship change of board directors after the takeover. In his
regression model, he finds that bids from foreign firms have a significant negative
impact on the survival rate of the board of the new merged firm for both inside and
outside directors. It means that a director has a lower probability of remaining in the
new board after cross-border takeovers than those directors that experienced a
domestic takeover. Therefore, we expect that the CEO turnover rate may be different
following cross-border takeovers than following domestic takeovers.
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o: Legal system difference
Hc2: The target company's CEO turnover rate is likely to be different according to
whether the acquiring firm comes from a country with a non-English common law
system or if it comes from a country with an English common law system which is
the same as the UK.
Cross-border transactions are much more complicated than domestic takeovers
because countries differ in many ways. Countries have different economic, political
and legal systems. A country's politics and law effectively regulate its business
practice. When the economies of countries are at different stages, the education and
skill levels of the populations differ significantly. All these differences can have
major implications for international transactions. With the increase of cross-border
takeovers, legal differences become a very significant issue in international
transactions.
"The legal system of a country refers to the rules, or laws, that regulate behaviour
along with processes by which the laws are enforced and through which redress for
grievances is obtained" . A country's law defines the rights and obligations of those
involved in business transactions, sets up how business transactions are to be
executed, and regulates business practice. Generally, UK target CEOs are more
familiar with the legal system and government of the UK and they might even have
their special network within this society. Therefore, the acquiring firms from
different legal systems are more likely to keep target CEOs and expect them to
manage local businesses and ensure corporate practices adhere to local
environmental regulations.
However, La Porta et al. (2000, 2002) find that the characteristics of corporate
governance vary with the nature of the legal system in the countries they sampled.
Countries with English common law legal origins provide greater investor protection
than other countries. Acquiring firms from English common law system may expect
2 Fred Maidment, "International Business" p49, Mcgraw-Hill
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that target CEOs' experience and knowledge would contribute to the combined
business, so that they are more likely to retain target CEOs for the benefit of their
investors. But those acquirers from countries with non-English common law may not
have such a strong intention, which leads them to dismiss target CEOs. Hence, in
such situations, a positive relationship between post-takeover CEO turnover and
legal differences is expected.
As far as we know, no research has been done on the relation between legal system
differences and post-takeover CEO turnover. This study will examine the impact of
legal differences on the target CEOs following international transactions.
cj: Cultural difference
The considerable importance of cultural effects in international business has long
been acknowledged. Cultural issues have an impact on the cost, profit and risk of
doing business in different countries, so that the operations and strategies of
international companies would have different needs or requirements for their
management. Management processes and practices need to vary according to
culturally determined values. Perhaps the most famous study of how culture relates
to values in the workplace was undertaken by Geert Hofstede (1980). His study is
based on IBM, and this international organization enabled him to compare
dimensions of culture across 40 countries. Hofstede (1980) propose that the national
culture and value can be categorized based on four variables which affect the work
environment and its management.
Hofstede's research has been criticized on a number of points: First, many countries
have more than one culture, but Hofstede's results do not capture the distinction.
Second, the research of Hofstede is based on questions asked of IBM employees, so
the analysis of the answers may have been shaped by their own cultural biases and
concerns. However, Hofstede's index tells us in a very general way about differences
between cultures. Many of Hofstede's findings are consistent with standard Western
stereotypes about culture differences (Hofstede and Hofstede (2005)). Hofstede's
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classification of countries is often used in inter-country comparisons.
(1) Power Distance
Hc3(i)i The turnover rate of target CEOs is likely to be higher if acquiring firms are
from countries with a large power distance, than from countries with a lower power
distance.
Power distance focuses on the degree of social equality, or inequality, between
people within the society of a country, including their relationship with authority. It
indicates the degrees of dependence relationship in a country. In large power distance
countries, superiors and subordinates consider each other as existentially unequal.
There is more dependence of subordinates upon a boss. Subordinates either prefer
such dependence or reject it entirely. Centralization is popular, and the ideal boss is a
benevolent autocrat. Privileges and status symbols for managers are both expected
and popular. Acquiring firms from such large power distance countries would rely
more on the high dependence between the boss and subordinates. This suggests that
the acquiring firm will have a large influence in the new firm. Acquiring firms are
more likely to replace target CEOs with managers from their own firms. In small
power distance situations, subordinates and superiors consider each other as
existentially equal. Hierarchy in an organization means an inequality of roles,
established for convenience. There is limited dependence of subordinates on bosses
and a preference for consultation. Decentralization is popular and the ideal boss is a
resourceful democrat. In such an environment, roles may be changed, and acquiring
firms may "consult" target CEOs more. So target CEOs are more likely to remain in
the new firm.
(2) Individualism vs. Collectivism
Hc3(2>: The turnover rate of target CEOs is likely to be higher if acquiring firms are
from an individualist society than if they are from a collectivist society.
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This dimension looks at the relationship between the individual and the group. In an
individualist culture, organizations are more impersonal and work is organized in
such a way that the self-interest and the employer's interest coincide. The
relationship of employer-employee is a contract which is supposed to be based on
mutual advantage. Management is management of individuals. Hiring and promotion
decisions are supposed to be based on skills and rules only. Acquiring firms from
individualist societies are more likely to classify target CEOs as a qualified or
unqualified manager by their own skills or their contribution to companies. Hence, if
CEOs were considered as ineffective managers, they are more likely to be replaced
by acquiring firms. However, in a collectivist society, the relationship between
employer and employee is perceived in moral terms, like a family link. Relationships
prevail over tasks. Practices are based on loyalty, a sense of duty and group
participation. Management is management of a group. The hiring process and
promotion decisions always take the group into account. In such societies, acquiring
companies would consider target CEOs as part of group. Ethnic and other in-group
differences within the work group play a role in the integration process. As the main
leader of the group, target CEOs have a relatively strong relation with other
managers and workers, which increases their own value in the group. Thus, it often
makes good sense to put people from the same ethnic background into one crew, and
then target CEOs are more likely to be retained in the new firm.
(3) Masculinity vs. Femininity
Hc3(3): The turnover rate of target CEOs may be different according to whether
acquiring firms are from a masculine society or from a feminine society.
This dimension focuses on the degree that a society reinforces, or does not reinforce,
the traditional masculine work role. There is no relationship between the masculinity
or femininity of a society's culture and the distribution of employment over men and
women. In a feminine culture, the dominant values in society are caring for others.
The manager is less visible, and always seeks a consensus. Problems are discussed
by a group and solutions are sought. However, in a highly masculine culture,
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dominant values are material success and progress. Organizations in masculine
societies stress results. The masculine managers are assertive and decisive. Such a
manager is always a sole decision-maker looking for facts rather than a group
discussion. They stress equity, competition and performance. The usual resolution of
conflicts is to fight them out. Compared with those in a feminine society, acquiring
firms from the high masculine culture have strong character and are more likely to
force target CEOs to leave after takeovers. Moreover, target CEOs in high masculine
countries may be more "aggressive" and they may not be willing to serve the
acquiring firms after takeovers. However, acquiring firms from highly masculine
countries stress economic factors rather than welfare factors. Target CEOs have a
special local knowledge and are more familiar with the operation of target firms,
which may benefit the development of the new firm and improve its performance in
the future. In such cases, acquiring firms are more likely to keep target CEOs after
takeover.
(4) Uncertainty Avoidance
Hc3(4): The turnover rate of target CEOs is likely to be higher if acquiring firms are
from a strong uncertainty avoiding society.
This dimension measures the extent to which different cultures encourage their
members to accept ambiguity and tolerate uncertainty. In strong uncertainty avoiding
societies, people consider job security, career patterns, and retirement benefit as very
important issues. There are many formal laws and/or informal rules controlling the
rights and duties of the employee and employer. Many internal rules and regulations
control the work process. To reduce uncertainty in a new firm, acquiring firms in
strong uncertainty avoiding countries may prefer to replace target CEOs. However, in
countries with very weak uncertainty avoidance, rules are only established in cases of
absolute necessity. People work hard only when it is needed, and they are not driven
by an inner urge towards constant activity. The UK is one of the countries in which
internal corporate governance is well developed. Target CEOs in the UK, a strong
uncertainty avoiding society, may be under the stress of their duties and
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responsibility and less likely to be ineffective, which increases their career security.
Thus, target CEOs are more reliable and more likely to be retained in the new firm.
C4: Related/unrelated takeover
HC4: Target companies' CEO turnover rate is likely to be higher following related
M&As than following unrelated M&As.
While it is difficult to predict the relative turnover rates among all types of
acquisition, it is likely that a CEO would face a lower probability of retention in
related takeovers than in unrelated takeovers. In a related M&A, the acquiring firm's
management team is already familiar with a target firms' business. As such, the
acquiring firm can afford to lose many of the target firm's managers. They are more
likely to replace the target CEO with their own manager to act as a liaison between
the technical leadership in the target firm and their own leadership. Moreover, Walsh
(1989) agues that "the acquiring company may feel that they can add value to the
target company by replacing the target's management with their own skilled
managers." However, the retention of the CEO may be crucial for a company when
the acquiring firm is keen to diversify by acquisitions. This should be common in
unrelated acquisitions, when the acquiring firm's management is unfamiliar with the
target company's business. The acquiring firms might be more dependent upon a
target's CEO and they cannot afford to lose the product and market experience of the
target firm's CEO. A CEO's institutional leadership in the target firm would be
helpful to increase the bidder's return. It is likely that the CEO would retain the
target's top management in unrelated takeovers.
Drucker's (1981) predictions of widespread top management turnover may be more
relevant to related acquisitions than unrelated acquisitions. The study ofWalsh (1988)
documents mixed results and does not significantly support the argument that top
management turnover following a related M&A would be higher than the turnover
following unrelated M&As. Walsh (1989) increased his sample and re-examined the
hypothesis. The new results show that the management team turnover rate is 29.95%
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for related M&As and 23.33% for unrelated M&As after the first year. The
management turnover rate in related M&As is higher than that in unrelated M&As in
the third and fourth year after the takeover was completed. But the difference is not
significant.
C5: High-technology
HC5: Target companies' CEO turnover rate is likely to be different between high-tech
M&As and non-high-tech M&As.
High-tech firms always play a critical role in scientific discoveries and promoting
technological advancement. On the one hand, the products of high technology
significantly affect people's daily life and bring high-tech firms great profit. There is
magnificent development of such companies, such as Microsoft. For these high-tech
acquiring firms, takeover is often an effective approach to extend their business or
reduce their cost. On the other hand, the efficiency gains make some high-tech firms
very valuable and become attractive targets. So acquiring firms have been drawn to
technology firms for the productivity gains they can provide and distinctive growth
opportunities they can bring.
From the acquirer's perspective, purchasing a new technology firm can bring more
advantages than trying to develop the technology internally. Due to the special
knowledge of technology and particular management, CEOs of these high-tech firms
would be more likely to be retained in the new firm. However, there are some cases
where CEOs were the owner of a target firm. They may sell their companies to some
bidders that offer a good price. Such CEOs are unlikely to stay in the new firm after
takeovers.
As we know, no research has been done on the effect of high-tech takeovers on target
CEOs following M&As. In this study, we will distinguish the high-tech takeovers
from non-high-tech takeovers and study their impact.
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C(,: Payment
Hc6: The target company's CEO turnover rate is likely to be higher following cash
payment than following stock payment.
Amihub et al. (1990) and Martin (1996) suggest that managers of acquiring firms
avoid issuing stock that dilutes their ownership and increases the risk of them losing
control. So they prefer cash payment. In such cases, the CEO of the target firm is
more likely to be removed. Moreover, if it knows that the value of the target firm is
less than the value of the cash offer, the target has an incentive to accept a cash offer.
When the acquiring firm discovers that the target's value is not what it expected, the
target's CEO is likely to depart (Walsh, 1989).
Hansen (1987) argues that a target company will prefer a stock transaction when its
assets are of high value. A perception of a high-quality manager may contribute to
the high valuation of these assets. As a result, one expects a lower CEO turnover rate
following a stock deal. Moreover, Ghosh and Ruland (1998) suggest that the method
of payment is determined by the target managers' preference for influence in the
combined firm. In general, CEOs of target firms have considerable bargaining power
in takeover negotiations. They can use their power to negotiate favourable terms, so
that the link between the motivation to obtain influence in the combined firm, the
method of payment, and their job retention exists. Previous studies show high
management turnover following takeovers. Ownership in the combined firm after
acquisitions, however, provides a form of unemployment insurance. When the target
is acquired for stock, the CEO who owned the target firms' shares becomes
influential in the combined firm. Thus, the CEO who desires to retain and have
her/his influence in the combined firm will negotiate for stock and discourage cash
offers. Therefore, one of determinants of payment is the CEO motivation to obtain
influence in the combined firm after the takeover.
We expect that a CEO who desires continued employment would not be indifferent
to the method of payment. In particular, a CEO who desires to retain his/her job will
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negotiate for stock and discourage cash offers.
Walsh (1989) investigates the relation between the payment and the turnover rate of
target top management. In the first year following takeovers, the turnover rate of top
management with stock payment is higher than that with cash payment. But the
situation is reversed in the second and third year after takeover. In particular, Ghosh
and Ruland (1998) determine the relation between the method of payment for
acquisitions, managerial ownership and executive job retention. They find that the
managers of target firms are more likely to retain their jobs in combined firms when
they receive stock rather than cash. Managers were found to lose their jobs following
payment with stock in only 10% of the acquisitions.
Cj: Multiple bidders
HC7: The target company's CEO turnover rate is likely to be different following
multiple bidders than following a single bidder.
Walsh (1989) argues that the existence of multiple bidders might show a consensus
view of the target CEO's inefficiency, and so the possibility of CEO turnover would
be higher when there are multiple bidders than when a CEO faces only one bidder.
Following the logic of the corporate control market, if more than one buyer has
recognized an inefficient management team, and expressed some interest in buying
the target, and that target is eventually purchased, it is expected that the turnover rate
among those managers will be higher than the turnover rate in a target company that
has been subject to the M&As interest from one bidder.
However, when a target firm has a high threat of takeover, multiple bidders may play
the role of a "white knight". In such an instance, the competition of bidders may
make the CEO use her/his power to negotiate a high price and other personal benefits.
Hence, the takeover pressure might be reduced for the CEO. Meanwhile, a CEO who
desires to remain may accept an offer from the acquiring firm that gives her/him a
job guarantee in the combined firm. So the auction may lead to a lower CEO
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turnover rate.
Walsh (1989) tests the hypotheses that firms having higher target management
turnover rate had experienced previous merger or acquisition interest. He finds that
in the first year following takeovers, top manager turnover rate of targets with
previous takeover interest is lower than targets without previous takeover interest.
But the situation is reversed two years after takeovers. In a study by Harford (2003),
the relation between multiple bidders and inside director retention was tested. The
results show that auctions have an insignificant negative effect on the probability of
inside director retention on the surviving board after takeovers.
eg: Attitude
Hcg: The target company's CEO turnover rate is higher following hostile takeovers
than following friendly takeovers.
During the process of a negotiation, the negotiations can be characterized as friendly
or hostile. Takeovers, especially hostile takeovers, are an important method of
removing the inefficient management, although some argue that takeovers are a poor
form of corporate governance. Some researchers argue that hostile takeovers create
gains from replacing incumbent management, and friendly takeovers generate gains
from strategies (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988, 1989), Schwert (2000)). Hostile
takeovers, in particular, serve as a useful external control mechanism for correcting
target management failures (Martin and McConnell (1991), Ikenberry and
Lakonishok (1993), Dahya and Powerll (1998)). A CEO of a target firm that
expresses open hostility at the prospect of a takeover is unlikely to remain in the
combined firm after the takeover. In contrast, a friendly takeover is often seen as
creating synergies that make both the target firm and bidding firm better off. In order
to increase returns to the acquiring firm, the CEO of the target firm may be retained
for her/his managerial skills or other benefit to the combined firm. Due to the
discipline function, we expect that CEO turnovers would more likely take place after
hostile takeovers.
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Several papers document that target management turnover increases following
hostile takeovers. This suggests that hostile takeovers are more disciplinary than all
friendly takeovers. Walsh's (1989) tests of US target firms show management
turnover rate after hostile takeover is significantly higher than that after friendly
takeovers. Hostile takeovers lead to 44.5% ofmanagement turnover, which is double
the 24.49% turnover rate after friendly takeovers in the first year after the completion
of M&As. Such a relationship continued until five years after the takeover. Martin
and McConnell (1991) find similar results that hostile takeovers are associated with a
greater degree of both top executive and top team forced departure rates compared to
that of friendly takeovers.
Franks and Mayer (1996) examine hostile takeovers in the UK in 1985 and 1986.
They find a forced restructuring of the target board following successful hostile
takeovers, which led to 88% of inside directors resigning after the successful hostile
takeover. Dahya and Powell (1998) investigate the UK takeover market from 1989 to
1992. They find that top managers are unlikely to remain in the target company
following a hostile negotiation. In their sample, 19% experienced a change in top
executives following successful hostile takeovers, while 15% of top executives are
turned over after successful friendly takeovers. In addition, in the more recent studies
of Harford (2003) and Kini et al (2004), evidence is found of a significant effect of
hostile takeover on the post-takeover CEO turnover.
Cy: Premium
HC9: The target company's CEO turnover rate is likely to be higher following higher
premium paid for the target company.
To acquire a firm, an acquiring firm pays a premium over the average market value
of the target company's stock. The premium can be a small percentage of the
"normal" value of the target firm or can sometimes be more than the "normal" value.
If an acquiring firm pays a high premium for a target company, the target should
have been much undervalued. Acquiring firms may be confident that the combined
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firm could create high returns. Following the corporate control logic, some
researchers argue that the target's top managers are ineffective or incompetent in
such cases (Oviatt (1988), Walsh (1989)). As a consequence, target CEO turnover is
likely to be high. Another case is that a high premium may be the result of
negotiation. CEOs may negotiate a high premium for their own benefit, especially
when they own a large proportion of target shares. Acquiring firms have to pay high
premium for target shares owned by target CEOs. The payment of a high premium to
managers who typically have some equity in the company might be a way of
"buying-out" entrenched managers. In such an instance, a higher CEO turnover rate
follows higher premium.
Walsh (1989) investigates the relation between management turnover rates and
premium. In the first year after takeovers, higher turnover rates follow higher
premium payments in takeovers. However, the study by Martin and McConnell
(1991) doesn't show a significantly different premium between targets with and
without top manager turnover. Their results show that higher premiums are not
associated with high levels of top managerial changes. Moreover, Franks and Mayer
(1996) examine hostile takeovers in the UK. Their results show that bid premium for
targets with top managers' departure is 25.23%, which is almost the same as those
without control change (25.25%). This suggests that the level of bid premium has no
significant influence on target managers' turnover.
In our study, we would like to test the effect of the premium on CEO turnover in the
recent UK M&A wave.
2.3.4 Target firm characteristics:
di: Size differential rate
Hdi: Target company CEO turnover rates are related to size difference between the
acquiring and target companies.
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The size of the target relative to the size of the acquiring firm affects the CEO's job
and even his/her expected influence in the combined company. After the takeover,
the CEO in the target company may be less skilled when managing in a larger
operational context. A very large company is likely to have more skilled managers on
hand than a small company, so that it is relatively easy for it to replace a CEO in a
smaller acquired company. We expect that the possibility of CEO turnover might
increase as the relative size difference between the acquirer and target increases.
However, if the target firm and the acquiring firm are of a similar size, they may
have similar management resources. So the acquiring firm is more confident in
replacing the target CEO with their own managers. In such a case, the probability of
post-takeover CEO turnover is negative related to the size difference between the
acquirer and the target.
Some previous studies show that the target management turnover rate differs
between small and large target firms. Warner et al. (1988) find the relation between
target management turnover and performance differs between larger and smaller
target firms. In the study of the takeover market by Walsh (1989), the impact of asset
size difference on the top management turnover rate is modest. The turnover rate
associated with a bigger size difference is slightly higher than that associated with a
smaller size difference two years after takeovers: 40.11% vs. 38.78% respectively.
Denis et al. (1997) investigate top executive turnover in 1,394 US firms over the
period 1985-1988. They find that a significant negative relationship exists between
the logarithms ofbook value of target total assets and the probability of top executive
turnover. The relationship between performance and turnover has some modest
differences between small and large firms.
d2'. Pre-takeoverperformance
Hd2: A target company's post-acquisition CEO turnover rate is likely to be high, if
the target has a low pre-takeover performance.
One of the most socially acceptable motivations for M&A is to discipline entrenched
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and inefficient top managers. If top managers engage in self-interested behaviour,
their company's performance would diverge from its maximum potential. This
underperformance is usually reflected in the stock value of the company and account
ratios. In a series of papers (Asquith (1983), Bartley and Boardman (1986),
Hasbrouck (1985)), the incompetence of managers is revealed through a series of
decisions that adversely affected their company's performance. In such cases, the
"external market for corporate control" is likely to offer the shareholders other
management teams as alternatives to the incumbent management. Jarrell et al. (1988)
argues that the "market for corporate control" is the competition among these
management teams. As a consequence, the acquiring firm will be able to replace
inefficient managers and put a target's assets to better use. Takeovers occur in part to
replace managers who are not maximizing shareholder wealth. Thus, the negative
relationship between target CEO turnover and pre-takeover performance is expected.
In studies by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Warner et al. (1988), top
management turnover is found to be inversely associated with the previous market-
related performance of the firm. Further, Weisbach (1988) examines the cross-
sectional differences between performance and turnover, and finds a strong negative
relation between performance and CEO turnover.
Martin and McConnell (1991) examine the role of the US takeover market as an
external source of performance-related discipline over top management. The results
show that CEO turnover after takeovers is inversely related to pre-acquisition
performance. Denis et al. (1997) investigate top executive turnover in US firms and
find a significant negative relationship between pre-takeover performance and top
executive turnover. When they consider the influence ofmanagerial ownership on the
performance-turnover relation, the results suggest that managerial ownership has a
significant impact on the sensitivity of turnover to performance. Furthermore, in the
study by Harford (2003) on board seat change of directors following takeovers, he
finds that the target pre-bid operating performance has a significant positive impact
on the probability that an inside director remains on the surviving board.
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Franks et al. (2001) examine how UK capital markets discipline management from
1990 to 1992. They find a high level of board turnover in poorly performing firms.
CEO turnover is much higher, compared with other board members. Regression
results show a strong negative relationship between board turnover for four out of
five measures of firm performance. However, the early study of Franks and Mayer
(1996) finds no significant evidence of a relation between executive turnover
following a takeover and target pre-acquisition performance, when investigating UK
hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986.
(13: Pre-takeover leverage
Hds: A target company's post-acquisition CEO turnover rate is likely to be high, if
the target firm has a high level of capital leverage.
In addition to the threat of a takeover, there is still a degree of disciplinary pressure
on the CEO. Jensen (1989) suggests that new loans or the restructuring of existing
loans may make give creditors a relatively greater motivation for monitoring the
management. Jensen (1993) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that contractual
commitments to debt-holders place external pressure on managers. These creditors
play a role to monitor target CEOs. Franks et al. (2001) suggest that board turnover
may be particularly high in a company where high leverage is combined with poor
performance.
In a study of the modern industrial revolution and internal control systems, Jensen
(1993) suggests that ineffective managers have to face external pressure from
debtholders, which produces corporate control market competition. Gilson and
Vetsuypens (1993) study 77 US listed firms that filed for bankrupt or privately
restructured their debt to avoid bankruptcy from 1981 to 1987. Almost one-third of
the CEOs in their sample were replaced. Their results indicate that the incumbent
management has large personal loss when their companies are in financial distress.
Mikkelson and Partch (1997) examine management turnover of 240 US target firms
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in takeovers that occurred in the period 1984 to 1993. Their results show that the
ratio of liabilities to assets is significantly and positively related to CEO turnover in
their sample. Franks et al. (2001) list the high leverage, combined with poor
performance, as one disciplinary mechanism. They find that leverage increases as
performance decreases in their sample of 243 firms. CEO turnover is higher in poor-
performing companies in the highest quartile of capital leverage than those in the
lowest quartile of capital leverage: 69.6% vs. 24.2% respectively. The regressions
results show a significant relation between high leverage and executive board
turnover. Hence, we expect that the CEO turnover might be likely higher when the
target firm has high leverage.
Overall, our hypotheses on relationships between target CEO turnover and various
determinants are summarized in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Summary of Determinants





























Whether CEO was the founder of the
target firm.
The years since CEO joined target firm
The number of additional board
appointments held by CEO
CEO is also the Chairman of the board
prior to the takeover announcement
The proportion of shares owned by CEO
The percentage of equity owned by
blockholders
The number of directors in the board of
the target firm
The proportion of non-executive
directors in the board
Whether the target was taken or acquired
by foreign firm
Whether acquirers were from countries



















Whether the acquirer and target firm in
the M&A are related
Whether the takeover occurred in high¬
tech industries
Whether the payment is stock, cash or a
combination of cash and stock
Whether multiple bidders emerged (an
auction)
Whether the contest was classified as
hostile or friendly
The premium paid for the target firm
The logarithms of the ratios of the asset
of the target to the asset of the acquiring
firm
The accounting performance of target
firm, such as average IAROA, IAROE
and IACFM over year (-4,-1), (-3,-1), (-
2,-1).
Average accumulative abnormal returns
over period (-38, -3), (-26,-3), (-14, -3)
month to the announcement month
The ratio ofNet debt / total assets and








































PWC: PriceWaterHouse Cooperate Register
SDC: Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Global Mergers and Acquisitions database
52
2.4 Summary
Although there are many motivations for mergers and acquisitions, some argue that
one motive is to remove ineffective target management and such takeovers play the
role of "a court of last resort" (Jensen (1986)). Special features of the fourth M&A
wave make this issue more interesting. Unlike other research, this study investigates
UK target CEO turnover following takeovers from 1998 to 2002 and considers the
characteristics of this period.
This chapter provides a brief review of the theory of corporate governance in the
context of takeovers. The literature on CEO turnover has been reviewed for both the
US and UK takeover markets. There are some shortcomings in previous studies, such
as a very small sample, the ignorance of CEO personal characteristics and the post-
takeover career change, only one aspect of the firm performance measurements, a
controversial methodology, and a lack of the up-to-date research and so on. These
gaps in the literature encourage us to improve the research in this field in later tests.
Moreover, the literature suggests that some factors may be related to CEO turnover.
Based on previous studies, we develop hypotheses about the relationship between
target post-takeover CEO turnover and various potential determinants. Later
empirical tests will examine and identify determinants that significantly affect CEO
turnover following takeovers.
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Chapter 3 The Post-takeover Turnover of Target CEOs:
A Comparison between Cross-border and Domestic Takeovers
3.1 Introduction:
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are generally considered as a means of
disciplining managers who are not maximizing shareholder wealth (Jensen 1988,
Denis and Denis 1995). Important value can be created from corporate takeovers
following the replacement of ineffective target management. Consistent with this
view, many studies find that target management turnover increases following
completed takeovers and more often so in the case of underperforming targets
(Martin and McConnell 1991, Mikkelson and Partch 1997).
The recent wave is the most important in value and numbers with over 20,000 deals
worth more than 2 trillion US dollar in 2000 alone. In the UK, Sudarsanam (2003)
reports some 2,675 deals with a value of £260 billion in 2000. The recent M&A
wave had very distinctive features and the dominant environment in the takeover
market was very friendly. Evidence shows that hostile takeovers were common in the
1980s (Franks and Mayer (1996)), whilst they were much less so in the late 1990s
(Kini et al. (2004)). One might then expect that the disciplining effect of M&A on
corporate management has changed. As far as we know, no research has been done
in this field for the UK takeover market. By using the most recent data available, this
study attempts to answer the questions: to which extent do recent takeovers still serve
as the last court of disciplining the ineffective target managers and does the pre-
takeover performance of target firms have significant effects on target CEO turnover.
A distinctive feature of the more recent M&A wave is the exponential growth of
international transactions since the late 1990s. According to Financial Securities
Data's Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum™ Worldwide Mergers &
Acquisitions Database, international deals account for one-third of the total value of
the M&A market. Cross-border deals often differ from domestic deals. Cross-border
deals allow firms to grow by opening up new markets, to acquire new technology to
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better compete and to follow their clients as they too become more international.
Cross-border deals, however, are very challenging given the lack of experience in
these new markets and the complex integration of firms with different cultural
backgrounds. Therefore, the impact of a cross-border deal on managerial turnover
may differ from that of a domestic deal and so we distinguish between the impact of
domestic and cross-border takeovers on CEO turnover.
Another feature of recent years is the increased focus on improving internal
corporate governance mechanisms in order to maximise firm value. The UK with its
Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report (1998), Turnbull
(1999) and Higgs Report (2003) has led the way. We look at the interaction between
target CEO turnover in the UK takeover market and suggested internal corporate
governance mechanisms such as board characteristics (duality, board size and
outsiders), CEO ownership and blockholders ownership and examine if weaker
governance leads to greater turnover.
We also identify other potential determinants of CEO turnover and compare them in
the different context of domestic and cross-border takeovers. These additional factors
are the CEO's personal characteristics, target governance characteristics, the deal
characteristics and target firm characteristics.
Our study provides an up-to-date perspective on the mixed evidence on the
disciplining role of the takeover market. Our sample consists of 217 successful
domestic and cross-border corporate takeovers of UK targets over the period from
1998 to 2002. We find that domestic deals and cross-border deals turn out to be
similar. Cross-border deals are slightly smaller and are more often paid for by cash.
Nevertheless, both univariate and multivariate results show a significant negative
relation between cross-border takeovers and post-takeover CEO turnover. The local
CEO's experience and knowledge of the business and the environment appear to be
valuable to foreign acquirers. Further, an insight into cultural differences is provided
by using four different dimensions of Hofstede's index. We find a significant
negative relationship between masculinity and the probability of post-takeover target
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CEO turnover, which indicates that the advantage of target CEOs may be more
valued by acquiring firms from high masculine countries. In addition, a CEOs'
tenure, reputation, duality and being the target founder increase their chance of being
retained in the new firm.
Using both accounting and market-based performance measures, we find that the
probability of the post-takeover CEO turnover is inversely related to target pre-
takeover perfonnance. Our results are consistent with the findings of Martin and
McConnell (1991), and Denis et al. (1997) who examine the management turnover-
performance relation in US takeovers. They find a significant negative relation
between management turnover and performance. Moreover, there is no evidence in
our study that better target governance such as greater blockholder ownership and a
greater proportion of non-executives leads to a lower probability of CEO turnover.
This suggests that takeovers play a disciplinary role in the more recent M&A wave
and act as a court of last resort when other governance mechanisms are weak, as
suggested by Kini et al. (2004).
Some deal characteristics are related to CEO turnover in the whole sample. We find
that CEOs are more likely to be retained in the new firm if payment by stock is
employed in the M&A deals. Moreover, similar to most previous studies, there is a
significant positive relation between hostile takeovers and post-takeover CEO
turnover in the whole sample, indicating that hostile takeovers still play an important
disciplinary role, although friendly takeovers are dominant in recent M&A activities.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the data and
methodology. Univariate tests results are presented in section 3.3. Also, we examine
the relation between CEO turnover and target firm pre-takeover performance and
leverage. Further, CEO turnover rates are examined for extreme quartiles of target
firms' performances and target leverage. In section 3.4, we study the determinants of
CEO turnover in a multivariate context. Section 3.5 shows robustness tests and
section 3,6 comprises the conclusion to this chapter.
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3.2 Data and Methodology
In this section, we describe the collection of the sample and the procedures for
documenting CEO turnover subsequent to the takeover. We also track departed CEOs
and document the career change of these CEOs after takeovers. Moreover, we
describe four types of determinants of post-takeover CEO turnover, including CEO
personal characteristics, target pre-takeover governance characteristics, deal
characteristics and target firms characteristics.
3.2.1 Data
The sample used in this chapter consists only of completed M&As in which one
public company (either foreign or UK domestic acquiring company) took over one
UK public company and the initial announcement date was between 1st January 1998
and 31st December 2002 in the UK (during the fourth M&A wave). This M&A wave
is generally considered to have started at the beginning of the 1990s. But there is a
lack of historical information about target firms, especially information about CEOs
before 1998. In addition, we trace the career change of target CEOs for two years
after each takeover announcement. So the test window starts from 1998 and ends in
2002. The primary source for identifying individual deals is the Securities Data
Corporation's (SDC) Global Mergers and Acquisitions database.
The sample is screened to include only completed M&A deals and the form of
transactions which are merger, acquisition, or acquisition of majority interest. After
the takeover, the acquirer must own 50%-100% of common shares of the target firm.
To be included in the sample, the transaction value must exceed one million US
dollars. The resulting list comprised 352 deals. Our data-screening criteria are similar
to those in Martin and McConnell (1991) and Kini et al. (2004), with the exception
that we require the availability of information about CEOs and the boards of target
firms.
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To be included in the sample, companies were required to be quoted on the London
Stock Exchange throughout the takeover process, which allows us to collect data on
their performance and relatively completed information about their CEOs. In order to
track CEOs who may remain in acquiring firms, we selected public target companies
taken over by public acquiring companies. However, for 122 takeovers, we lacked
information on CEOs and target broads. As this information is crucial for our
subsequent test, we had to drop these cases. Afterwards, there are 230 observations
in our sample.
In order to have a more accurate data analysis, we removed outliers and transformed
data in our sample. Kinnear and Gray (2000) suggest that it is better to have statistics
that describe 95% of the data well than 100% of them badly. Due to data errors and
"rare event syndrome", we deleted 13 observations which, for any variable, have a
value more than four standard deviations above or below the mean. Thus, our final
sample includes 217 takeovers completed M&As announced during the period from
1st January 1998 to 31st December 2002.
Moreover, in order to improve model fit, we transformed variables of target firms'
pre-takeover performance and leverage as following:
X" =log(l +X), if X>0
X - -log(l -X), if X < 0
Both ofXhad highly skewed distribution.
3.2.2 Methodology:
We test determinants of post-takeover CEO turnover by using logistic regression, as
logistic regression is more tolerant of the inclusion of qualitative variables such as
gender (Kinnear & Gray (2000)). The logistic model in our study is:
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the age of the target CEO
an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the target CEO was a founder of
the target firm, and is 0 otherwise
the years since CEO joined the target firm
the number of additional board appointments held by CEO
an indicator that is 1 for a firm where the CEO is also the chairman of
the board prior to the takeover announcement, and is 0 otherwise
the proportion of shares owned by CEO
the percentage of equity owned by blockholders
the number of directors in the board of the target firm
the proportion of non-executive directors in the board
an indicator that is 1 if the "acquirer nation code" of an acquiring firm
in SDC is not UK, and is 0 otherwise
an indicator that is 1 when the target and acquiring firms have same
four or three-digit SIC, and is 0 otherwise
an indicator that is 1 for firms involved in high-tech industries, and is 0
otherwise
an indicator that is 1 for the big cultural difference between acquiring
countries and target countries according to Hofstede's composite index,
and is 0 otherwise
an indicator that is 1 if the acquiring firm was from a non-English
common-law country, and is 0 otherwise
an indicator that is 1 if the acquiring firm paid the deal by stock, and is
0 otherwise
an indictor that takes a value of 1 if more than one bidder had an
interest in the target firm, is 0 otherwise
an indictor that is 1 if the takeover is a hostile takeover, and is 0
otherwise
the premium paid for the target firm
the logarithms of the ratios of the asset of the target to the asset of the
acquiring firm
the industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA)
the ratio of total debt to total asset
the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return
t: As there is a high correlation between legal differences and cultural differences, so we put only
one of such variables in each regression.
3 We assign code numbers to the two categories: to those target firms with post-takeover CEO
turnover, we assign Pf= 1; and to those without post-takeover CEO turnover, we assign P,=0.
59
3.2.3 Sample description
The annual distribution of takeovers in the sample is presented in Table 3.1. We
classify a transaction as a domestic takeover if the acquiring firm's "Acquirers
Nation Code" in SDC is the UK. Otherwise, the transaction is a cross-border
takeover. Both M&As' deal numbers and deal values kept growing in the 1990s and
reached a peak in 2000. Nearly one-third of the M&As took place in 2000, followed
by a decrease towards the end of our sample period. Similar phenomena are also
found in the total value and the average value of transactions. The total value of
transactions reached $156,029 million in 2000, which is about 7 times the total value
of 2002 ($21,269mil) and about 3 times the total value of 1998 ($50,318mil) or of
2001 ($46,987mil).
In subsequent tests, we divide the sample into two subsamples: domestic takeovers
and cross-border takeovers. In the sample, 67 takeovers are cross-border transactions,
which is about one-third of the whole sample. The country of origin of the various
foreign acquirers is in Table 3.2, which shows that acquiring firms came from 15
different countries. Of 67 international transactions, 23 acquiring firms are US
companies, which is more than one-third of total foreign acquirers. 8, 6 and 5
acquiring firms were from France, Republic of Ireland and Germany, respectively.
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Table 3.2
Country classifications of 67 Target Firms in Cross-border Takeovers
According to "Acquirer Nation Code" in SDC, 67 foreign













South Africa 3 4.48%
Sweden 1 1.49%
Switzerland 3 4.48%
United States 23 34.33%
Total 67 100%
3.2.4 The Impact of Takeovers on target CEOs
• CEO Turnover
This study focuses on the turnover of CEOs because the CEO is the person in the
company who is responsible for the main policy decisions of the company. The first
task was to identify the CEO at the time ofmerger or acquisition of each of the target
companies in our sample. The names of the target CEOs were found in
PriceWaterHouseCoopers Corporate Register, Directory ofDirectors and Thomson
OneBanker for the month related to the announcement month of the takeover. If no
person in particular was named as the CEO in the target firm, we identify "Managing
Director" playing the same role as the CEO of the company, following Kenney and
Limmack (1996). Then we examine CEO turnover by attempting to find the CEO's
name in the following annual report of the acquirer and by tracking press releases.
CEO turnover is defined as the CEO leaving after the takeover announcement. We
consider three time periods during which the CEO may depart. These are Year 0 (the
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calendar year in which the takeover announcement was made), Year +1 (one year
after the year of the announcement) and Year +2 (two years after the year of the
announcement).
Table 3.3
Summary and Comparison on CEO Turnover for Target Firms in Domestic
and Cross-border Takeovers
CEO post-tumover is an indicator variable that is 1 for the firms with CEO turnover over
three time periods Year 0 ,Year +1, Year +2 following the announcement of the takeover, and
is 0 otherwise. Panel A documents the cumulative turnover for Year 0, Year (0, +1), and Year
(0, +2), while panel B reports the annual turnover for each year after the takeover
announcement. The t-statistics and p-value are reported to test for differences in CEO post-
tumover rate between the samples of domestic and cross-border takeovers.
Time Domestic takeovers Cross-border
period All sample (N=217) (N=150) takeovers (N=67)
relative Number Number Number
to ofCEO % CEO of CEO % CEO ofCEO % CEO
takeover Turnovers turnover Turnovers turnover Turnovers turnover Chi2 {p-val)
Panel A Cumulative turnover
Year 0 105 48.39% 76 50.67% 29 43.28% 1.011 (0.32)
Year +1 133 61.29% 98 65.33% 35 52.24% 3.347* (0.07)
Year +2 146 67.28% 104 69.33% 42 62.69% 0.929 (0.34)
Panel B Annual turnover
Year 0 105 48.39% 76 50.67% 29 43.28% 1.011 (0.32)
Year +1 28 12.90% 22 14.67% 6 8.96% 1.344 (0.25)
Year +2 13 5.99% 6 4.00% 7 10.45% 3.419* (0.06)
*** indicatesp<0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10
Table 3.3 documents a summary of CEO turnover rates after the takeover
announcement. Panel A reports the cumulative CEO turnover rate for three time
periods. For the full sample, 48.39% of CEOs left target firms shortly after the
announcement of takeovers, which is similar to 41.9% reported by Kennedy and
Limmack (1996) for UK takeovers between 1980 and 1989. But it is much less than
the 88% of inside directors that resigned after hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986 in
the study of Franks and Mayer (1996). After two years, the cumulative CEO
departure rate increases to 67.28% in the full sample. Panel B reports the annual
CEO turnover rates. Most CEOs left target firms by the end of the year of the
announcement. The annual turnover rate decreased in the following two years, which
was 12.90% in the first post-takeover year and 5.99% in the second post-takeover
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year. These results are similar to those found in the literature. In the US, Hartzell et al.
(2004) show retention of CEO's as executives at 57% shortly after and down to 34%
by the end ofYear 1. Martin and McConnell (1991) find a 41.9% turnover after Year
1. Bhagat and Jeffris (2002) find that the turnover of the top officers varies between
50% and 64 % after two years. Walsh (1988) reports a turnover rate of 59% five
years after the deals. In the UK, Franks and Mayer (1996) find a 50% turnover of
inside directors in the first two years. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) report a CEO
turnover rate of 40.1% and 65.8% after one and two years, respectively. Dahya and
Powell (1998) show that 47% of top executives depart within one year.
For domestic takeovers, 50.67% of CEOs departed target firms, while only 43.28%
of CEOs left by the end of the year of the announcement in cross-border takeovers.
After one year of the takeover announcement, 65.33% of CEOs departed from target
firms following domestic takeovers, while only 52.24% of CEOs left after cross-
border takeovers.
The difference is statistically significant and is consistent with our hypothesis that
CEOs are more likely to remain after cross-border takeovers, indicating that the
special experience of the target business and the knowledge of local culture secured
their jobs in their new firms. Generally, the annual CEO turnover rate reported in
Panel B declined in the following two years subsequent to takeover. A significant
difference of post-takeover CEO turnover is found between domestic and cross-
border takeovers in the second year after the takeover announcement. In the second
year after the takeover announcement, there was a 10.45% CEO turnover rate
following cross-border takeovers, while only 4% of CEOs left after domestic
takeovers. This shows that more CEOs left two years after cross-border takeovers
than domestic takeovers. This may be caused by the completion of integration or
integration difficulties following takeovers.
• Career Changes ofCEOs
We investigate the post-takeover career change of the CEO. According to Fama's
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(1980) ex post settling-up hypothesis, the directorial labour market would penalize
such CEOs by reducing their directorships following discipline takeovers, as they put
their own welfare above that of shareholders of target firms. It would be hard for
target CEOs who departed after takeovers to find a new director position in another
company. However, CEOs who were retained in the new company could keep their
directorships, as their experience and special knowledge may match requirements of
the acquiring firms. Acquirers would take such CEOs' advantages and make them
contribute to the integration and further success of the new firm.
Table 3.4
Frequency Distribution for Departures and Retentions of CEOs
This table reports that distribution of CEO departures and retentions two years after takeover
announcements, and compares domestics and cross-border takeovers. Panel A documents
146 CEO departures and Panel B reports 71 CEO retentions in new firms after takeovers.
Cross-border
All sample Domestic takeover takeover
%of %of %of
Number sample Number sample Number sample
Panel A. 146 departures ofCEOs
Retirement 5 3.42% 5 4.81% 0 0.00%
Resignation'" 23 15.75% 16 15.38% 7 16.67%
Departure to join other firm 76 52.05% 55 52.88% 21 50.00%
Death/Illness 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Fired, poor performance cited 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
No reason given 42 28.77% 28 26.92% 14 33.33%
Total 146 100.00% 104 100.00% 42 100.00%
Panel B. 71 retentions ofCEOs
Retained on other position in
the new firm 6 8.45% 5 10.87% 1 4.00%
Promoted*** 9 12.68% 1 2.17% 8 32.00%
Remained as CEO 37 52.11% 25 54.35% 12 48.00%
Joined the acquirer's board 19 26.76% 15 32.61% 4 16.00%
Total 71 100.00% 46 100.00% 25 100.00%
(": no evidence is found to suggest that CEO joined another company
*** indicates /?<0.01, when we compare the difference of the promoted CEOs between following
domestic takeovers and following cross-border takeovers.
Although the data in the table was measured as accurately as possible from the available data sources,
it is likely that certain reasons for departure were not accurately recorded in the data sources used.
We tracked the careers of target CEOs for two years after takeovers. Table 3.4 reports
the distribution of both departures and retentions of CEOs two years after each
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takeover announcement. Out of the departed 146 CEOs in all samples, 3.42% of
CEOs retired and 15.75% ofCEOs resigned after takeovers. After leaving their target
firms, 52.05% of CEOs found new positions in another firm. Thus, the directorial
labour market did not totally negatively react to these departed CEOs. Out of the
remaining 71 CEOs, 52.11% were retained as CEOs in the new firm and 26.76% of
them joined the acquiring firms' board. A small number of the target CEOs played
top leadership roles in the merged firm: 9 CEOs became Chairmen of the new firms
and 37 served as new CEOs. Six target CEOs were retained in another position in the
new firm. As our findings suggest, most retained CEOs still play an important role in
the new firm. This suggests that acquiring firms expected target CEOs to make a
major contribution after takeovers.
We also compared the situation following domestic and cross-border takeovers. A
strong significant difference is found between the CEO promotion rate following
domestic takeovers and that after cross-border takeovers. Eight CEOs were promoted
to Chairman of the new firm following cross-border takeovers, while only one CEO
became Chairman after domestic takeovers. This suggests that, especially following
cross-border takeovers, foreign acquiring firms are more likely to attach importance
to retained target CEOs.
3.2.5 Descriptive statistics
In this section, we describe the collection of determinants of the probability of CEO
departure and provide descriptive statistics for them. They are divided into four parts:
CEO characteristics, target governance characteristics, deal characteristics and target
firm characteristics.
a. CEO Characteristics
We collected data on the CEO's age, tenure, reputation, ownership and whether the
CEO was the founder of the target firm. Although information may be obtained on
named senior managers, there is no readily available comprehensive resource of
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information on directors' turnover for individual companies. Information on the
characteristics of the CEOs and the board of directors was selected from
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Corporate Registers, annual reports, Datastream,
Directory ofDirectors, the Financial Times, and news releases from company web
sites.
Table 3.5 reports summary statistics on the characteristics of the CEOs, target firm
governance, deals and target firms at the end of the year prior to the year of the
announcement. Statistics are presented for all samples and also split into domestic
and cross-border takeovers. Panel A of the table describes the information about
CEOs. The average age of the CEOs in all samples is 49.84 years, close to the 52.6
years which was the average CEO age in the study of Franks et al. (2001) for their
UK samples. UK CEOs are younger than the mean of those CEOs in US studies by
Allgood and Farrell (2000) (56.6) and Huson et al. (2001) (61.60).
The tenure of each CEO is used to measure the experience of the CEO in previous
studies (Denis and Denis (1995), Goyal and Park (2002) and Harford (2003)). In our
study, CEO tenure is measured as the number of years that the CEO was in the
company until the year of the takeover. We argue that, for the CEO, the years with
the company might provide a better indication of his/her knowledge of the company
business than the years for which the person was the CEO. The average CEO tenure
in our sample is 8.295 years, which is similar to the average directors' tenure
reported by Harford (2003) (8.6 years) for a large sample of US corporations.
Moreover, CEO tenure in the cross-border subsample is a little shorter than that of
the domestic subsample (7.925 years vs. 8.460 years), but the difference is not
statistically significant.
In general, the quality of each target firm's CEO could be characterized by the
reputation of the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), Kini et al (2004)). Following
Shivdasani (1993), we measure the reputation of a CEO as the number of additional
board appointments held by the CEO. The reputation of CEOs in all samples is 0.922,
which is slightly lower than the 1.05 ofUS target samples in Kini et al. (2004) and
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the 1.09 of Italian target firms in Brunello et al. (2003). Meanwhile, the average
number of additional directorships held by CEOs is significantly higher in domestic
takeovers than in cross-border takeovers (1.013 vs. 0.716).
b. Target Governance Characteristics
In terms of target governance, Panel B of Table 3.5 reports CEO duality, CEO
ownership, whether or not the CEO was a blockholder, blockholders' ownership,
board size, and board composition. Following the definition of previous studies
(Goyal and Park (2002), Kini et al. (2004)), CEO duality refers to the circumstance
where the CEO serves as the chairman of the board of directors simultaneously.
Previous studies associate duality with a lack of board independence or management
entrenchment (Jensen (1993)). Our results show that only 10.1% of CEOs are also
the chairman in target firms for all samples, which is close to 14.3% of companies
with CEO duality in the study of Franks et al. (2001) for UK samples at the
beginning of the 1990s. But it is much less than the frequency of CEO duality
reported by Kini et al (2004) for US target firms, which was 80%.
We also collect ownership data for each CEO. Similar to Core et al. (1999), CEO
ownership is measured as the percentage of shares owned by the CEO of the target
firm. On average, CEOs in all samples held 2.5% of the shares of target firms, and
CEOs in cross-border takeovers owned a little higher percentage than those in
domestic takeovers (2.7% vs. 2.4%). However, it is much higher than the finding of
Core et al. (1999) where the mean of CEO stock owning was found to be 1.5% for
US firms at the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, following UK company law
(Hillern et al. (2003)), we classify CEOs who own 3% or above 3% of shares as
blockholders. We found that 23% of CEOs are blockholders in our sample. The
proportion of such CEOs in domestic takeovers is higher than that in cross-border
takeovers (25.3% vs. 17.9%).
We collect the total proportion of shares owned by blockholders prior to the
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announcement date of the takeover. As mentioned in Franks et al. (2001), the
statutory disclosure threshold for outside shareholders was reduced to 3% from 19904.
All shareholdings greater than 3% are including in our samples. Panel B documents
that, on average, blockholders own 46.2% of the shares of the target firms. It is much
higher than the 16.97% of blockholdings reported by Kini et al. (2004) for the
average US target firms from 1979 to 1998. Huson et al. (2001) report that the
aggregate level of institutional equity holding is 43.9% in 1994 for US samples. This
indicates that blockholdings increased dramatically and it may lead to a change of
UK blockholders towards a more active role in recent years.
Another important internal control mechanism is the board. For each target firm, we
collected data on the composition and information about the board of directors from
PriceWaterHouseCoopers Corporate Register. We measure the board size by the
number of board directors. Following Franks et al. (2001), outside directors
(outsiders), nonexecutive directors, are defined as board members who are not full-
time employees of the company. Inside directors (insiders), executive directors, are
defined as board members who are full-time employees. Descriptive statistics
relating to the average size of the target board is provided in Panel B of Table 5,
which is 7.567. The board sizes in cross-border subsamples are a little bigger than
that in domestic subsamples (7.597 vs. 7.553). By comparison, the study by Franks et
al. (2001) documents 9.3 directors on the board for a UK sample at the beginning of
the 1990s. Denis et al. (1997) and Hardford (2003) report 11 directors on the board
ofUS target firms.
In terms of board composition, Panel B reports that the average fraction of
nonexecutives is 49.9% of the target board. Franks et al. (2001) documents 39.8%
nonexecutives on the board for their UK samples. The study by Denis et al. (1997)
documents 47.3% of independent outsiders on the board and Flardford (2003) reports
that outsiders account for 54% of the board, both based on the US takeover market.
Thus, UK target firms have a similar composition to the average board of US target
firms, while they have a relatively smaller average board size.
4 The disclosure threshold in the United States is 5%. (Franks et al.(2001))
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c. Deal Characteristics
We collected deal characteristics data for each of the target firms. Thomson
OneBanker provides most data on the characteristics of deals, such as the acquirer
nation, the payment, the number of bidders, the attitude of acquirers, and the
premium prior to the announcements. Panel C of Table 3.5 presents descriptive
statistics on deal characteristics. 67 out of 217 transactions are cross-border, which
account for 30.87% of the whole samples in our study. When both the target firm
and the acquiring firm have the same four-digit or three-digit primary SIC code, the
deal is defined as a related M&As (McNeil et al. (2004)). For the full samples, 126
transactions took place in related industries, which is 55.3% of the full samples.
Approximately 58.2% of deals are related in cross-border takeovers, which is higher
than 54% related deals in domestic takeovers. The difference is not statistically
significant.
For the cross-border takeovers, we identify the legal system of acquiring countries.
Watson (1974) argues that laws in different countries are typically transplanted from
a few legal families or traditions. In general, commercial laws come from two broad
traditions: common law, which evolved in England, and civil law, which is Roman
law in origin. Three main types of civil laws are in use around the world: French,
German and Scandinavian civil law. The samples are divided into two groups:
targets acquired by bidders from an English common law system and from a non-
English common law system. Panel C shows that, for the whole sample, 12.4%
targets were bid for by acquiring firms from non-English common law countries. The
details of the distribution of acquiring nations laws involved cross-border takeovers
is presented in Table 3.6. Amongst 67 cross-border takeovers, 40 acquiring firms
were from countries with English common law, which is 59.70% of total
international transactions. 27 acquiring firms were from the non-English-common-
law countries, including 15 French-civil-law countries, 8 German-civil-law countries
and 4 Scandinavian-civil-law countries.
Moreover, for the cross-border takeovers, culture difference is measured according to
72
Hofstede (1980). Different cultures in international business are summarized in four
dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus
collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity. Following Conn et al (2005), we use
a composite index based on four national culture dimensions. For each M&A
transaction, we take the difference between the acquirer's country and the UK in
each of the culture dimensions. The composite index is the summation of these four
differences, which ranges from a low of 22 for the US to a high of 153 for Singapore,
with a median of 28. We classify any country with a score of 28 or less as having a
low cultural difference, and any country with a score of more than 28 as having a
high cultural difference. Panel C of Table 3.5 shows that, for the cross-border
takeovers, 47.8% of acquiring firms have a high cultural difference from the UK,
which accounts for 14.4% of the whole sample.
Table 3.6
The distribution of acquirer nations' law involved 67cross-border takeovers according to
legal system
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According to special high-tech classification codes provide by SDC, we identified
high technology industries, which include areas in biotechnology, chemicals,
computers, defence, electronics, communications, medical, and pharmaceuticals,
among others. These industries cover a broad range of high-tech fields, but the
common characteristic is that they reflect emerging industries that focus on the
development of new and innovative technology within their respective areas. Since
the focus is on the effects of technology takeovers, we define a high-tech takeover if
either the acquiring firm or the target firm is in a high technology industry. Panel C
of Table 3.5 shows that, in our sample, 25.3% of deals took place in high-tech
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industries. In domestic takeovers, 22.7% of transactions were in high-tech industries.
In cross-border takeovers, the percentage of high-tech takeovers was higher, and
reaches 31.1%. But the difference in percentage from that in domestic takeovers is
not significant.
We also collected details about deal payment for each of the transactions. We divided
them into three groups: stock payment, cash payment and mixed payment. This
division roughly coincides with three generally common payment methods in M&A
transactions. For the whole sample, 55.3% of deals used mixed payment for the
transactions, while 27.2% of deals employed stock payment. Cash payment was only
used in 17.5% of deals. More cross-border transactions employed cash payment,
compared with domestic takeovers (29.9% vs. 12.0%). The difference is statistically
significant at the 1 % level. This indicates that foreign companies are more likely to
employ cash payment. Moreover, 32% of domestic takeovers were involved in stock
payment in the transactions, which is significantly higher (p<0.05) than the 16.4% of
deals using stock payment in cross-border takeovers.
Panel C provides details of the number of bidders. 15 out of 217 target firms faced
more than one bidder in the process of takeovers, which only account for 6.9% of the
full samples. 8 cases took place in domestic takeovers, and 7 cases were cross-border
takeovers. Moreover, following the definitions of hostility in SDC, we classify a
takeover as hostile if the target firm's management opposed the initial bid in the
takeover contest. Panel C shows that only 4.6% of all samples was in hostile
environments. Similar situations are found in domestic and cross-border takeovers,
3.3% and 7.5% respectively. Compared with 48% of hostile takeovers in the 1980s
documented in the study ofKini et al. (2004), the takeover activities are friendlier in
the 1990s. This indicates that friendly deals are dominant in the recent takeover
market, which is consistent with the finding ofHuson et al. (2001).
Panel C also reports the descriptive statistics on bid premia. For the full samples, the
average bid premium four weeks prior to the takeover announcement is 41.175%,
which is much higher than the 30% reported by Franks and Mayer (1996) for UK
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hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986. By comparison, Franks and Harris (1989) report
bid premia of 42% for hostile takeovers in the US. Moreover, we observe the
significantly different bid premium between domestic and cross-border takeovers. In
domestic M&As, UK acquiring firms paid an average of 37.864% premium to the
target firms, while the mean of the bid premia paid by foreign acquiring firms was
48.587% in cross-border takeovers. This significant difference indicates that the
special circumstances of cross-border takeovers, such as information asymmetry,
may lead to high premia.
d. Target Firm Characteristics
We collect the total asset values for each of the target firms and acquiring firms at the
end of the year prior to the takeover announcement. Because the asset size
distributions of the target and acquiring firms were skewed, following the previous
studies by McNeil et al. (2004), Denis et al. (1997) and Warner et al. (1988), we
calculate the size difference:
Size Difference = log (the target's asset / the acquirer's asset)
Panel D of Table 5 shows that the mean asset size of the target firms is $3914.596
million, while the mean acquiring firm asset size is $63451.828 million. The average
size difference is -0.762. In addition, we observe that the average size difference in
domestic takeovers is significantly smaller than that in cross-border takeovers at the
1% level (-0.658 vs. -0.994).
Turning to the measure of firm performance, we test target pre-takeover performance
by using both accounting and capital market performance variables. Kini et al (2004
pi528) argues that "market-based performance measures are sensitive to the effect
on the stock price of any change in market expectations of future performance over
the performance window", while accounting measures present a more historical
performance of target firms. So both accounting and market-based measures are
employed in our tests.
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■ Accounting Performance
For the accounting performance, we employ the industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA),
which is the ratio of net income to total assets. SDC and DataStream provide the data
of accounting performance, such as ROA. Following most previous papers (Kini et al.
(1995, 2004)), the IAROA are computed as the difference between the target
accounting performance and the industry median level. The industry level is
computed as the median accounting performance for the firm's industry, based on the
target firm's four-digit primary SIC code. If we find less than three other firms in the
industry at the four-digit SIC level, we match at the three-digit SIC level. The
performance of each firm is measured for each year, from 1 year prior through 2
years prior to the year of the announcement of takeover (-2, -1). We then compute
average performance over the interval -2 year through -1 year. This method is similar
to that used in Brickley et al. (1999), Frank et al. (2001), Harford (2003), Kini et al
(2004).
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows average means, medians and standard deviations of
IAROA over the different intervals. Average IAROA decreases when the time
interval is relatively near the announcement of takeovers. This indicates that the
accounting performances of the target firms were getting worse prior to the takeover
announcement. Average IAROA of target firms involved in cross-border takeovers
was generally lower than that of target firms involved in domestic takeovers. But no
significant difference was found.
■ Stock Performance
In addition, we also use capital market variables to measure firm performance. The
market benchmark, "FTSE ALL", is used to adjust stock market performance. The
abnormal return for each target firm is the difference between the firm's monthly
return and the monthly return on the market index "FTSE ALL".
In order to avoid the possibility of being affected by any event-related information,
we use monthly data to measure the stock price performance up to 3 months prior to
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cumulative abnormal returns are calculated over T months to 3 months prior to the
announcement of the takeover. For different numbers of month T, the test could
produce cumulative returns over different time periods to the takeover announcement.
In our study, we examine the stock performance of target firms over 1 year and over
2 years prior to (3 month before) the takeover announcement. Then, T equates to 14
and 26.
Panel B of Table 3.7 shows the summary statistics on stock performance. The means
of cumulative abnormal returns were significantly negative across all time windows.
The means of cumulative abnormal return in cross-border takeovers were lower than
those in domestic takeovers, but no significant differences are found. The stock
performance provides evidence that target firms underperformed prior to the takeover
announcement.
■ Leverage
To test the effect of target leverage on post-takeover CEO turnover, we collected
leverage data for the target firms. Following Franks et al. (2001), we measured
leverage by using the total debt to total asset ratio. Thomson OneBanker provides the
data, such as net debt and total debt. The leverage of each firm was measured for
each year, and the time period covers 2 years through 1 year prior to the year of the
takeover announcement. Then we calculate the mean of leverage over the interval -2
years to -1 year.
Summary statistics on leverage are reported on panel C of Table 3.7. All ratios of
total debt to total asset for target firms were significantly different from zero across
all time windows. The capital leverages for target firms involved in cross-border
takeovers were higher than that in domestic takeovers. But the differences are not
statistically significant.
In summary, the above results show that, in our sample, the target firms in cross-
border takeovers underperform more than those in domestic takeovers prior to the
announcement. Moreover, in our sample, the target firms in domestic takeovers had
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better capital leverage than those in cross-border takeover. The differences are not
statistically significant and so we cannot infer these differences to the corresponding
populations.
3.3 Univariate Tests Results
In this section, we compare the target firms with and without post-takeover CEO
turnover with respect to CEO characteristics, target governance characteristics, deal
characteristics and target firm characteristics prior to the announcement of the
takeovers. The sample of 217 targets is divided into two subsamples. The first
subsample includes 112 targets in which there is no post-takeover CEO turnover,
while the second subsample includes 105 targets that have post-takeover CEO
turnover. We compare the mean characteristics of the two subsamples. Table 3.8
reports the results for the full samples in the first set of three columns. The second
and third sets of columns divide the full sample once more into domestic and cross-
border takeovers. The t-statistics, Chi-square and p-values of the difference tests are
calculated to determine if a difference in these characteristics exists between targets
with and without CEO turnover.
3.3.1 CEO Characteristics
Panel A of Table 3.8 reports comparisons of subsample means with respect to pre-
takeover CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO reputation and whether or not the CEO was the
founder of the target firm. We perform a comparison of means tests to determine
whether or not a significant difference exists between the target samples with or
without post-takeover CEO turnover. A significant relationship was found between
CEO turnover and dummies of whether the CEO was the founder. 12.5% of non-
departed CEOs were founders of target firms, while 3.8% of departed CEOs were
founders of target firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. To
some extent this may indicate that a founding CEO has a good knowledge of the
target firm and an expertise that might be valuable to the acquiring firm, so corporate
takeover may be less likely to result in the removal of these CEOs. No significant
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3.3.2 Target Governance Characteristics
The results for target governance characteristics are in panel B of Table 3.8. A
significant difference is found between CEO duality and post-takeover CEO turnover.
Among the remaining target CEOs, 14.3% of them were a Chairman of a target firm
before takeovers. Only 5.7% of post-takeover departed CEOs were Chairmen in
target firms prior to a takeover announcement. The difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the duality of a target CEO may
strengthen his/her power, and help him or her to secure the CEO job in the new firm.
No significant differences exist between takeovers with and without post-takeover
CEO turnover as regards CEO ownership, whether or not the CEO is a blockholder,
blockholder ownership, board size and the proportion of nonexecutives on the board.
3.3.3 Deal Characteristics
Panel C of Table 3.8 shows some interesting statistics on deal characteristics. For the
full sample, 33.9% of target firms without post-takeover CEO turnover were
involved in cross-border takeovers, while cross-border takeovers occurred in 27.6%
of the targets with CEO turnover after the takeovers. This higher proportion of cross-
border takeovers occurring for targets without, rather than with post-takeover CEO
turnover indicates that the special features of cross-border takeovers may increase the
value of the targets' CEOs and then reduce the CEOs turnover rate following the
takeovers. But the difference is not statistically significant.
We also find that, in the full sample, slightly more than 50% of takeovers are related,
regardless of whether or not there was CEO turnover afterwards. But only in cross-
border takeovers, did the related takeovers occur more frequently in targets without,
rather than targets with post-takeover CEO turnovers (71.1% vs. 41.4%). Such a
negative association between related takeovers and post-takeover CEO turnover
suggests that, although target firms were in related industries, foreign acquirers may
prefer to retain target CEOs due to some uncertain issues in cross-border transactions
and may expect the benefit that target CEOs could bring to the new firms.
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Panel C of Table 3.8 also shows a significant relationship between payment and CEO
turnover after takeovers. In the full sample, domestic and cross-border takeovers,
stock payments were employed in a greater percentage of targets without than of
targets with post-takeover CEO turnover (36.6% vs. 17.1%, 45.9% vs. 18.4%, 18.4%
vs. 13.8% respectively). The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level
for the full sample and domestic takeovers. In addition, for the full sample and
domestic takeovers, we find that a greater percentage of target firms with post-
takeover CEO turnover used cash payment than targets with no post-takeover CEO
turnover (25.7% vs. 9.8%, 21.1% vs. 2.7% respectively). The findings indicate that
stock payment may be the result of negotiation by CEOs who are keen to remain and
receipt of stock tends to increase the opportunities for these CEOs to have continued
employment in the new company. Such a significant difference was not observed for
cross-border takeovers.
Moreover, we find that, for the full sample, a hostile attitude occurred more often in
takeovers with post-takeover CEO turnover than in those without CEO turnover after
takeover (7.6% vs. 1.8%), as shown in panel C. The difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level. A similar significant difference exists in cross-border
takeovers (13.8% vs. 2.6%). This result supports the traditional theory that hostile
takeovers play a disciplining role (Martin and McConnell (1991), Dahya and Power
(1998)), although hostile takeovers have declined dramatically since the 1990s.
In Panel C of Table 3.8, as regards high-tech takeovers, multiple bidders and
premium, no significant difference in the frequency is found between targets with
and without CEO turnover after the takeovers.
3.3.4 Target Firm Characteristics
As Panel D of Table 3.8 shows, there is no significant size difference between targets
with and without post-takeover CEO turnover.
Also, we compare the average pre-takeover performance level over different time
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windows for targets with and without CEO turnover after the takeover. The
differences between the means are tested to determine whether a difference in pre-
takeover performance exists between the two samples of targets. Panel A of Table 3.9
reports the results using IAROA. For each set of samples, although the means of
IAROA for targets with post-takeover CEO turnover are consistently lower than
those for targets without post-takeover CEO turnover over all performance windows
for all samples, the differences are not statistically significant.
For stock performance, we calculate the mean of the cumulative abnormal returns
and perform the difference between means tests for the subsamples with and without
CEO turnover following takeovers. Panel B of Table 3.9 shows the results. For the
full samples and domestic takeovers, there is strong evidence of significant negative
stock performance for targets with and without post-takeover CEO turnover across
all performance windows (p<0.01 or p<0.05). Furthermore, the stock performance
for targets with post-takeover CEO turnover is worse than that for targets without
post-takeover CEO turnover across all performance windows. Especially, for the full
sample, a significant difference is found over the performance window -26 to -3
months at the 5% level. For cross-border takeovers, there is a highly significant
negative stock performance for targets with post-takeover CEO turnover over both
performance windows (p<0.01), and for targets without post-takeover CEO turnover
over the window -26 to -3 months (p<0.05). For both domestic and cross-border
takeovers, although targets with post-takeover CEO turnover underperformed the
sample without post-takeover CEO turnover across all performance windows, the
differences are insignificant.
Turning to the leverage of target firms, Panel C of Table 3.9 reports results of the
turnover-leverage relation. For each set of samples, the mean of total debt/total assets
for targets with and without post-takeover CEO turnover are significantly different
from zero. But no significant difference is found between targets with and without
post-takeover CEO turnover for each set of samples.
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3.3.5 CEO Turnover Rates for Extreme Quartiles of Performance and Leverage
To further examine, the impact of target pre-performance and pre-leverage on post-
takeover CEO turnover, we conduct tests to gain an insight into the relation between
CEO turnover and performance and leverage by comparing post-takeover CEO
turnover rates in the lowest and highest performance and leverage quartiles.
We compare post-takeover CEO turnover rates in the lowest and highest performance
quartiles. As Kini et al. (2004) suggest, such tests provide additional insight into the
relation between post-takeover CEO turnover and pre-takeover performance. Table
3.10 contains a summary of the results.
Panel A presents the results of comparing post-takeover CEO turnover rates for
extreme performance by using IAROA averaged over performance windows ranging
from 2 years to 1 year prior to the year of the takeover. We find that post-takeover
CEO turnover rates in the highest performance quartiles are lower than that in the
lowest performance quartiles across all performance windows. For the full sample,
the difference is statistically significant over the time window -2 years to -1 year and
-1 year. For example, for the total sample measured by IAROA over the performance
window -2 years to -1 year, 37.04% of target CEOs in the highest performance
quartile experienced post-takeover turnover, while the turnover rate for the lowest
performance quartile is 53.70%. The difference is 16.66%, and it is statistically
significant at the 10% level. Such a situation is also found in domestic takeovers, and
significant differences existed over the performance window -1 year. But there is no
significant difference in cross-border takeovers.
Panel B ofTable 3.10 presents stock performance. Again, for each set of samples, the
rates of CEO turnover in the highest performance quartile are lower than that in the
lowest performance quartile. But this finding is statistically significant only over the
performance window -26 months to -3 months for the full sample where the rate of
CEO turnover is 37.04% for the quartile with the highest average cumulative
abnormal returns and 55.56% for the lowest quartile. Our results are similar to the
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findings of Franks et al. (2001) for UK companies in 1990. They find that CEO
turnover is higher in the worst performance decile than in other better performance
deciles, but the difference is not statistically significant. Mikkelson and Partch (1997)
also find that the lowest quartile of performance is related to higher CEO turnover
rate. But a significant difference is only found in the 1984-1988 period.
Taken together, the results presented in Table 3.10 reinforce our finding in Table 3.9
of univariate tests. For the full sample, post-takeover CEO turnover is weakly related
to target pre-takeover performance (p<0.10), which is based on both IAROA and
targets' stock performance prior to the takeover announcement. Meanwhile, for
domestic takeovers, we find evidence for a statistically significant relation between
post-takeover CEO turnover and accounting pre-takeover performance measured by
IAROA. Collectively, the results of the univariate test indicate that, in recent years,
performance-related discipline was exerted by the corporate takeover market,
especially domestic takeovers.
Furthermore, we compare post-takeover CEO turnover rates in the lowest and
highest leverage quartiles. These results, in Table 3.10, highlight the effect of the
target pre-takeover leverage on post-takeover CEO turnover. Panel C reports the
difference of post-takeover CEO turnover for extreme leverage quartiles based on
total debt/total assets over the windows ranging from 1 to 2 years prior to the
takeover year.
For the total sample and for domestic takeovers, post-takeover CEO turnover is
higher for takeovers in the highest than those in the lowest leverage quartiles across
all time windows. In particular, for domestic takeovers, the difference of CEO
turnover rate is significant at the 5% and 10% levels. It indicates that the pre-
takeover leverage is significantly positively related to post-takeover CEO turnover
for domestic takeovers. The opposite situations are found in cross-border takeovers,
but the differences are not statistically significant.
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3.4 CEO Turnover and Various Determinants: Multivariate Tests
In this section, we examine the relation between post-takeover CEO turnover and
various determinants in a set ofmultivariate tests. Logistic regressions are performed
to estimate the significant determinants of CEO turnover. The function includes the
following sets of independent variables: (1) CEO characteristics, (2) target
governance characteristics, (3) deal characteristics, and (4) target firm characteristics.
We perform three sets of tests, each based on different samples: the full sample,
domestic takeovers and cross-border takeovers. We trace the situation of post-
takeover CEO turnover for about two years. For each set of tests, we test the relation
between determinants and CEO turnover for different time periods, YO (the year in
which the takeover announcement was made), Y+l (one year after the year of the
announcement) and Y+2 (two years after the year of the announcement). Meanwhile,
we use pre-takeover performance and leverage over different time windows ranging
from 1 to 2 years prior to the takeover year.
3.4.1 The Full Sample
Table 3.11 shows the results based on the full sample. For the CEO characteristics,
we find that coefficients on whether the CEO was the founder are negative and
significant at the 5% level for YO and Y+l. This shows that the probability of CEO
turnover would be lower, when the CEO was the founder and his/her knowledge and
experience may secure his/her job in the new firm. Two years after takeovers, the
significance disappears, which indicates that the effect of whether the CEO was the
founder was getting smaller. But for Y+2, coefficients on CEO reputation appear to
be significantly negative. Those CEOs have more directorships would have a lower
probability of leaving the firm. This is consistent with the finding of Shivdasani
(1993).
For the target governance characteristics, we find that the coefficients on CEO
duality are significantly negative (p<0.05 or p<0.10) in models for YO. The results
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suggest that the probability of post-takeover CEO turnover is lower when the CEO
was also the Chairman of the board. This indicates that the double position of CEOs
increases their power to negotiate their career in the new firm. Duality only has an
effect shortly after the takeover announcement, as the significance disappears in the
later years. The regressions also computed the parameter estimates for CEO
ownership, blockholder ownership, board size and the proportion of outsiders. These
parameter estimates are all insignificant, which indicates that no significant
relationships exist between post-takeover CEO turnover and most target governance
situations prior to the takeovers.
Moreover, we test the effect of deal characteristics on post-takeover CEO turnover.
We find that the coefficients on the cross-border dummy are significant and negative
(p<0.10 or /?<0.05) in all regressions, which implies that the probability of CEO
turnover is lower for target firms in cross-border takeovers. Even two year after the
takeover announcement, the effect of cross-border takeovers still exists. The results
of all regressions strongly support our previous results. The significant negative
relation is consistent with the hypothesis that target CEOs are more likely to be
retained after cross-border takeovers. Our results differ from those ofHarford (2003),
who find that both inside and outside directors are more likely to be removed after
the target is taken privately or acquired by a foreign company for US samples.
Another significant deal characteristic is stock payment. The results of regressions
for Y0 show significant negative coefficients (p<0.05), indicating that the probability
of CEO turnover is lower when stock payment is used in takeovers. The negative
relationship supports the results of the univariate tests. It is consistent with our
hypothesis that a CEO who desires to remain would prefer stock payment instead of
cash payment, and his ownership of shares in the new company may increase her/his
influence in the combined company. Ghosh and Ruland (1998) also find that target
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In addition, whether the acquisition was hostile shows a positive effect on target
CEO turnover in the year of takeover announcement. When the takeover is hostile,
the probability of CEO turnover would be high. The positive relation supports our
hypothesis that hostile takeovers are more disciplinary than friendly takeovers. Our
finding is consistent with the study of Walsh (1989), Martin and McConnell (1991),
Franks and Mayer (1996), Dahya and Powell (1998), Harford (2003) and Kini et al
(2004).
For pre-takeover performance and leverage of target firms, a negative significant
coefficient (p<0.05) on IAROA was found for the -1 year. Average market-adjusted
stock returns over two years prior to takeover showed a strong negative effect on
CEO turnover one year and two years after takeovers. The significance is at the 1%
level. It provides evidence that corporate takeovers discipline the ineffective
management of target firms, especially when their success is measured by stock
performance. Franks and Mayer (1996) found little evidence that pre-takeover
performance is related to the control change of target firm for UK hostile takeovers
in the middle of the 1980s.
3.4.2 Domestic takeovers
We re-estimate the logistic models presented in Table 3.11 based on UK domestic
takeovers rather than the full samples. In re-estimating each model, the performance
and leverage of target firms are tested over each of two relevant intervals.
Table 3.12 summarizes the results of logistic regressions based on the sample of
domestic takeovers. For CEO characteristics, negative significant coefficients on
CEO reputation are found in regressions for Y+l (p<0.10) and Y+2 (p<0.05). This
indicates that good reputation reduces the probability of CEO turnover, and the effect
is getting stronger in the later years. The finding supports results gained from
regressions based on the full samples. There is no significant relation between the
probability of post-takeover CEO turnover and CEO age, tenure and whether the
CEO was the founder.
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For the target governance characteristics, we do not find a significant relation
between any of the hypothesized determinants and post-takeover CEO turnover. For
deal characteristics, all regressions in YO and Y+l show a significant and negative
coefficient on stock payment, which more clearly highlights the impact of the
turnover-payment relation in the previous tests. This indicates that, for domestic
takeovers, the probability of post-takeover CEO turnover is lower when stock
payment is used in transactions.
For target firm characteristics, a positive significant coefficient on size difference is
found in regressions for Y+l and Y+2 (p<0.10). The smaller the size difference
between the acquirer and the target, the more likely is the post-takeover CEO
turnover.5 This indicates that the target firm and the acquiring firm with similar sizes
may have similar management resources. So the acquiring firm was more confident
in replacing the target CEO with their own managers. This is more likely to happen
in the later years, when the acquiring firm has become more familiar with the target
firm's operations.
For target pre-takeover performance, the coefficient on CAR over -1 years through -2
is negative and significant in models for Y+l and Y+2. This indicates a significant
relationship between CEO turnover and poor pre-takeover performance measured by
market-adjusted stock returns. These results suggest that some disciplining effect of
corporate takeovers exists in domestic takeovers.
3.4.3 Cross-border Takeovers
In this section, we repeat the regressions for cross-border takeovers. Legal and
cultural differences are crucial in international transactions. But there is a high
correlation between legal differences and cultural differences, so we put only one of
them in each set of regressions.
5 We measure "size difference" between the acquiring firm and the target firm as the logarithm of the
ratio of the two firms' total assets. So the larger is log(target/acquirer), the smaller is size difference,
and then the higher is the post-takeover CEO turnover.
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• Legal system variable included
Table 3.13 presents the results when legal system differences are included as a
variable. For the CEO characteristics, the coefficients of whether the CEO was the
founder are negative and significant in Y+l. This provides modest evidence that, in
cross-border takeovers, the target founder has a greater chance to secure his/her job
in the new firm than non-founders. Moreover, we find a positive relation between
CEO tenure and post-takeover CEO turnover, when the performance variable that is
included relates to 1 year prior to the takeover announcement. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that the probability of CEO turnover increases with CEO tenure.
CEOs with long tenure may feel more associated with the management style and
process of their firm than those with less tenure, and they feel more dissatisfied with
the new or changed process introduced by a new owner.
We find that the coefficients on the independent variables representing target
governance characteristics are insignificant. For deal characteristics, the regression
for Y+2 shows a significant and negative coefficient on related takeovers. This
indicates that the probability of CEO turnover is lower two years after takeover,
when takeovers take place in related industries. Moreover, we find that high-tech
takeovers have a significant positive relation with CEO turnover in the year of
takeover announcement and two years after takeovers. In high-tech international
takeovers, target CEOs are more likely to be replaced.
In addition, we find that the coefficient on bid premium is negative and statistically
significant in the regression for YO at the 10% level. This suggests that a higher bid
premium is significantly related to a lower probability of post-takeover CEO turnover.
The weak finding may be caused by a particular feature of cross-border takeovers-
information asymmetry, whereby the acquiring firm was willing to pay a particularly
high price to retain a CEO who has specific knowledge.
For target pre-takeover performance, the results show a significant negative
relationship between post-takeover CEO turnover and IAROA one year prior to the
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takeover. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the lower accounting
performance, the higher CEO turnover.
• Culture difference variables included
One famous study of culture in international business was carried out by Greet
Hofstede (1980). Hofstede isolated four dimensions that he claimed summarized
different cultures: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus
collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity. Hofstede created an index score for
each of these four dimensions that ranged from 0 to 100. A high score means high
individualism, high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, and high masculinity.
Table 3.14 summarizes these data for 16 countries in our samples.
Table 3.14






Australia 36 90 61 51
Bermuda 34 85 58 49
Canada 39 80 52 48
Denmark 18 74 16 23
France 68 71 43 86
Germany 35 67 66 65
Greece 60 35 57 112
Ireland-Rep 28 70 68 35
Italy 50 76 70 75
Netherlands 38 80 14 53
Singapore 74 20 48 8
South Africa 49 65 63 49
Sweden 31 71 5 29
Switzerland 34 68 70 58
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35
United States 40 91 62 46
For each of the four national cultural dimensions of Hofstede's index, we measure
the cultural difference as the difference between the index score of the UK and that
of the acquirer's country.
6 Source: G. Hofstede, "Culture's Consequences" (1980) Sage Publication
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We repeat regressions by replacing "culture difference" by four dimensions of
Hofstede's index: individualism, masculinity, power distance, uncertainty avoidance.
For each pair of columns relating to one culture dimension, the culture difference
variable takes a value of that dimension. The results are shown in Table 3.15 for YO,
Table 3.16 forY+l, and Table 3.17 for Y+2.
Essentially, the results are very similar to those gained by using "legal system". In
Table 3.16, we find that the coefficients of masculinity (columns 3 and 4 of Table
3.16) are significantly negative at the 10% level for Y+l. Hence, the probability of
CEO turnover is lower, if acquiring firms are from a masculine society. This may
indicate that acquiring firms from high masculine countries might stress economic
factors and mainly focus on the benefit that target CEOs could bring to new firms,
and then target CEOs are more likely to be retained after takeover. However, the
other culture indices are not significant in any regression. We infer that culture
difference between the acquiring country and the UK, measured by power distance,
individualism, uncertainty avoidance, has no effect on the probability of CEO
departure.
In Table 3.16 and 3.17, we find significant negative coefficients on total debt/total
asset over the time window -1 year. The significant negative relation between post-
takeover CEO turnover and target pre-takeover leverage suggests the complexity of
cross-border takeovers and leverage may be not the focus of foreign acquirers.
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Table 3.15
Logistic Models Relating Probability of CEO Turnover Shortly(YO) after Cross-border
Takeover Announcement to CEO Characteristics, Target Governance Characteristics, Deal
Characteristics and Target Firm Characteristics for 67 Targets of Successful Takeovers over
the Period 1998 to 2002
(Hofstede's index were employed to measure "Culture Difference")
Independent Variables Models
Uncertainty
Individualism Masculinity Power distance avoidance
-1 year -2 years -1 year -2 years -1 year -2 years -1 year -2 years
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
CEO Characteristics
Age 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Founder -23.32 -22.76 -22.97 -22.30 -23.24 -22.51 -23.12 -22.37
Tenure 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03
Reputation 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.32
Target Governance Characteristic
Duality -1.30 -1.14 -0.83 -0.43 -1.29 -0.94 -1.16 -0.85
CEO Own 10.51 9.32 9.70 7.99 10.24 8.21 9.63 7.69
Block Own -0.49 -0.93 -0.11 -0.63 -0.44 -0.96 -0.36 -0.81
BoardSize 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.03
Outsiders -2.53 -2.26 -2.56 -2.29 -2.54 -2.54 -3.05 -3.06
Deal Characteristics
Related -0.48 -0.40 -0.33 -0.27 -0.53 -0.46 -0.47 -0.41
Stockpay -0.49 -0.52 -0.49 -0.48 -0.37 -0.42 -0.47 -0.54
Auction 1.03 0.17 1.17 0.31 1.19 0.31 1.08 0.22
Attitude 2.30 1.94 2.55 2.34 2.60 2.21 2.41 2.06
Premium -0.02* -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
High-tech 1.43 0.97 1.49 1.05 1.51 1.12 1.59* 1.21
Culture Dif 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
Target Firm Characteristics
Size Dif -0.21 -0.30 -0.40 -0.51 -0.26 -0.38 -0.27 -0.37
IAROA-2 -0.11 -0.19 -0.18 -0.15
IAROA-1 -0.74 -0.77 -0.82* -0.77
Totdebt/asset-2 -4.44 -3.06 -4.58 -4.15
Totdebt/asset-1 -4.86 -3.63 -4.92 -4.73
CAR-2 -2.13 -2.16 -2.12 -2.02
CAR-1 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.36
-2 log likelihood 63.13 64.35 61.87 62.97 63.27 64.81 63.31 64.72
Cox&Snell R2 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.33
Negelkerke R2 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.44
*** indicatesp<0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10
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Table 3.16
Logistic Models Relating Probability of CEO Turnover One Year(Y+l) after Cross-border
Takeover Announcement to CEO Characteristics, Target Governance Characteristics, Deal
Characteristics and Target Firm Characteristics for 67 Targets of Successful Takeovers over
the Period 1998 to 2002
(Hofstede's index were employed to measure "Culture Difference")
Independent Variables Models
Uncertainty
Individualism Masculinity Power distance avoidance
-2 -2 -2 -2
-1 year years -1 year years -1 year years -1 year years
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
CEO Characteristics
Age -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
Founder -3.87** -2.75* -3.69** -2.52* -3.97** -2.80* -3.78** -2.71*
Tenure 0.15** 0.10 0.16** 0.11 0.15** 0.10 0.14* 0.09
Reputation 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.18
Target Governance Characteristic
Duality 0.17 0.38 0.47 0.72 0.03 0.27 0.09 0.26
CEO Own 2.42 0.72 1.93 0.19 2.89 1.13 2.76 1.26
Block Own -1.83 -1.24 -1.92 -1.29 -1.74 -1.14 -1.72 -1.14
BoardSize 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.02
Outsiders -2.65 -2.41 -2.17 -1.95 -2.17 -1.99 -3.10 -3.00
Deal Characteristics
Related -1.19 -1.10 -1.06 -0.97 -1.20 -1.12 -1.11 -1.03
Stockpay 0.35 0.36 0.27 0.30 0.40 0.41 0.20 0.19
Auction 0.72 0.09 0.71 0.10 0.69 0.07 0.62 0.06
Attitude 1.95 1.64 2.32 1.93 2.01 1.71 1.76 1.45
Premium 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
High-tech 1.08 0.79 0.81 0.58 0.95 0.67 1.08 0.84
Culture Dif -0.01 0.00 -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
Target Firm Characteristics
Size Difr 0.25 0.11 0.19 0.03 0.28 0.13 0.27 0.14
IAROA-2 -0.35 -0.39 -0.36 -0.32
IAROA-1 -0.82* -0.84* -0.83* -0.76*
Totdebt/asset-2 -7.49 -6.41 -7.32 -6.78
Totdebt/asset-1 -9.57* -9.29 -9.42* -8.79
CAR-2 -3.11 -3.35 -3.12 -3.00
CAR-1 -2.50 -3.09 -2.53 -2.59
-2 log
likelihood
70.76 72.65 67.47 69.48 70.73 72.60 70.51 72.25
Cox&Snell R
0.28 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.26
square
Negelkerke R 0.37 0.35 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.35
square
*** indicatesp<0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10
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Table 3.17
Logistic Models Relating Probability ofCEO Turnover Two Year(Y+2) after Cross-border
Takeover Announcement to CEO Characteristics, Target Governance Characteristics, Deal
Characteristics and Target Firm Characteristics for 67 Targets of Successful Takeovers over
the Period 1998 to 2002
(Hofstede's index were employed to measure "Culture Difference")
Independent Variables Models
Uncertainty
Individualism Masculinity Power distance avoidance
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2
-1 year years -1 year years year years year years
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
CEO Characteristics
Age -0.10 -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05
Founder 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.18
Tenure 0.18** 0.10 0.17** 0.11 0.17** 0.11 0.15** 0.09
Reputation 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.11
Target Governance Characteristic
Duality 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.14 0.23 0.38 0.37
CEO Own -1.90 -2.11 -1.52 -1.64 -1.13 -1.35 -1.38 -1.46
Block Own -3.31 -2.31 -2.83 -2.04 -2.71 -1.93 -2.63 -1.84
BoardSize 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.04





-1.37* -1.14 -1.56* -1.33* -1.40* -1.19
Stockpay 1.52* 1.44* 1.37 1.34 1.62* 1.57* 1.26 1.22
Auction 1.35 0.44 1.03 0.36 1.04 0.32 0.94 0.30
Attitude 1.51 1.19 1.43 1.24 1.52 1.28 1.09 0.91
Premium -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
High-tech 2.06* 1.40 1.55 1.10 1.54 1.04 1.74* 1.30
Culture Dif -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02
Target Firm Characteristics
Size Difr 0.52 0.37 0.53 0.39 0.60 0.43 0.58 0.44
IAROA-2 -0.26 -0.23 -0.26 -0.20
IAROA-1 -0.86* -0.73 -0.80* -0.68
Totdebt/asset-2 -7.04 -5.45 -6.17 -5.43
Totdebt/asset-1 -10.97* -8.97 -9.42* -8.64
CAR-2 -2.95 -3.00 -3.01 -2.89
CAR-1 -2.21 -2.44 -2.31 -2.37
-2
likelihood























*** indicates/><0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10
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3.4.4 Summary
Taken together, the results of Table 3.12, 3.13, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17 indicate that different
factors affect post-takeover CEO turnover for each set of samples.
For the full samples, CEO reputation, whether the CEO is the target founder, CEO
duality, dummies of cross-border takeovers, stock payment, pre-takeover IAROA and
CAR are all negatively related to the possibility of post-takeover CEO turnover.
Hostile takeovers still cause higher post-takeover CEO turnover. For domestic
takeovers, the significant and positive determinant ofCEO turnover is size difference,
while CEO reputation, stock payment and CAR are significant and negative
determinants. For cross-border takeovers, CEO tenure and high-tech takeovers have
a positive relation with the probability of post-takeover CEO turnover. Related
takeover, whether CEO was the founder, premium and pre-takeover IAROA have a
significant and negative effect on CEO turnover.
A weakly significant turnover-performance relation is found in the full sample,
domestic takeovers and cross-border takeovers. Hofstede's index gives us an insight
into cultural differences. Acquiring firms from masculine countries are more likely to
keep the target CEO for their benefit to the new firms.
3.5 Robustness test
When we measured pre-takeover accounting performance and leverage of target
firms, IAROA and total debt/total asset were employed. Although IAROA and total
debts/total assets are the main ratios to measure the performance and leverage for a
firm, it is possible that other measures may give different results. In this section, we
employ other ratios to conduct robustness tests. We also extend the time window to 4
years prior to the takeover announcement. For stock returns, the performance
window is taken back to 38 months prior to the takeover announcement.
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3.5.1 Pre-takeover performance
For accounting performance, we employ other two measures: (1) the industry-
adjusted ROE, which is the ratio of net income to common equity; (2) the industry-
adjusted cash flow margin (CFM), which is the ratio of cash flows to net sales.
Essentially, employing IAROE shows similar results to using IAROA. In univariate
tests, for all the sample and domestic takeovers, we find significant negative
IACFMs of target firms with post-takeover CEO turnover across all performance
windows. This provides evidence that, prior to takeovers, the cash flows of target
firms with post-takeover CEO turnover were significantly low. But there is no
significant difference between targets with and without CEO turnover. Moreover,
when the stock performance window is extended back to month -38, we find that, for
cross-border takeovers, the stock performance for targets with post-takeover CEO
turnover is worse than that for targets without post-takeover CEO turnover. In the
multivariate tests, some regressions show a significant negative coefficient on
IAROE and CAR. This supports the above test results of a weak performance-
turnover relation.
3.5.2 Pre-takeover leverage
Turning to the leverage of target firms, the net debt to total asset ratio is used to do
robustness tests. Univariate tests of CEO turnover rates for extreme quartiles show
similar results to those using total debt/total asset. When the window of total
debt/total asset was extended to 4 years prior to takeover announcement, for the total
sample, post-takeover CEO turnover is significantly higher for takeovers in the
highest versus those in the lowest leverage quartiles over the windows (-4, -1) and (-
3, -1). This reinforces the previous results which show that target pre-takeover
leverage positively affects the post-takeover CEO turnover.
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3.6 Conclusion
The aim of eliminating inefficient target management is one of the motivations for
corporate takeovers. We have studied the post-takeover turnover of CEOs in a
sample of UK target companies. The novelty of this study stems from the
characteristics of recent M&As of increasing international transactions and more
developed alternative control mechanisms. This paper makes several distinctive
contributes to the literature on the UK disciplining function of the corporate takeover
market.
Firstly, our study provides new UK evidence concerning the disciplinary takeover
market regarding the relation between post-takeover CEO turnover and pre-takeover
performance over a more recent time period than existing studies: 1998 to 2002.
Both accounting and market-based performance measures are employed in our tests.
Analyzing the relation between various performance measures over four years and
subsequent CEO turnover, we find a significantly negative relationship between post-
takeover CEO turnover and pre-takeover performance measured by IAROA and
stock performance. This is consistent with the findings of Martin and McConnell
(1991), and Denis et al. (1997) for the US takeover market. This indicates that the
disciplinary function ofUK takeovers is operative in recent years.
Secondly, considering the dramatic growth of international transactions in recent
M&A activities, our study examines the different impact of domestic and cross-
border takeover on CEO turnover. In both univariate and multivariate tests, we find a
significant negative relationship between cross-border takeovers and the likelihood
of post-takeover CEO turnover. That is, a lower CEO turnover rate follows cross-
border takeovers. This indicates that cross-border takeovers play a different role in
disciplining managers in target firms or involve different motivations for the
remaining target CEOs after takeovers. The differences of cultures, regulations and
socioeconomic conditions may cause greater information asymmetries and
integration difficulties. Thus, the foreign acquiring firms had to face more difficult
environments than the UK acquirers. The benefit of target CEOs' experiences and
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better knowledge of their target business may match the requirement of foreign
acquiring firms. Then, such target CEOs are more likely to be retained in the new
firm after cross-border takeovers.
Thirdly, we explicitly recognize potential determinants of CEO turnover in recent
years. The results suggest CEO reputation and whether the CEO was the founder are
negatively related to CEO turnover after takeovers. Moreover, CEO duality reduces
the probability of CEO turnover for the full samples, which indicates that duality
may increase CEO power to negotiate employment in the new company. For deal
characteristics, stock payments have a significant negative impact on post-takeover
CEO turnover. This suggests that stock payments may give more job security to
target CEOs. Moreover, bid attitude is found to have a positive relationship with
CEO turnover, which means that hostile takeovers are still playing a disciplining role
in the recent takeover market.
Fourthly, legal and cultural differences are crucial factors in international
transactions. We consider legal system differences and Hofstede's index to explain
CEO turnover. This is a new approach in research on the takeover market. We find a
significant negative relationship between masculinity and the probability of post-
takeover CEO turnover, which suggests that foreign acquirers from masculine
countries are more concerned with competition and performance and are more likely
to retain a target CEO for their benefit to the new firm. This provides evidence of the
important role of cultural differences in the disciplining takeover market.
Finally, we shed light on the interplay between corporate takeovers and other types
of disciplinary mechanisms, such as the target board, blockholders and outsiders. No
alternative mechanism is found to provide an effective substitute for corporate
takeovers.
108
Chapter 4 The Post-takeover Turnover of Target CEOs:
A Comparison between the Active and Less Active Takeover Periods
4.1 Introduction
It is well-known that mergers and acquisitions come in waves (Sudarsanam (2003)).
So far, five obvious US M&A waves have been distinguished in the literature: the
early 1900s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s and the 1990s. Each M&A wave had
distinctive features: a "monopolisation wave" at the end of the 19th century; a "scale-
economies wave" in the 1920s; a "decade of greed wave" in the 1980s; and a
"globalisation wave" starting in the late 1990s (Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)).
Of these M&A waves, the most recent wave has remarkable characteristics in terms
of size and geographical dispersion. M&A activities in the UK hit levels similar to
those experienced in the US. M&A activities picked up from the beginning of the
1990s and started slumping at the beginning of 2000s with the broken "new
economic" bubble. This M&A wave tended to coincide with periods of high share
prices and technological shocks: the internet and media development. With the
collapse of the stock market in 2000, M&A activities declined dramatically. The
period of increasing M&A activity (the rising side) and the period of decreasing
M&A activity (the slumping side) have distinctive features, such as a reduction in the
attractiveness of corporate equity as the currency for acquisitions and a decrease in
high-tech takeovers (Economist, 2001). These features may affect the motives of
bidders and have different effects on the managers of target firms.
In this chapter, we investigate whether the disciplinary function applied to target
CEOs by the market for corporate control varies with variation in the level of
takeover activities. We study a period from 1998 to 2002, which encompassed a
rising of the M&A wave (active takeover period) Jan 1998-May 2000 and a slumping
of the M&A wave (less active takeover period) June 2000-Dec 2002. We test
whether the frequencies of post-takeover target CEO turnover differ, especially
among extreme performing target firms, and whether the effectiveness of alternative
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governance mechanisms differ between the two periods of different levels ofM&A
activities. This allows us to examine whether CEO disciplining by takeovers is
associated with the intensity of takeover activity. We also compare target firms with
and without CEO turnover. In addition, the potential determinants of CEO turnover
in the up and down sides of the M&A wave have been investigated.
We find that the CEO turnover rate falls from 51.06% in the rising M&A wave to
43.42% in slumping side, but the difference is not statistically different. The decline
in CEO turnover frequency occurred mainly amongst poorly performing target firms.
Additionally, in the rising side of the M&A wave, the rate of CEO turnover among
the quartile of target firms with the lowest performance is significantly higher than
that for the quartile of target firms with the highest performance. Furthermore, we
find a significant relation between post-takeover CEO turnover and pre-takeover
performance measured by industry-adjusted ROA and market-adjusted stock returns.
But such a relation is confined only to the rising side of the M&A wave, indicating
that those disciplinary CEO turnovers are more likely to occur in the intensive period
of the M&A wave.
Our results are consistent with the findings of Mikkelson and Partch (1997) who
compare top management turnover during an active takeover market (1984-1988)
and a less active takeover market (1989-1993). They find a decrease in top manager
turnover frequency from the active to the less active period and a significant relation
between turnover and firm performance only in the period of active takeovers.
Moreover, Denis and Kruse (2000) examine managerial discipline during two similar
time periods (1985-1988 and 1989-1992) and find a significant decline in the
disciplinary events from the active to the less active takeover periods. Their findings
show that the decline in takeover activities is associated with a decrease in
disciplinary CEO turnover.
On the slumping side of the M&A wave, the probability of post-takeover CEO
turnover has a weak but significant negative association with blockholder ownership
and the percentage of nonexecutives on the board. This implies that there is less need
no
for takeover-related discipline for target firms, when a higher level of monitoring
mechanisms indicated by blockholder ownership and nonexecutives exists. This
finding is in line with the study of the US takeover market by Kini el at. (2004). The
statistical significance of such relations is confined only to the slumping period of the
M&A wave.
Finally, we find that the frequency of cross-border takeovers increases in the
slumping M&A wave and is significantly negatively related to post-takeover CEO
turnover. Further, on the slumping side, high-tech takeovers and the masculinity of
acquiring countries have significant and negative associations with target CEO
turnover following takeovers. By analyzing potential determinants ofCEO turnover,
we find different determinants in the two subperiods.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2, we provide the
background to the recent M&A wave and analyze the possible effect of a decline in
takeover activities on target CEO. Section 4.3 describes the data, the cut point and
methodology. Also descriptive statistics on the determinants of post-takeover CEO
turnover are provided in this section. Section 4.4 documents the univariate tests and
we compare CEO turnover rates for extreme quartiles of target firm pre-takeover
performance and leverage. The results ofmultivariate tests are reported in section 4.5.
Section 4.6 shows robustness checks and further tests. The conclusion is in section
4.6.
4.2 Features of the recent M&A wave
4.2.1 The recent M&A wave
One interesting phenomenon about M&A activity is that there are periods when
takeovers are plentiful and other periods when merger activity is much lower.
Empirically, Golbe and White (1993) observe the cyclical pattern ofM&A activity.
So far, three previous UK M&A waves have been examined in the literature
ill
(Sudarsanam (2003)). The recent M&A wave started at the beginning of the 1990s
and has remarkably different features, compared to previous waves.
Firstly, M&A activity in this time period hit the highest number of deals and total
transaction value in M&A history. According to the Thomson Financial Securities
Data, in the period 1993-2002, there were 31,448 total completed M&A deals
recorded for the UK, while only 6,471 such transactions took place during the last
merger wave (1983-1989). This wave in the UK is impressive in transaction value as
well, since its total value adds up to US$ 2.6 trillion (see Figure 4.1), more than eight
times the combined total of the last wave.
Figure 4.1
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As showed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, strong growth has taken place in the UK M&A
market over the last twenty years. From the low level at the beginning of the 1980s,
takeover activity increased and reached 2,548 deals in 1989. Following a slight
decline, the recent M&A wave started with 1,807 deals in 1992, and more than
doubled by 2000.
Secondly, in the M&As wave over the period 1993-2002, more than one-third were
cross-border deals. Figure 4.3 illustrates that the value of the international
transactions account for more than 70% of the total investment in M&A in 1999,
having increased from 38% in 1996. The figures reflect the considerable impact of
unprecedented deals, such as the acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone which
involved US$ 202 billion in 1999.
Figure 4.3









Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data
Figure 4.4
The Number of UK Hostile Takeovers
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data
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In our sample from the UK takeover market from 1998 to 2002, the most active
participants in the cross-border takeover market were from the US (34.33%), France
(11.94%) and Republic of Ireland (8.96%) as shown in Table 3.2 of Chapter 3. These
deals represented more than half of the total number ofUK cross-border M&As over
the period 1998 to 2002.
Thirdly, the remarkable feature of the fourth wave is the dramatic decrease in hostile
takeovers. Figure 4.4 shows that, compared to the 1980s, the numbers of hostile bids
fell in the 1990s significantly. Hence, friendly and strategy-oriented takeovers were
dominant in this M&A wave.
Fourthly, some researchers suggest that the high M&A activities seem to be
correlated with high market valuation (Maksimovic and Philips (2001), Jovanovic
and Rousseau (2001)). In these high M&A activity or high stock market periods,
firms tend to use stock as the payment in the transactions. Further, Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004) find that stock deals were common in the high-flying high-
technology sector where most takeovers involved securities. In the UK takeover
market, the percentage of stock as the means of payment in deals was only 6.03% in
1990, while in 2000 the use of stock peaked at 10.96% (Thomson Financial
Securities Data).
Fifth, a non-classical explanation of merger waves argues that the recent merger
wave results from an industry's technological or regulatory shocks (Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005)). In the late 1990s, the stock market was
booming with high technology, media and telecoms (TMT). Takeover in this sector
accounted for over 40% of worldwide mergers in 2000, with deals valued at more
than $1.5 trillion (Economist.com).
4.2.2 The rising and slumping side of the M&A wave
The recent M&A wave came with high market valuation, technological shocks,
deregulation and high capital liquidity. In the clustering period of the M&A wave,
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the above features are very distinctive. Towards the end of 2000, the takeover market
was entering a significant downturn. Not only had the number of deals gone down,
but so also had the amount of "talking about" deals, a strong leading indicator of
future activity. These blows have fallen especially hard on the once hot technology,
media and telecoms (TMT) sector (Economist, 2001). The pace slowed in most
industries, particularly after 11th September 2001. According to Bloomberg, in the
two weeks after the attack, 20 US companies cancelled $15 billion-worth ofmergers.
On the slumping side of the M&A wave, some of the features of the bubble years
disappeared or became less influential. Share prices fell from the highs they reached
in early 2000. This reduced the attractiveness of corporate equity as a currency with
which to pay for acquisitions. Companies also seemed more intent this time on
strategic, rather than financially motivated deals. Building on core strengths and
buying into new geographic markets were common themes in the latest round of
deals, whereas costly diversifications are little in evidence (The Economist 2001).
Managers were less loaded up with share options, which reduced their temptation to
chase deals that deliver a short-term pay-off at the cost of long-term value creation
(Economist, 2005).
4.2.3 The possible effect of a decline in takeover activities on target firm CEOs
Previous research7 shows that takeovers play an important role in disciplining
ineffective managers in target firms. Particularly, the likelihood of management
turnover increases with poor corporate performance. With the decrease in takeover
activity, alternative governance mechanisms become relatively active and the
disciplinary pressure from takeovers on target managers declines, and thus it leads to
a decrease in CEO turnover. There are plausible arguments for and against this view.
7 These studies include Walsh (1988), Walsh and Ellwood (1991), Martin and McConnel (1991), Kini
et al. (1995, 2004), Denis and Kruse (2000) and Harford (2003).
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One argument is that when the takeover market becomes less active, alternative
mechanisms that control agency problems substitute for takeover activity, which play
the role ofmonitoring managers of target firms. In addition to the threat of takeover,
Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) point out
that managers face other pressures from blockholders, acquirers of new blocks, non¬
executive directors, debtholders, active investors, product market competition and
initiatives in the legal and political sectors. In the studies of Gilson and Vetsuypens
(1993) and Franks et al. (2001) on financially distressed firms, the increased
managerial discipline is related to the high levels of financial leverage. Moreover,
Kini et al. (2004) argue that, in a less active takeover market, there is greater
shareholder and institutional investor activism and more evolved internal governance
mechanisms. These substitutions potentially offset the reduced disciplinary pressure
from the takeover market and then reduce the ineffectiveness of target CEOs. Hence,
there is no significant difference in CEO turnover rate in the active and inactive
takeover period.
The alternative argument is that alternative governance mechanisms are not as
efficient as takeover activity. A "horse race" between principal competing parties in
the study of Franks et al. (2001) shows that neither existing holders nor new
purchasers of large share blocks exert much discipline. It is quite striking that, in
their examination, nonexecutive directors and directors with large share stakes tend
to entrench management by reducing board turnover in poorly performing firms.
Jensen (1993) argues that alternatives to takeovers are not equally effective
disciplinary mechanisms. He also cites the poor record of boards of directors in
disciplining managers. Moreover, Denis and Denis (1995) find that disciplining CEO
turnover tends to occur in coincidence with takeover-related events. For many firms,
effective disciplinary pressures are applied in the takeover market. Thus, less CEO
turnover is expected to occur in the less active takeover period.
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4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 Sample Selection
The sample selection criteria are the same as Chapter 3. Our sample consists of 217
completed takeovers announced between 1st January 1998 and 31st December 2002 in
the UK, which is selected from the Global Mergers and Acquisitions database of
Securities Data Corporation's (SDC).
4.3.2 The cut point of the rising side and the slumping side of the M&A wave
Generally speaking, the fourth UK M&A wave picked up at the beginning of the
1990s. In order to compare the rising side and the slumping side of this M&A wave,
we have to find the point to divide the two periods.
We select all completed M&A deals that involved UK target firms between 1990 and
2005. According to the Thomson Financial Securities Data, 35,927 UK firms were
recorded as being merged or acquired during this period. The total transaction value
adds up to US$ 2,362 trillion. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the total number and total
value of deals for each month between 1990 and 2005. As Figure 4.5 illustrates,
M&A activities in the UK became especially numerous from 1993, and it was
booming in March 1998 (352 completed deals), April 1999 (345 completed deals)
and May 2000 (328 completed deals). It is also impressive in terms of transaction
value involved, as depicted in Figure 4.6. Obviously, the total value of deals in this
wave was up from 1994, and it reached a peak in January 2000 (US$ 93 trillion),
May 2000 (US$ 76 trillion) and November 1999 (US$ 60 trillion). Table 7 in the
appendix shows details of total number and total value of M&A for each month
during 1990-2005.
Considering both the number and value of M&A deals, May 2000 was the most
active month in the fourth UK M&A wave. Hence, we chose it as the cut point to
compare the rising and slumping side of the wave. Meanwhile, the data in National
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Statistics8 shows a similar trend, where the value of M&A deals in the UK reach a
peak in the second quarter of 2000. In our subsequent tests, the whole sample of
M&A activity is divided into two subperiods: January 1998 to May 2000 and June
2000 to December 2002. Distinguishing between these two subperiods allows us to
examine the impact of the intensity of takeover activity on the discipline function.
Figure 4.5 Total Number of M&As During 1990-2005
The Figure shows total number of deals in the UK for each month between 1990 and 2005
and Source is Thomson Financial Securities Data.
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Figure 4.6 Total Values ($ million) of M&As During 1990-2005
This Figure shows total value of deals ($ million) in the UK for each month between 1990
and 2005 and Source is Thomson Financial Securities Data.
100,000
8
www, statistics, gov.uk provides time-series of mergers and acquisitions data in UK and summary of
cross-border mergers, acquisitions and disposals by UK companies and foreign companies in the UK.
Data is yearly and quarterly.
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4.3.3 Methodology
In this chapter, we employ the same methodology as in the last chapter. All
determinants of post-takeover CEO turnover are divided into: CEO characteristics,
target governance characteristics, deal characteristics and target firm characteristics.
To examine the relation between these determinants and CEO turnover, we use
univariate and multivariate tests. Logistic regression was employed to test the
determinants of post-takeover CEO turnover in multivariate tests. We test whether
the likelihood of target CEO turnover changes between Jan 1998-May 2000 and June
2000-Dec 2002, in particular for extremely performing target firms, and whether the
relationship between performance and CEO turnover changes between the two time
periods.
4.3.4 The Effect on target CEOs
4.3.4.1 Post-takeover CEO Turnover
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics on CEO turnover for 217 target firms, separated
into the rising and slumping side of the M&A wave. Panel A documents the
cumulative CEO turnover following takeover announcement. For the whole sample,
nearly half of CEOs (48.39%) left by the end of the takeover announcement year. A
higher rate ofCEO turnover following takeovers was observed on the rising side than
that on the slumping side: 51.06% versus 43.42%. In addition, the cumulative CEO
turnover rate on both the rising and slumping side of the M&A wave generally
increased over time but by different amounts. Two years after takeover
announcement, 70.92% of target firms on the rising side had CEO turnover, and
60.53% on the slumping side. However, for each post-merger period, the difference
in the turnover rate is non-statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the
study of Mikkelson and Partch (1997), which recorded that CEO turnover is also
higher in the more active takeover period (1984-1988), but not statistically different
from the CEO turnover in the less active takeover period (1989-1993) in the US.
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Table 4.1 Summary and Comparison of CEO Turnover for UK Target Firms
in rising side and slumping side of M&A wave
CEO post-turnover is an indicator variable that is 1 for the firms with CEO turnover over
three time periods Year 0 ,Year +1, Year +2 following the announcement of the takeover,
and is 0 otherwise. Panel A documents the cumulative CEO turnover for Year 0, Year (0, +1),
and Year (0, +2), while panel B reports the annual turnover for each year after the takeover
announcement. The Chi-square and p-value are reported to test for differences in CEO post-
turnover rate between the samples of rising-side and slumping-side takeovers.
AH sample The rising side The slumping side
Time (N=217) (N=141) (N=76)
period
relative Number Number Number
to ofCEO % CEO ofCEO % CEO of CEO % CEO
takeover turnover turnover Turnover turnover Turnover turnover Chi2 (p-val)
Panel A Cumulative turnover
Year 0 105 48.39% '72 51.06% 33 43.42% 1.155 (0.283)
Year +1 133 61.29% 92 65.25% 41 53.95% 2.658 (0.103)
Year +2 146 67.28% 100 70.92% 46 60.53% 2.424 (0.119)
Panel B Annual turnover
Year 0 105 48.39% 72 51.06% 33 43.42% 1.155 (0.283)
Year +1 28 12.90% 20 14.18% 8 10.53% 0.588 (0.443)
Year +2 13 5.99% 8 5.67% 5 6.58% 0.072 (0.789)
*** indicates/?<0.01, ** indicates/?<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10
Panel B of Table 4.1 documents annual CEO turnover rate, which has decreased over
time. Most target firms experienced CEO turnover in Year 0. Afterwards, on the
rising side takeovers, 14.18% target firms had CEO turnover rate in Year +1, and
5.67% in Year +2. A similar situation was observed in takeovers on the slumping
side of the M&A wave. In Year +1, more target CEOs left new firms following
takeovers on rising side of the M&A wave than that on the slump side (14.18% vs.
10.53%). The converse situation occurred in Year +2. But the difference in target
CEO turnover rates between the rising side and slumping side takeovers is not
statistically significant.
4.3.4.2 Post-takeover CEO Career Change
We traced the career change of target CEOs for two years. Table 4.2 documents the
frequency distribution of departures and retentions of target CEOs. As shown in
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Panel A, more CEOs retired following takeovers on the rising side than those on the
slumping side: 4.00% versus 2.17%. Moreover, 13.00% of target CEOs resigned
following takeovers on the rising side of the wave, as compared to 21.74% following
slumping-side takeovers. In addition, more target CEOs joined other firms following
rising-side takeovers than those on the slumping side: 53.00% versus 50.00%. We
could not find a reason for 28.77% ofCEO departures.
Table 4.2 Frequency Distribution for Departures and Retentions of CEOs
This table reports that distribution of CEO departures and retentions after takeovers, and
compares takeovers in rising-side and slumping-side of the UK M&A wave. Panel A
documents 146 CEO departures and Panel B reports 71 CEO retentions in new firm after
takeovers.










Panel A. 146 departures ofCEOs
Retirement 5 3.42% 4 4.00% 1 2.17%
Resignation'' 23 15.75% 13 13.00% 10 21.74%
Departure to join other firm 76 52.05% 53 53.00% 23 50.00%
Death/Illness 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Fired, poor performance cited 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
No reason given 42 28.77% 30 30.00% 12 26.09%
Total 146 100.00% 100 100.00% 46 100.00%
Panel B.71 retentions ofCEOs
Promoted 9 12.68% 7 17.07% 2 6.67%
Remained as CEO 37 52.11% 26 63.41% 11 36.67%
Joined the acquirer's board 19 26.76% 6 14.63% 13 43.33%
Retained in other position in
the new firm 6 8.45% 2 4.88% 4 13.33%
Total 71 100.00% 41 100.00% 30 100.00%
no evidence is found to suggest that CEO joined another company
Although the data in the table was measured as accurately as possible from the available data sources,
it is likely that certain reasons for departure were not accurately recorded in the data sources used.
Panel B of Table 4.2 shows the retention of target CEOs. Following takeovers on the
rising side of the M&A wave, 63.41% of target CEOs remained as CEO in the new
firm, which is much higher than 36.67% following the slumping-side takeovers.
More target CEOs were promoted to Chairman after the rising-side takeovers than
the slumping-side takeovers: 17.07% versus 6.67%. More target CEOs joined the
acquirer's board or remained in other positions in the new firm following slumping-
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side takeovers than following rising-side takeovers, 43.33% vs. 14.63%, and 13.33%
vs. 4.88%, respectively. Our evidence shows that the remaining target CEOs played a
relatively more important role following rising-side takeovers than those after
slumping-side takeovers. This might be the result of strong negotiations of confident
target CEOs in the clustering period of M&A activities. Alternatively, this might
indicate that, in the clustering period ofM&A activities, acquiring firms value target
CEOs more highly, if they were to remain in the new firms.
4.3.5 Descriptive Statistics on Determinants of Post-takeover CEO turnover
In this section, we describe the determinants of post-takeover CEO turnover and
compare them between takeovers in the rising M&A wave and those in the slumping
M&A wave. Table 4.3 illustrates the summary statistics on CEO characteristics,
target governance characteristics, deal characteristics and target firm characteristics
for the 217 target firms divided into these two periods.
• CEO characteristics
Panel A describes the CEO age, whether the CEO was the founder, the CEO tenure
and reputation. 8.3% of CEOs in the whole sample were the founders of target firms
before takeovers. In the rising-side of M&A wave, 4.3% of target CEOs were
founders, which is significantly lower than the 15.8% on the slumping side (/?<0.01).
This indicates that, after the high-tech boom period, founders might be more likely to
sell their own firms than during the boom.
We also consider CEO reputation, measured as the additional directorships that
CEOs held in other companies before takeovers. In our sample, the average number
of additional board appointments held by target CEOs is 0.922. We also find a
significant increase in CEO reputation over time. The average number of additional
directorships of target CEOs increases from 0.794 on the rising side of the M&As
wave to 1.158 on the slumping side (p<0.10). Our finding gives more evidence that
the quality of target managers improved over time, which may have led to lower
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CEO turnover later. Meanwhile, the mean CEO age and tenure decreased over the
two time periods (50.326 to 48.934, 8.560 to 7.803), but the difference is not
statistically significant.
• Target governance characteristics
Panel B of Table 4.3 reports CEO duality, whether the CEO was the blockholder,
CEO ownership, blockholder ownership, target board size and the fraction of non-
executives on the target board. As mentioned in the previous chapter, CEO duality
refers to the circumstance that the CEO serves as Chairman of the board of a target
firm.
Targets with CEO duality account for 10.1% of the whole sample. The incidence of
CEO duality increased between the two time periods, the rising and slumping side of
the M&A wave (from 7.8% to 14.5%), but it is not statistically significant. We also
look at the ownership structure of target firms. In particular, we focus on the
proportion of shares held by the CEO and blockholders. Those CEOs who own more
than 3% of the shares of target firms are defined as blockholders, according to Franks
et al. (2001). Panel B shows summary statistics on the ownership structure of target
firms. On average, the CEO owns 2.5% of the shares of target firms and blockholders
own 46.2%. Moreover, 23% of target CEOs were blockholders of target firms in our
sample. We observe insignificant changes in CEO or blockholders' ownership
between the rising side and the slumping side of the M&A wave.
In addition, we study the size and composition of the boards of target firms prior to
the takeover announcement. As Panel B of Table 4.3 indicates, the average size of
the target board is 7.567 directors, and there is no significant change between the two
subperiods. In terms of board composition, the average percentage of non-executives
on target boards is 49.9%. We find that it increases significantly from 48.3% in the
rising side of the M&A wave to 52.8% in the slumping side. Thus, while there is no
change in the average size of target boards, the composition of the average board
does change towards an outside-dominated structure.
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Table4.3





















































































































































































































































































This indicates that nonexecutives might become more influential of the governance
in target firms, and then reduce target CEO turnover on the slumping side of the
M&A wave.
• Deal characteristics
Panel C of Table 4.3 documents several deal characteristics. In our sample, 30.9% of
takeovers are cross-border. There is an increase of the proportion of cross-border
takeovers between the two subperiods (29.1% to 34.2%), although the difference is
insignificant. Thus, our sample is consistent with the obvious trend of globalisation
recorded repeatedly in the literature (Harford (2003), Moeller et al. (2005)).
Moreover, 55.3% of the whole sample of M&A are related takeovers in the whole
sample. The frequency of related takeover is found to have risen significantly, from
49.6% on the rising side of the M&A wave to 65.8% on the slumping side (p<0.05).
Our study provides partial support that recent takeover activity is more strategic and
focuses on the development of the core business, which is in line with studies by
Martynova and Renneboog (2006).
Further, in our whole sample, 25.3% of takeovers took place in high-tech industries.
There is a decrease on the proportion of high-tech takeovers over the two subperiods
(26.2% to 23.7%). Although the difference is not statistically different, such a
decrease still shows the influence of a collapse of the "new economics" bubble. We
also find that 12.4% of takeovers in our sample involve a different national legal
system. With the growing proportion of cross-border takeovers, the percentage of
takeovers involving different legal systems has slightly increased from 11.3% to
14.5% over the two subperiods.
Payment is an important issue in each transaction. 27.2% of takeovers in our sample
were paid by stock, which is much higher than the 17.5% of takeovers paid by cash.
Such a phenomenon is consistent with the general literature (Shleifer and Vishny
(2003), Martynova and Renneboog (2006)) on the popularity of stock payment when
the stock market is booming and the takeover environment is friendly in the recent
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M&A wave. 55.3% of deals in our sample employed mixed payment as the
acquisition "currency". We observe no significant change in payment in takeovers
between the rising side and the slumping side of the recent M&A wave.
Multiple bids are often considered as a consensus of ineffective management of a
target (Walsh (1989)). Fewer multiple bidders appeared in takeovers on the slumping
side than on the rising side of the recent M&A wave (5.3% vs. 7.8%), indicating the
decline in the consensus of target CEO inefficiency. Meanwhile, over two subperiods,
the proportion of hostile takeovers decreased from 5.7% to 2.6% and the mean
transaction premium reduced from 41.782% to 40.049%. But the difference between
the two time periods is not statistically significant in terms of these variables.
• Target firm characteristics
In this section, we look at target firm characteristics, including target total assets,
bidder total assets, size difference betweens targets and bidders, pre-takeover target
performance and pre-takeover target leverage.
Panel D of Table 4.3 shows that both the average of target total assets and the
average ofbidder total assets decreased from the rising period to the slumping period
of the recent M&A wave ($4299mil to $3201mil, $85076mil to $23334mil
respectively). The only significant difference appears in bidder total assets (/?<0.01),
which shows that big bidding firms played a very important role in the rise ofM&A
activity and may have pushed up the wave. But we don't find a significant size
difference between the target and the bidder between the two subperiods.
Moreover, we examine both accounting and stock pre-takeover performance of each
target firm. Table 4.4 illustrates the summary statistics of the pre-takeover
accounting performance measured by the industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA), stock
performance measured by market-adjusted return (CAR) and leverage measured by
the total debt to total asset ratio for all 217 target firms.
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Table4.4
Summarystatisticsonthepre-takeoverp rformancedlev ragef217UKg tfi sv rthp riod19982002
VariablesA lsampleJ n1998-May2000N=141Ju e2000-Dec02N=76 MeandianSt. evMe ndianSt. evMedianSt. evt-stat(p- al)
PanelA.IAROA IAROA(-2,-1)3.272-0.12337. 954.146-0.5903 .7 71.6 25445.6800 3( 67)IAROA(year-1)1.276-0.35025.272. 43-0. 7024. 1-1.436-0.9852 301( 2 ) PanelB.CumulativeMarket-adjust dR turn(CAR)(Mon hly) -26to 3-0.357*** -0.2680.67-0.357-0.2920.6 -0.355-0. 300.7 -0.02( 8) -14to 3-0.184*** -0.0980.5 - .171- .1000.5 -0.211-0. 980.6 24( 62) PanelC.pitalLeverage(ToDebt/TotalAss t) Year-20.240***.2200. 06.2610. 82. 2. 090.163. 4**(0.03)Year-10.231***.2 60. 2.243170.2 8. 120.2 4. 91. 1(0. 7)
**indicates/X0.01,indicatesp<0.05,andin ic tes/?< .10
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the results using IAROA. The mean of IAROA of target
firms in the early subperiod is higher than that in the later subperiod (4.146 vs. 1.622,
2.743 vs. -1.436), but the difference is not statistically significant. Panel B also
reports no significant difference in monthly cumulative market-adjusted returns
between the two subperiods.
Panel C of Table 4.4 presents results for capital leverage using the ratio of total debt
to total assets. We find that average total debt/total assets of target firms on the rising
side of the M&A wave is significantly higher than that on the slumping side over
leverage window of (Years -2 to Year -1), 0.261 vs. 0.202. Therefore, most target
firms on the rising side of the recent M&A have more debt than those on the
slumping side, which indicates that bidding firms in a booming economy are more
likely to lighten the debt situation of target firms.
4.4 Univariate Tests
4.4.1 Targets with and without post-takeover CEO turnover
In this section, we compare the target firms with and without post-takeover CEO
turnover with respect to the determinants of CEO turnover. Moreover, we test the
mean of each variable to determine if a difference in these determinants exists
between two samples of targets. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report our results.
• CEO Characteristics
Panel A of Table 4.5 presents our findings on CEO characteristics. In the early
subperiod of the rising M&A wave, we find that the average age of departed CEOs is
statistically significantly higher than that of those who remained CEO (51.250 vs.
49.362). This indicates that, with an increase in M&A activity and the boom in the
high-tech sector, younger CEOs were more likely to be valued and kept in the new
firms after takeovers. We do not find this in the less active M&A period.
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The percentage of CEO-founders is higher in target firms without than with post-
takeover CEO turnover. Moreover, it is mainly on the rising side of the M&A wave,
as, in this subsample, there is no CEO who was the founder of a target with post-
takeover CEO turnover. This is not found in the falling part of the wave.
On the slumping side of the M&A wave, we find the tenure of remaining CEOs was
significantly longer than that of those CEOs that departed after takeovers (9.140 vs
6.061). Our finding is consistent with Denis et al. (1997), Goyal and Park (2002). A
long tenure is normally associated with rich experience and power established over
time (Salancik and Meindl (1984)), which avoids the fate of departure, especially
after the boosting ofM&A activity.
• Target Governance Characteristics
Panel B of Table 4.5 shows results with respect to governance characteristics of
target firms. The proportion of CEO duality is much higher in target firms without
than with post-takeover CEO turnover in both subperiods (11.6% vs. 4.2%, 18.6% vs.
9.1% respectively). In contrast to the previous studies of Jensen (1993), Brickley et
al. (1997), and Goyal and Park (2002), our finding suggests that the power of CEO-
Chairman leadership may outweigh the ineffectiveness of CEO duality, and
encourage CEOs to remain in the new firms.
In addition, a significant difference exists in blockholder ownership between targets
with and without CEO turnover following takeovers on the slumping side of the
recent M&A wave. Blockholders of targets without post-takeover CEO turnover own
a higher percentage of target shares than those in targets with CEO turnover (45.9%
vs. 41.8%). But no significant difference is found in takeovers on the rising of the
wave. This indicates that, with the slump of M&A activity, blockholders owning a
high proportion of the target's shares may be more effective at monitoring target
managers, and so reduce the CEO turnover rate following takeovers. Consistent with
the study of Denis et al. (1997), our finding shows that blockholders provide an
efficient governance mechanism on the slumping side of the recent M&A wave.
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In terms of CEO ownership, whether the CEO was a blockholder, board size and
composition, we do not find significant differences between targets with and without
post-takeover CEO turnover for any set of the samples.
• Deal Characteristics
Panel C of Table 4.5 shows results on various deal characteristics. We find that, of
targets with no post-takeover CEO turnover, the proportion that were cross-border
takeovers increased from 26.1% on the rising wave to 46.5% on the slumping wave.
The corresponding proportions of targets with post-takeover CEO turnover are
31.9% and 18.2% respectively and consequently show a decrease. Also, on the
slumping side of the wave, 46.5% of target firms without post-takeover CEO
turnover were involved in cross-border takeovers, which is significantly higher than
the 18.2% of targets with CEO turnover following takeovers (p<0.01). As show
above, cross-border takeovers were still growing, even when the M&A wave started
going down. Foreign acquiring firms might further realise the experience and special
knowledge of target CEOs and rely on them more, so that these target CEOs are
more valued and more likely to be kept after takeovers. Further, we look at the effect
of legal difference and find that, on the slumping side of the M&A wave, 20.9% of
target firms without post-takeover CEO turnover were involved with acquirers from
different national legal systems, while only 6.1% of targets with CEO turnover were
so involved. The difference is statistically significant (p<0.01). It provides a deep
insight that foreign acquiring firms need managers who are more familiar with the
target's business and local environment.
Another interesting finding is a notable decline in the proportion of high-tech
takeovers, for targets with post-takeover CEO turnover, from 27.8% on the rising
M&A wave to 18.2% on the slumping side of the wave. The situation is contrary for
targets without post-takeover CEO turnover. With respect to industries, acquiring
firms might learn more lessons and be more cautious after the bubble burst in 2000,
so that they might value target CEOs with special experience in high-tech industries
more highly in the slumping period than the boom period. It shows that takeovers in
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high-tech industries are associated with lower post-takeover CEO turnover rate.
Further evidence is found that, on slumping side of the recent M&A wave, 27.9% of
target firms without post-takeover CEO turnover were involved in high-tech
takeovers, while 18.2% of targets with CEO turnover were high-tech takeovers. The
difference is statistically significant (p<0.10). But for takeovers on the rising side of
the wave, we do not find these significant differences.
In terms of payment, for the overall sample, we find significantly higher use of stock
payment for targets without than those with post-takeover CEO turnover (36.6% vs.
17.1%). Such a significant difference also appears in the two subperiods, 34.8% vs.
18.1%, and 39.5% vs. 15.2%, respectively. The situation is the reverse for cash
payment. Only 9.8% of target firms without post-takeover CEO turnover accept cash
as the acquiring "currency", while cash payment was used for 25.7% of targets with
CEO turnover following takeovers. When the sample is split, the significant
difference is only confined to the rising side of the M&A wave (5.8% vs. 26.4%).
Consistent with studies of Ghosh and Ruland (1998), stock payment is associated
with a lower CEO turnover rate, and it may be the bargaining results of those CEOs
who desire to retain their jobs and even keep their influence in the new firms. Cash
payment may show the confidence of acquirers for the control of targets, and they
also avoid issuing equity to dilute their ownership. For the mixed payment,
significant difference appears only on the slumping side of the recent M&A wave
and more targets with post-takeover CEO turnover accepted mixed payment than
those without CEO turnover after takeovers (60.6% vs. 44.2%).
Moreover, we find a greater proportion of target firms with, than without, post-
takeover CEO turnover received multiple bids. It is statistically significant in the
rising M&A wave (11.1% vs. 4.3%), but not on the declining section of the wave.
This suggests that the ineffectiveness of managers may be indicated by multiple
bidders in the boom of the M&A wave (Walsh (1989)). In addition, for the whole
sample, 7.6% of takeovers with post-takeover target CEO turnover were hostile,
which is significantly higher than 1.8% of hostile takeovers which involved targets
without CEO turnover afterwards. Such a situation is especially clear on the rising
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side of the M&A wave, but not on the slumping stage of the wave. Thus, to some
extent, hostile takeovers still discipline target CEOs, which is significant in the active
M&A period.
• Target Firm Characteristics
Panel D of Table 4.5 shows target firms' total assets, bidders' total assets and their
size difference. We find no significant difference between targets with and without
CEO turnover, for each sample.
Table 4.6 presents comparisons of pre-takeover performance and leverage between
the two parties. Panel A shows the results using industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA),
but there is no significant difference between two samples of targets within each of
the time periods.
Panel B of Table 4.6 reports our findings using market-adjusted return. The stock
performances are significantly negative across most time windows for each sample,
with the exception of targets without CEO turnover over -14 to -3 months in the
slumping M&A wave. For the overall sample, the stock performance is significantly
lower for targets with, than without, post-takeover CEO turnover for the performance
window -26 to -3 month (p<0.05). When the whole sample is split, however, the
inverse relationship is only found in takeovers on the rising side of the M&A wave.
During the period January 1998 to May 2000, lower performance is significantly
associated with CEO turnover for the performance window, -26 to -3 months
(p<0.10). For the later period from May 2000 to December 2002, we find no
significant relation between pre-takeover performance and post-takeover CEO
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Panel C Table 4.6 presents the results from leverage tests by using the ratio of total
debt to total assets. For each sample, we find capital leverages are significantly
different from zero across all time windows. Although the leverage of targets with
post-takeover CEO turnover is higher than that for targets with no CEO turnover
after takeover for all time windows, the difference is not statistically significant.
Overall, our results in Table 4.5 show some significant associations between post-
takeover CEO turnover and determinants such as CEO age, CEO-founder, CEO
duality, stock and cash payment, hostile takeovers in the rising M&A wave, and
CEO tenure, CEO duality, blockholders ownership, cross-border takeovers, high-tech
takeovers, legal difference, stock and mixed payment in the slumping M&A wave.
In addition, our results in Table 4.6 show that post-takeover CEO turnover is weakly
associated with stock performance prior to takeover announcements only in the early
subperiod, January 1998 to May 2000, but no significant association is found in the
later subperiod. It provides modest support for the role of corporate takeovers as a
source of discipline based on target stock performance in the boom period ofM&A
activities.
4.4.2 CEO Turnover Rates for Extreme Quartiles of Performance and Leverage
To add additional insight to the performance-turnover and leverage-turnover relation,
we compare post-takeover CEO turnover rates in the lowest and highest performance
quartiles and leverage quartiles.
• CEO Turnover Rates for Extreme Quartiles ofTarget Firm Pre-takeover
Performance
In Panel A of Table 4.7, we compare post-takeover CEO turnover rates for extreme
performance quartiles based on industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) over performance
windows 1 to 2 years prior to the year of takeover announcement. For each sample of
target firms, post-takeover CEO turnover rates are lower for takeovers in the highest
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than lowest performance quartiles across all performance windows. A significant
difference exists for the full sample over performance windows of (-2, -1) and (Year
-1), and for the rising M&A wave over the performance window of (Year -1). For
example, on the rising side of the M&A wave over the performance window of (Year
-1), the CEO turnover rate for the high performance quartile is 34.29% while the
CEO turnover rate for the lowest performance quartile is 54.29%. The difference is
about 20% and statistically significant.
Panel B of Table 4.7 shows similar results when using market-adjusted stock return
as performance measures. In particular, for the full sample over performance window
-26 to -3 months, the rate of CEO turnover is 37.04% for the highest quartile of stock
performance, which is significantly lower than the 55.56% of the CEO turnover rate
for the lowest performance quartile. But no significant difference is found in the two
subperiods.
• CEO Turnover for Extreme Quartile ofTarget Firm Pre-takeover Leverage
Panel C of Table 4.7 presents results for the leverage-turnover relation using the ratio
of total debts to total assets. Generally, for each sample across all leverage windows,
the CEO turnover rate for the highest leverage quartile is higher than that for the
lowest leverage quartile. The difference in turnover rates, however, is statistically
significant only over -1 year leverage interval for the rising side of the recent M&A
wave. Average CEO turnover rate is significantly higher among targets in the highest
quartile of than that among targets in the lowest quartile of targets (57.14% vs.
37.14%).
Taken together, the results presented in Table 4.7 provide more evidence that, in the
rising M&A wave, target performance-turnover and leverage-turnover relationships
are weakly statistically significant. This indicates that takeover market applied weak
discipline only in the boom of the recent M&A wave.
138
Table4.7
Post-takeoverTurnoverRat sfor217UKT rg tFirmsfSucc s fulT ke rsf m19982002Extr mePerf anceQuartiles
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4.5 CEO Turnover and Various Determinants: Multivariate Tests
In this section, we use multivariate tests to examine the relation between CEO
turnover and various determinants. To test whether the disciplinary effects of
takeovers are sensitive to changes in the intensity of takeover activity, we include a
time dummy as a deal characteristic. The time dummy variable is equal to 1 for
takeovers over the period January 1998 to May 2000, and equal to 0 for takeovers
during the period June 2000 to December 2002. We employ logistic regressions to
estimate the probability of CEO turnover as a function of the same four sets of
independent variables as above: CEO characteristics, target governance
characteristics, deal characteristics and target firm characteristics.
Three different sets of regressions are estimated, based on three different samples:
the full sample (including the time dummy), takeovers on the rising side and the
slumping side of recent M&A wave (excluding the time dummy). For each set of
target firms, we test the relationships between the independent variables and post-
takeover CEO turnover. To test whether the determinants may have different impacts
on CEO turnover for different periods after takeovers, the dependent variable, CEO
turnover, is modelled over different windows as before: Year 0 (the year of takeover
announcement), Year +1 (one year after the year of the announcement) and Y+2 (two
years after the year of the announcement). We also employ the same measures of
target performance and leverage prior to the takeover announcement.
4.5.1 The Full Sample
• CEO turnover by the end of the year of takeover announcement (Y0)
Table 4.8 shows the results of our tests on the full sample, where we include the time
dummy. The dependent variable in the first set of regressions is the probability of
CEO turnover by the end of the year of the takeover announcement.
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All of the results are almost qualitatively the same as the findings in Table 3.11 of
Chapter 3, where the time dummy was not included. So the coefficients on CEO-
founder are significant negative (p<0.05). This indicates that the probability of CEO
turnover shortly after takeover announcement is lower if CEO was the founder of
target firm. The coefficients on CEO duality are significant and negative (p<0.05 or
/K0.10) in the first set of regressions. This implies that the probability of post-
takeover turnover of the CEO is lower for targets with CEO duality. The coefficients
of cross-border takeovers are significantly negative (p<0.10). Hence, when target
firms are involved in cross-border takeovers, the probability of post-takeover CEO
turnover is lower.
In addition, we find a significantly negative relation between post-takeover CEO
turnover and stock payment in the transaction (p<0.05). Stock payment could reduce
the possibility ofCEO turnover after takeovers. The coefficients of takeover attitude
are statistically significant and positive (/?<0.10). For target pre-takeover
performance, the coefficient is negative and significant in the regression by using
IAROA one year prior to takeover announcement (p<0.10).
The coefficient of the time dummy is positive, but not statistically significant. This
indicates that the intensity of M&A activities does not significantly affect the
probability ofpost-takeover CEO turnover.
• CEO turnover one year after takeover announcement (Y+l)
The dependent variable in the second set of regressions in Table 4.8 is CEO turnover
one year after takeover announcement. The results are again the same qualitatively as
in Table 3.11 in Chapter 3. The coefficients of CEO-founder are significant and
negative (p<0.05). It indicates that the influence of the founder may still exist one
year later. The coefficients of cross-border and IAROA (-1 year) are significantly
negative (p<0.05, p<0.10), which suggests they are negatively related to CEO
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Moreover, in this set of regressions, we find that the coefficients on CAR are
significant and negative (p<0.01, /?<(). 10), suggesting that stock performance
significantly affects CEO turnover one year after the takeover announcement.
Meanwhile, some significant coefficients appeared in first set disappear in this set,
such as CEO duality, stock payment and attitude. But no significant effect of the time
dummy is found.
• CEO turnover at two years after takeover announcement (Y+2)
The dependent variable in the third set of regressions in Table 4.8 is CEO turnover
two years after takeover announcement. The results show that, even after two years,
some coefficients on pre-takeover variables are still statistically significant. The
coefficient of CEO reputation is significant and negative (p<0.10), which suggest
that the higher CEO reputation, the lower the probability of CEO turnover. In
addition, we no longer find a significant relation between CEO-founder and CEO
turnover.
In the regression using target pre-takeover performance one year prior to takeover
announcement, cross-border takeovers still have a weakly significant negative
relation to CEO turnover. In this regression, we find a significant positive coefficient
on legal difference, which indicates a positive relation between post-takeover CEO
turnover and legal system difference. In addition, the coefficients on CAR are also
significantly negative, which indicates that, two years after announcements, stock
performance still has a negative influence on CEO turnover.
Taken together, the results reported in Table 4.8 are very similar to those in Table
3.11 of Chapter 3. Although we add the new variable "time dummy" to distinguish
the effect of the rising and slumping side of the recent M&A wave, the coefficients
are not statistically significant in any of the regressions. This suggests no significant
relationship between post-takeover CEO turnover and the intensity of M&A
activities.
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4.5.2 Takeovers between January 1998 and May 2000
In this section, we re-estimate the logistic models presented in Table 4.8 using
samples from the subperiod of January 1998 to May 2000. Table 4.9 summarizes the
results of the logistic regressions.
The first set of results in Table 4.9 show the results related to CEO turnover on Y0.
Once again, regressions indicates that the probability of post-takeover CEO turnover
is lower for targets with CEO duality, stock payment in the transaction and pre-
takeover accounting performance measured by IAROA (-1 year). Moreover, in each
regression, the coefficients of CEO age are also significant and positive (p<0.05,
/K0.01). This suggests that CEO age is significantly and positively related to the
probability of CEO turnover. In this subperiod, older targets' CEOs have higher
probability of departing. The coefficients on CEO ownership are also significant and
positive (p<0.05, /?<0.10), which means that higher CEO ownership of target shares
is related to a higher probability of CEO turnover shortly after a takeover
announcement. It may be the case that such CEOs sell their own shares and leave the
target firms
In the second set of regressions relating to Year +1, we find similar results, that CEO
age is significantly positively related to CEO turnover one year after announcement,
and a significant negative association is found between the CEO turnover and CEO-
founder, CEO duality, and IAROA (-1 year) and (-2 years). Moreover, the
coefficients on auction and size difference are significant and positive (p<0.05). This
indicates that the probability of CEO turnover one year after announcement is higher
for targets involving multiple bidders and with a small size difference. Regressions in
the third set, relating to Year +2, show similar results. CEO age, auction and size
difference are all significantly positively related to CEO turnover two years after the
takeover announcement, while CEO-founder and CEO duality have a significant
negative association with CEO turnover two years following the takeover.
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4.5.3 Takeovers between June 2000 and December 2002
In this section, we repeat our regressions using another subsample from the
subperiod of June 2000 to December 2002. The results are presented in Table 4.10.
In the first set of regressions, more CEO characteristics appear statistically
significant. Older CEOs, long tenure and high reputation are all associated with a low
probability of CEO turnover shortly after takeover announcement. But on the rising
side of the wave, these factors have the opposite but insignificant effect on post-
takeover CEO turnover. CEO age is in contrast to the findings for the rising side of
the wave where it has the opposite effect on post-takeover CEO turnover. The
experience and stature of CEO are always represented by the CEO's age, tenure and
reputation (Cotter et al. (1997), Kini et al. (2004)) and, in the falling part of the
M&A wave, these factors decrease the probability of CEO turnover. This suggests
that acquiring firms may value the knowledge of target CEOs more in the slumping
M&A wave. Moreover, the coefficient on blockholders' ownership is significantly
negative, when the regression includes target firms' performance two years prior to
the takeover announcement. But it was not significant in the rising part of the wave.
This suggests that, in the falling part of the wave, the higher the proportion of target
shares owned by blockholders, the lower the probability of CEO turnover following
takeovers. Thus, the internal governance mechanism, blockholders, appears to
significantly monitor target management and lead to lower CEO turnover rate on the
slumping side but not the rising side of the wave.
The results also show that CEO turnover is also lower for targets involved in cross-
border takeovers, auctions and high-tech takeovers, which have no significant
association with the probability of CEO turnover in the rising M&A wave. This
suggests that, compared with the decreasing M&A activities on the slumping side of
the wave, cross-border takeovers were dramatically growing and acquiring firms
might need more help from target CEOs. Meanwhile, multiple bidders might provide
more change to target CEOs to secure their job in the new firm. In high-tech
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takeovers, acquiring firms might pay more attention to the advantage of target CEOs
after the bubble burst.
Similar to the first set, the results in the second regression sets show that CEO age,
CEO reputation and cross-border takeover are significantly negatively related to the
probability ofCEO turnover one year after the takeover announcement. Furthermore,
the coefficient on outsiders is significant and negative when using pre-takeover
performance two years prior to the announcement. This differs from the rising part of
the wave. It implies that another internal governance mechanism, outsiders, becomes
active and reduces the probability ofCEO turnover following takeovers.
In the third set of regressions on the probability of CEO turnover two years after
takeover announcement, we find similar results. CEO age, CEO reputation, cross-
border takeovers and high-tech takeovers are significantly negatively related to CEO
turnover. CEO-founder, CEO duality and legal difference have significant and
positive association with CEO turnover.
Among three set of regressions, we find no significant effect of pre-takeover
performance and leverage on CEO turnover. But the significant negative
performance-turnover relationship is found in the rising M&A wave. This implies
that a weak disciplining function of takeovers exists only in the rising side of the
wave.
4.5.4 Summary
Comparing the two sets of regressions for the rising and slumping side of the M&A
wave, we find that CEO age, CEO-founder, CEO duality and auction are inversely
related to CEO turnover over different time windows. This indicates that, following
the collapse of the stock market in 2000, acquiring firms might become more
cautious and value the ability of target CEOs more than they did early in the rising
period of the wave. Moreover, on the slumping side of the M&A wave, CEO tenure,
CEO reputation, cross-border, high-tech and legal difference appear to have
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significant effects on post-takeover CEO turnover. More governance variables,
blockholders and outsiders, become significant on the slump side. This is consistent
with the study of Huson et al. (2001) that other corporate governance mechanisms
have been well developed in recent years, so that both of blockholders and outsiders
have significant negative effects on post-takeover CEO turnover. In the whole
sample, we find a significant negative relation between post-takeover CEO turnover
and pre-takeover performance measured by IAROA and CAR. When the sample is
split into two subperiods, however, such a performance-turnover relation is confined
to the rising side of the M&A wave. No significant association between pre-takeover
performance and post-takeover CEO turnover is found in the later period on the
slumping side of the M&A wave. Collectively, our evidence indicates that the
intensity of performance-related discipline exerted by the corporate takeovers has
changed significantly over time, which is consistent with the argument of Kini et al.
(2004).
4.6 Robustness Checks and Further Tests
4.6.1 Other Performance and Leverage Measurements
As in Chapter 3, we examine the robustness of our findings to alternative
performance and leverage benchmarks, so that industry-adjusted ROE (IAROE) and
industry-adjusted cash flow margin (IACFM) are employed to test accounting
performance. For the leverage of target firms, we use the net debt to total asset ratio.
Moreover, we extend the pre-takeover time windows beginning 4 years prior to
takeover announcement for accounting performance and leverage, and 38 months
prior to takeover announcement for stock performance.
Univariate tests show that, after extending performance windows, IAROA and CAR
provide more evidence that pre-takeover stock performance is significantly better for
targets without than with CEO turnover following takeovers during the rising M&A
wave. Also, significantly lower CEO turnover rates is found for the highest
performance quartile for IACFM in the slump side over (-3 year, -1 year), (-2 year, -
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1 year) and CAR on the rising side over (-38 month, -3 month). Multiple regressions
strengthen the previous results. Across the extended performance windows, the
significant turnover-performance relations are found using IAROA and CAR in all
samples and the rising M&A wave. But no such significant relations are found on the
slumping side of the wave.
4.6.2 Hofstede's Index for Culture Difference
Following Chapter 3, we employ Hofstede's index to test culture difference and redo
the multiple regressions by using four of Hofstede's indices of culture difference:
individualism, masculinity, power distance and uncertainty avoidance.
The results are similar to those in section 4.5 in terms of the significance of
determinants. In particular, for the whole sample, the coefficient on masculinity is
significantly negative when testing CEO turnover one year after takeover
announcement. It is consistent with the results in Chapter 3. Such an effect is found
for the probability of CEO turnover shortly after and one year following takeover
announcement on the slumping side of the M&A wave. Foreign acquiring firms'
need for target CEOs' knowledge may increase with the growth of cross-border
takeovers on the slumping period of the fourth wave. Generally, masculine acquiring
firms are stressed by firm performance, and such foreign acquiring firms are more
likely to value the benefit brought from target CEO and then keep the target CEO.
4.7 Conclusion
Our results show that a decline ofUK takeover activities from Jan 1998-May 2000 to
June 2000-Dec 2002 was accompanied by decreased post-takeover CEO turnover in
UK public target firms. This study makes several contributions to the existing
literature on the disciplinary role ofUK corporate takeovers.
First, it provides new UK evidence regarding the relation between the probability of
post-takeover CEO turnover and pre-takeover performance over the rising (active)
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and slumping (less active) period of the fourth UK M&A wave. We find a weak but
significantly negative relation between CEO turnover and performance on the rising
part of the M&A wave, which is the active takeover period. This finding is consistent
with the study of Mikkelson and Partch (1997), which reports the presence of a
turnover-performance relation in the active takeover period of 1984-1988 and the
absence of such a relation in the less active takeover period of 1989-1993 in the US.
Hadlock and Lumer (1997) also report no relation between performance and top
management turnover in the inactive takeover period of 1933-1941.
Second, we find new evidence concerning the interplay between corporate takeovers
and other governance mechanisms as alternative disciplining mechanisms over
different intensities of takeover activities. Consistent with the study of Kini et al.
(2004) for US takeovers over the period 1979-1998, we provide evidence that
corporate takeovers serve as a substitute disciplinary mechanism to blockholder
ownership and the percentage of non-executives on the board, but only in the rising
period of the M&A wave, Jan 1998 to May 2000.
Third, regarding special features of the recent M&A wave, we find that cross-border
takeovers have a significant negative relation with post-takeover CEO turnover,
especially in the more active international takeovers of the later period, Jun 2000 to
Dec 2002. This suggests that target CEOs would be more likely to remain in the new
firm following cross-border takeovers. A further insight shows that, in particular,
post-takeover CEO turnover is significantly lower in high-tech takeovers or when
acquirers are more masculine.
Finally, we provide a comprehensive analysis of potential determinants on CEO
turnover over three time windows following takeover announcement (Y0, Y+l and
Y+2). On both the rising side and slumping side of the M&A wave, stock payment
decreases the probability of post-takeover CEO turnover. It is not surprising that
CEOs who desire to retain and influence the new firms would negotiate a stock
payment. Some variables have the reverse relation with CEO turnover in the rising
and slumping period, such as CEO age, CEO-founder, CEO duality and auction. This
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suggests that the intensity of takeover activity may affect the relation between CEO
turnover and these determinants.
In closing, we have not demonstrated that a decrease in takeover activity actually
causes a decline in CEO turnover, although this is possible. The reduction in
takeover activity and the changes of CEO turnover may be explained jointly by
macroeconomic conditions. The slumping period ofM&A waves includes a collapse
of the stock market and slight recession, which could explain the change of
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance. Alternatively, after the "fever",
managers may have been more rational and effective to increase firms' value.
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Chapter 5 The Impact of Takeovers on
Shareholders'Wealth ofAcquiring Firms
5.1 Introduction
How do M&As affect shareholders' wealth? Answering this question may not be
straight forward. Most studies examine the stock behaviour of firms either around
takeover announcement or several years after the takeovers. Event literature written
over the past several decades has become an important part of financial economics.
In a corporate context, many event studies focus on announcement effects for a short-
horizon. A unanimous conclusion of this aspect of empirical literature is that
takeovers create value for the target and bidder shareholders combined, with the
major gains accruing to the target shareholders (Franks et al. (1977), Firth (1979,
1980), Asquith (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrel et al. (1988)). This is a
reasonable result considering the bidding firms must pay an acquisition premium to
target shareholders for giving up their ownership.
However, empirical studies related to wealth effects for acquiring shareholders show
inconclusive results. Some studies report that acquiring firms could have small
positive abnormal announcement returns (Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), Franks
and Harris (1989)), whereas about half of the studies find insignificant or zero
announcement returns (Schwert (2000), Loderer and Martine (1990), Jensen and
Ruback (1983)) and some reveal negative wealth effects for acquiring shareholders
(Andrade et al. (2001), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Franks et al. (1991), Healy et al.
(1992)). Gaining a better understanding in specific contexts and in the new period
would be interesting.
Unlike the previous studies, this up-date research considers the features of the recent
takeover wave and looks at the M&A wave cycle in the UK. This study aims to
provide a new perspective on the existing literature by conducting two main
comparisons: cross-border and domestic takeovers, and takeovers during the rising /
slumping side of the recent M&A wave. The specific contexts and the new period
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would provide a better understanding about the effect of M&As on acquiring
shareholders' wealth. In this chapter, we review the literature on event studies
relating to the acquiring shareholders' returns during takeover announcements and
methodologies employed in most studies. We also develop hypotheses on the
relationship between announcement abnormal returns and some possible
determinants. In subsequent chapters, we present our empirical results.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Our research motivation and research
questions are provided in the next section. Section 5.3 summarises literature on the
shareholder wealth effects around takeover announcements. In terms of features of
the recent M&A waves, we focus on certain circumstances in international M&As
and the intensity of M&A activities. A review of methodologies in event studies is
also provided in this section. Section 5.4 shows the hypotheses on the relationship
between announcement abnormal return and potential determinants. Section 5.5
provides the conclusion.
5.2 Research question
The impact of corporate takeovers on abnormal returns has been researched and
analysed by many over the years. A few studies provide insights into the gains to the
shareholders of both target and acquiring firms. There is a considerable contrast
between the large share price returns of target firms and the frequently small returns
of acquiring firms. The general consensus reached in most studies is that target
shareholders have positive abnormal returns, while the evidence on wealth effects for
acquiring firms are not conclusive. Some empirical tests suggest that the
shareholders of acquirers realize abnormal returns immediately around the
announcement day, while others exhibit negative wealth effects. Some revealed that
the returns are insignificantly different from zero.
Nevertheless, very few studies have studied the relationship between M&A activities
and the general economic conditions. Generally, all kinds of corporate activity and
business decision are influenced by the overall economic circumstances. M&A
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waves have always coincided with high stock market valuations (Crook (1996),
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Shleifer and Vishny (2003)) and shocks to
an industry's economic, technological, or regulatory environment (Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996), Andrade et. al (2001)). The objective of this study is to add a new
dimension to the view of the impact ofM&As on shareholder wealth.
Compared to previous M&A waves, some distinguishing features of the UK fourth
takeover market is that takeovers were large in size and very global (Goergen and
Renneboog (2004), Cosh and Hughes (1996)). The value of cross-border acquisitions
by UK firms had grown from $30m in 1995 to $209m in 1999. Moreover, cross-
border mergers accounted for around 80% of FDI outflows in 20009. Thus, instead of
greenfield investments, mergers and acquisitions have become the predominant form
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US, UK and continental Europe over the
past decade (Goergen and Renneboog (2004), Gregory & McCorrison (2001)). FDI
theory posits that imperfections exist which give multinational firms a competitive
advantage over local firms. Kang (1993) suggests that cross-border acquisitions are
expected to generate more wealth than domestic acquisitions, while Harris and
Ravencraft (1991) argue that abnormal returns of targets in domestic acquisitions are
not expected to differ from those of targets in cross-border takeovers provided that
capital markets are not segmented internationally. Hence, our study would provide
new evidence regarding the market returns of acquiring firms in the UK fourth M&A
wave, which experienced a surge in international corporate activities in the context of
general globalization of the world economy.
Although the fourth M&A wave was distinguished by the high number and value of
deals, it experienced a slump that was coincident with the collapse of the "new
economy bubble". For the UK, M&A activity during the 1990s was characterized by
continual increases in both the number and the value of takeovers. The year 1999
was not only remarkable in terms of the total bid value ($694 billion) in the UK, but
also in terms of the number of deals (4,087deals). But in the year 2002, both figures
9 Data comes from World Investment report 2000: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and
Development, UNCTAD (2000).
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decreased substantially to $196 billion and 2,660 deals10 respectively. The studies on
the US and Europe by Shelton (2000), Martynova and Renneboog (2006) and
Harford (2003) report that takeovers occurring at a later stage of the wave trigger
lower abnormal returns to the bidders shareholders than those at the rising wave,
while Tse and Soufani (2001) find no significant difference in the returns to the
acquiring firms between the M&A active period and the less active period. Thus, we
investigate the wealth effects for shareholders involved in takeovers in two different
economic periods, which are characterised by a difference intensity of takeover
activity in the UK.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that internal corporate governance
mechanisms became prominent and relatively more effective in the late 1990s (Kini
et al. (2004)). These corporate governance mechanisms have an important influence
on corporate strategies, including the takeover of another company. Hence, these
governance mechanisms might be important in explaining the abnormal behaviour at
the announcement of a takeover. The common practice is to test whether board or
ownership structure of a bidder can explain changes in bidder shareholder wealth, or
whether target board or ownership characteristics can explain changes in target
shareholder wealth during a takeover process (Constantinou and Constantinou (2003),
Hermalin (2001), Cosh and Hughes (2001)). However, it is interesting that the cross-
reaction effect between target governance and bidder shareholders wealth is often
neglected. In this study, we try to investigate whether target governance can explain
this effect.
Finally, we study several potential determinants, which may affect abnormal returns
of bidder firms around the takeover announcement. These determinants are divided
into four groups: deal characteristics, target governance characteristics, target and
acquiring firm characteristics. We would like to identify the type of characteristics
which make it more likely that a particular merger will generate or destroy
shareholder value. In the following chapters, we test our hypotheses.
10 Data is from Thomson Financial Securities Data.
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5.3 Literature Review
5.3.1 Shareholder Returns Review
This section focuses on three specific issues: the evidence accumulated through event
studies on the returns to shareholders of acquiring firms accruing around the takeover
announcement; the acquiring shareholder returns following cross-border / domestic
takeovers; and the return to acquiring shareholders following takeovers during the
rising / slumping M&A wave.
5.3.1.1 Brief Review
Early empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions during the early 1970s applied
comparative studies of firm performance to test for synergy in mergers and
acquisitions. Mandelker (1974) applied the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology
to examine the profitability of mergers. This is considered as the first modern
treatment of the financial consequences of mergers, since completion dates are
precisely determined and abnormal returns are calculated relative to a benchmark.
Mandelker considers the time period from several months prior to the merger to
several months following the merger, and finds that the acquiring firms earn a normal
rate of return on the acquisitions. Following this pioneering study, researchers carried
out extensive studies on the wealth effects of takeover activities throughout the entire
acquisition process.
Most studies find that target firm shareholders, on average, experience negative
abnormal returns from five to two years prior to the takeover announcement. In
contrast, the vast majority of studies on the bidding firm shareholders earn significant
positive abnormal returns from five to two years prior to the takeover announcement.
Mandelker (1974) finds that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of bidding firms
increased by 5.1% during the 30 month prior to merger. Asquith (1983) finds that the
CAR for both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms has risen to 14.3% and 2.2%
respectively from 48 months prior to the month of the takeover announcement.
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Schipper and Thompson (1983) find that the increase in CAR from month -24 to the
event month is over 20%. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that
bidding firms have a good performance several years prior to the takeover bid.
However, Firth (1980) found normal returns to bidding firms four or two years
before the announcement of the takeover.
During the period of takeover announcement, there is striking evidence of large
significant abnormal returns to the target firm shareholders. But the results for
bidding firms are mixed. There are three groups of studies each with different results.
One group finds that bidding firm shareholders earn a small but significant positive
abnormal return on the announcement date of takeover proposal. Asquith, Bruner and
Mullins (1983) report that average announcement date abnormal returns for all
merger bids is 0.9% with a t-statistic of 4.68. Franks and Harris (1989) find that UK
bidding firm shareholders earn significant positive abnormal returns in the month of
takeover announcement. Similarly, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find significant
abnormal returns of 1.40% for UK bidder shareholders in the month of takeover
announcement.
Another group argues that bidding firm stockholders experience a normal rate of
return during the bid announcement date. Asquith (1983) reports little reaction on the
announcement day of a merger bid for both successful and unsuccessful bidding
firms. The two-day (day -1 and day 0) abnormal returns are 0.2% for successful
bidding firms and 0.5% for unsuccessful bidding firms. Both are statistically
insignificant. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) find an insignificant average CAR of
0.79% for a sample of 236 bidding firms from event day -5 to +5.
The third group of studies reveals a small but significant negative abnormal return at
the announcement of the bid. Dodd (1980) finds a significant abnormal return of -
0.4% at day -1 and -0.62% at day 0. Travlos (1987) reveals that in particular bidding
firms choosing common stock financing had a negative effect on their common stock
returns at the announcement. Significant abnormal returns are found on the day -1 (-
0.78%) and on day 0 (-0.69%). Moreover, Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) find
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that UK bidding firm shareholders suffer a significant negative abnormal return of -
1.26% on the day of the merger proposal announcement. Another UK study of
Draper and Paudyal (1999) observes a small but significant negative abnormal return,
for bidder shareholders, of -0.82% (equally weighted) and -0.66% (value-weighted)
on the announcement day of the merger proposal.
For post-acquisition performance, the issue is not unambiguous. Amajority of studies,
both in the UK and elsewhere, have documented a pattern of long-running
significantly negative post acquisition returns to the shareholders of the bidding firms.
The study by Franks and Harris (1989) examine a nearly exhaustive sample of 1,800
UK takeovers in the period 1955-1985, and they find that successful bidding firms
suffer significant wealth loss with the CAR of-12.6% in the two-year period after
the completion of the takeovers. By using six benchmarks, Gregory (1997) finds that
the two years post-merger CARs ofUK bidding companies are between -11.8% and -
18% under these six different models, all ofwhich are statistically significant.
5.3.1.2 Shareholder Returns Following Cross-border and Domestic Takeovers
A large number of studies have addressed the issue of M&As merely from a
domestic point of view (Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter
(1988) and Jenson (1988)). The literatures were reviewed in the previous section.
Cross-border takeovers have received more limited attention in the finance literature
and most studies have considered the impact on target firms. Harris and Ravenscraft
(1991) examine shareholders' wealth gains for 1,273 US target firms during 1970-
1987 and compare the effect of acquisition made by foreign and by US firms. Their
conclusion is that target shareholders are offered higher wealth gains by foreign firms
than those by US firms over the window (day -3, day +1), which were 39.77% vs.
26.33%, respectively. In particular, Conn and Connell (1990) examine the returns to
shareholders of firms involved in international transactions between American and
British firms. Their results show that cumulative abnormal returns for targets
acquired by UK firms are about 50% of those of targets acquired by US firms.
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Some research has considered the impact of cross-border acquisitions on returns of
acquiring firms. But the findings are mixed. Some studies discover significant
positive returns to foreign acquirers. Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon (1996) examine
shareholder wealth gains for 195 foreign firms that acquired US target firms during
1983-1992. Their results show that foreign acquirers have significant and positive
abnormal returns of about 2% over (day -10, day +10), and no positive wealth effect
for US bidders in the full sample. Choi and Tsai (2002) investigate the market
reaction for 369 US firms acquiring foreign target firms during the period of 1992-
2000. Their results show significantly positive CARs of 1.08% over the event
window (day -1, day 0), and more significant positive CARs are found over three
short-term intervals, (day -1, day 0), (day -1, day +1) and (day -1, day +5).
However, other research finds the acquiring firms suffer from significant loss in
international transactions. Mathur et al. (1994) study 77 bidding firms from 10
countries during 1984-1988 and find that stockholders of foreign bidders earn
significant, negative abnormal returns of -0.08% surrounding the announcement of
acquisitions in the US. These negative abnormal returns increase to -1.80% over the
15 days after the announcement of acquisitions. Datta and Puia (1995) report
negative cumulative stock returns implying that cross-border M&As may actually
destroy value for US acquiring firms.
There are some studies that discover no significant wealth effects for foreign bidders
over the announcement period. Doukas and Travlos (1988) examine foreign
acquisitions from 1975 through 1983 and report a positive but insignificant
announcement day return of 0.08% for a sample of 301 US firms. The study of
Fatemi and Furtado (1988) investigate foreign acquisitions by US bidders and their
results show no significant (day -1, day 0) window effects. Biswas et al. (1989)
report insignificant announcement day returns for the 52 bidders that include 49 from
the US and 3 from the UK. Servas and Zenner (1994) study the returns to 70 foreign
bidders during the period 1979-1988 and report negative but insignificant abnormal
returns for the (day -1, day 0) window. Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) study the
wealth effects of US firms involved in international transactions during 1982-1991
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and discover no significant wealth gains for US bidders.
Only a limited body of research provides empirical evidence on share returns for UK
firms that engaged in cross-border takeovers. Based on a sample of 343 foreign
acquisitions by UK firms over the period 1985-1994, Gregory and McCorriston
(2001) investigate the performance of UK acquiring firms over the event window
(day -3, day +1). Their results show that short-run returns are insignificantly different
from zero irrespective of the locations of the acquisitions. Conn et al. (2003) examine
the announcement share returns of 4,000 acquisitions by UK public firms during
1984-1998. In the acquisitions of cross-border public targets, abnormal returns are
zero (insignificant CAR of -0.09) over the announcement period (day -1, day +1),
while abnormal returns for acquiring domestic public targets are -0.99, which is
statistically significant.
In terms of non-US countries, King (1993) investigates the abnormal returns of
Japanese bidders for US companies and finds positive abnormal returns to the
bidders. Corhay and Rad (2000) find weak significant positive abnormal returns for a
sample of Dutch firms involved in cross-border takeovers. In terms of cross-country
comparison, Eun et al. (1996) have shown that abnormal returns to bidding firms
vary across countries, such as positive abnormal returns for Japanese acquiring firms
but considerable negative returns for UK acquiring firms.
A clear conclusion is that economically large and statistically significant wealth gains
are made by the shareholders of target firms, especially in international transactions.
But reported returns to foreign acquiring firm shareholders at the time of bid
announcements are very ambiguous.
5.3.1.3 Shareholder Returns Following the Rising-side and Slumping-side
Takeovers of the M&A wave
Only a limited number of studies consider the characteristics of the prevailing
economic activity period when assessing shareholders' gains in takeover.
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A large sample of 2,194 transactions across European countries is studied by
Martynova and Renneboog (2006). Three periods are examined: the beginning of the
wave (1993-1996), the middle of the wave (1997-1999) and the slow period (2000-
2001). They find that, in the 1997-99 period, the target firms' gains at the
announcement day are the highest, which is about 10%. The differences between the
targets' returns in the three periods are statistically significant. However, acquirers'
gains experienced substantial decline subsequent to the M&A peak of 2000, from -
1.30% in the 1997-99 period to -9.87% in the 2000-2001 period. They argue that,
from the middle of 2000, the M&A market became bleak and the stock market
declined, which made acquiring shareholders very pessimistic about future synergies
of takeovers.
In another European M&A study by Goergen and Renneboog (2004), a sample of
142 deals was split into two periods: takeovers before 1999 and those in 1999-2000.
They find a significant difference in terms of abnormal returns around the
announcements for the target firms in the two periods. However, there is little
difference in announcement reactions for acquiring firms prior to and after 1st
January 1999.
Tse and Soufani (2001) investigate 124 takeovers in the UK between 1990 and 1996.
They find a link between the wealth effects of shareholders and the prevailing
economic condition by analyzing abnormal returns for shareholders in two different
economic periods. For the target firms, the returns for hostile bids generated greater
returns in the high merger activity era (1990-1993) than in the low merger activity
era (1994-1996). The returns to friendly takeovers are fairly similar to each other.
The abnormal return for friendly acquirers is 1.66% on the event month in the low
merger activity era, while the acquirer return is 1.35% in the high merger activity era.
The situation reversed in the three months following takeover announcement. But the
patterns of abnormal returns for acquiring firms are relatively consistent for both eras.
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) examine 4,430 acquisitions by US firms between
1985 and 1995. They compare the announcement day abnormal returns for cross-
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border and domestic acquisitions that occurred during the period of 1985-1990 and
1990-1995. Domestic acquiring firms experienced significantly higher returns in the
period 1990-1995 than in 1985-1990, 1.49% vs. 0.44%. No significant difference is
found for cross-border acquirers in the two periods.
It seems that the abnormal returns for targets' shareholders have distinctive patterns
for two periods with distinguishing economic conditions, the returns being positively
correlated with aggregate economic activity. But for acquiring firm shareholders, we
have to be more cautious in making the same claim, as the previous findings are
much less conclusive.
5.3.2 Methodology Review
In this section, we provide an overview of event study methods. Although some
serious limitations remain in long-term methods, short-term methodologies are
relatively straightforward and trouble-free. Normally, two main issues are considered
in event study methodology: choice ofmodel and choice of significance tests.
5.3.2.1 Models in Event Study
An event study typically tries to examine the return behaviour for a sample of firms
that experience a common type of event, such as the announcement of takeover or
the announcement of a dividend. Let t = 0 represent the time of the event. For each
sample security i, the abnormal return, AR„, is the difference between the actual
return Rjt and the counter-factual expected returnRit, if the event had not occurred.
ARu=Rit-K
The key is how we measure the expected return Rjt. An increasing body of research
has sought to measure abnormal returns in more reliable ways. A brief summary of
previous literature is as follows:
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• Market Model:
The Market Model is considered as the implication of the assumption of the two-
parameter portfolio model. It is widely used in event studies, which research the
adjustment of stock prices to an event. Most studies of mergers and acquisitions
employ the market model to calculate abnormal returns (Dodd and Ruback (1977),
Firth (1979), Malatesta (1983), Barnes (1984) with an added industry factor, Dodds
and Quek (1985), Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988),
Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991)). The market model specifies the
following linear relationship between security i returns and returns on a market
portfolio.
Rit=ai+PiRmt+sit
Where: Ru = the rate of return on security i over period of t,
Rmt = the rate of return on a value weighted (or equally weighted) market
portfolio in time period t
a[ and /?. = security-specific parameters that vary from one security to another,
sit = the random disturbance term of security i at time t, and E( sit )=0. In the
market model, the effects of company-specific information should show
up in this disturbance.
Under specific assumptions about the sit distribution, ai and /?. can be estimated by
least squares. They are calculated by regressing daily/monthly returns for security i
on the daily/monthly returns of the market index for a period prior to the bid, which
is unaffected by any information related to the bid. When we get the estimates ai
and Pt, we can calculate the abnormal returns as follows:
Where:
sit = the residual or the abnormal performance of security i at time t.
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• Fama-French Three-Factor Model
Over time, researchers have found that stock market ft seems unable to explain the
cross-sectional variation in average returns. Size, leverage, book-to-market equity
(BE/ME), and earnings-price ratios (E/P) have all been found to help to explain the
cross-section variation of expected returns.
Fama and French (1993) identify three common risk factors in stock returns: an
overall market factor, factors related to firm size (ME) and book-to-market equity
(BE/ME). They argue these three factors can explain the cross-section variation of
returns better than others.
Based on empirical tests of Fama and French (1992, 1993), Fama and French (1993)
state that: "Many continue to use the one-factor Sharpe-Lintner model to evaluate
portfolio performance and to estimate the cost of capital, despite the lack of evidence
that it is relevant. At a minimum, the results here and in Fama and French (1992)
should help to break this common habit."
The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is widely used in recent studies. The
abnormal return based on this three-factor model is specified as follows:
= R, R, +AK, - R,)+fXSMB)+4 ]
Where:
Rmt = the monthly return on a value-weighted market portfolio
SMB = the value-weighted return on small firms minus the value-weighted return
in big firms (Small Minus Big)
HML = the value-weighted return on high book-to-market firms minus the value-
weighted return on low book-to-market firms (High Minus Low)
• Size and Book-to-market Adjusted Method (reference portfolio approach)
Some studies do not use any specific model at all (Anderson and Mandelker (1993),
Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998)). Following the spirit of Fama
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and French (1992, 1993, 1996), they calculate abnormal returns for each firm relative
to its size and book-to-market benchmark. Thus, for each firm, the abnormal return is
the difference between its daily/monthly return and that of its reference portfolio.
• Other Models
Other models used to calculate the AR are:
(1) CAPM: sit=Ru ~[Rft + #(*_ -/?,)]
This is anther popular model to calculate the abnormal return. In studies ofmergers
and acquisitions, it is used by Langetieg (1978), Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988),
Franks and Harris (1989), Gregory (1997). But Roll (1977) and Brown and Warner
(1980, 1985) criticize the empirical CAPM as being computationally more complex
and costly than the simpler market model and the mean adjusted return model but not
superior in its performance.
(2) Mean Adjusted Return Model: /^" ~~
This model is used by Lathey and Conn (1990) for merger studies, since the
calculation is relatively simple.
(3) Market/Index Adjusted Return Model: ARa = Rit -Rml
This kind of model is to calculate abnormal returns adjusted by the market (where it
is market model with ai constrained to zero and /?. constrained to 1) or some kind of
index. It is also popular in merger studies (Langetieg (1978), Dodds and Quek (1985),
Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988), Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991), Franks,
Harris and Titman (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996)). Gregory (1997) provides
more complicated multi-index models, which use a form of post-event extended
CAPM incorporating a small-companies effect. Gregory argues that these models
have the advantage of showing that "beta risk and firm size are significant in
explaining the cross-section of expected return".
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> Multi-index model using equally-weighted smaller decile minus large decile
returns (SML):
4 =R„-[R,+A(- ) + ( ~K)
where:
Rsl = the return on an equally weighted portfolio of smaller firms in event
month t;
Rlt = the return on an equally weighted portfolio of largest firms in event
month t.
> Value weighted multi-index model using the Hoare-Govett Index as the
measure of small firm performance:
eu = R» -
where:
Rllt = the return on the Hoare-Govett Smaller firms index in event month t.
(4) Dimson-Marsh risk and size adjusted model (DM):
4 =A,-K+(A-A)K "*/>)]
where:
Rsl = return on the size control portfolio in event month t\
Ps = CAPM beta of size control portfolio.
This model is used by Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992), and Gregory (1997) in
the studies ofM&A.
(5) Simple size control portfolio (SS):
£u =Ri,-Rst
where:
Rsl = return on the size control portfolio in event month t;
This model is provided by Gregory (1997). Meanwhile, he points out one weakness,
in that it defines decile membership at the beginning of year market capitalisation, so
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that decile membership cannot be adjusted accurately throughout the calendar year.
(6) Return across time and security method:
4 -M
where:
Rsl = the equally-weighted return across all firms in the same size decile as firm
i
Agrawal, JafFe and Mandelker (1992), Loderer and Martin (1992) use this model to
test abnormal returns.
Moreover, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) provide a ten-factor model and an eight-
portfolio model.
(7) The Carhart (1997) four-factor model
To our knowledge, the newest model of performance measurement is the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model. It is motivated by the Fama-French three-factor model's
limitation to explain cross-section variation in momentum-sorted portfolio returns.
Based on the Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart constructs his four-factor
model by adding the new factor capturing Jegadeesh and Timan's (1993) one-year
momentum anomaly. He states that "it may be interpreted as a performance
attribution model, where the coefficients and premia on the factor-mimicking
portfolios indicate the proportion of mean return attributable to four elementary
strategies: high versus low beta stocks, large versus small market capitalization
stocks, value versus growth stocks, and one-year return momentum versus contrarian
stocks." The model is:
Rit - Rft = cciT + fia(Rm, -Rfi) + siTSMBt + hiTHMLt + piTPR\YRt +
t = 1,2,...J7
where Rit, SMB , HML are the same as the Fama-French three-factor model, PR1YR
is an equally weighed portfolio return of stocks with highest returns less an equally
weighted portfolio return with lowest returns in month t-12 to t-2.
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Summary
Merger event studies, like event studies in general, have used various return
generating models to estimate firm abnormal returns after controlling for general
market conditions. Each of these models is used to estimate the counter-factual return
if the announcement of the acquisition had not been made. The earliest model is the
simple, one-index market model. In the later studies, researchers find that more
factors could help to explain the cross-section variation in expected return, such as
size, leverage, book-to-market equity (BE/ME), and earnings-price ratios (E/P).
Some studies provide a review of some main event study methods and of research
concerning them (Armitage (1995), Kothari et. al (2006)). After bringing together
and comparing their performance, the market model is, generally, the best supported
one in the sense that it is always at least as powerful as the best alternative, although
the different models produce similar but not identical results. When examining short-
run returns over several days surrounding an event, the market model seems to be
sufficient in most of the studies (Armitage (1995)).
5.3.2.1 Significance Tests in Event Studies
For a given performance measure, such as AR or CAR, a test statistic is computed to
test if it is significantly different from zero. A wide variety of approaches have been
used to measure significance. We present some of these here. Generally, a
significance test can be carried out in two main ways: one is to use a parametric test,
the other is a non parametric test.
• Parametric test statistics
In parametric tests, the variable whose value is to be tested is assumed to have a
parametric distribution. In this section, abnormal return (AR) and cumulative returns
(CAR) are assumed to be estimated using the market model. Under the null
hypothesis, Ho, that the event has no impact on the mean and variance of abnormal
returns, the distribution of the sample abnormal returns in the event window is
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assumed to be normal:
~ N (0, <J2 {ARit))
The distribution of the cumulative abnormal returns from time r, to time r2 under Ho
is
CAR, (r,, r2) ~ N (0, Var(CARi (r,, r2)))
For instance, the null hypothesis, H0, for the CAR can be tested using
CAR(tx,T2)
(Var(CAR(rvr2)))V2
Similar tests are for the AR. This is the basic approach. This distributional result is
asymptotic with respect to the number of securities N and the length of time window
L.
A variety of modifications to the basic approach presented above have been made.
One general modification is to standardize abnormal returns using an estimator of the
standard deviation. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) provide more common
approaches, which are used in most event studies. Armitage (1995) provides a review
of some main event study methods and of research which has used them. He outlines
three widely used methods of significant tests: the share time series method, the
portfolio time series method and the cross-sectional method. The conclusion is that
each method has different advantages in different circumstances.
The choice of significance tests depends mainly on the characteristics of market
model errors. Hence, when choosing a method, certain issues should be considered,
for example whether the model errors are cross-correlated or whether there is an
event period where the error variance increases. According to Armitage (1995), one
uses the portfolio time series method when errors are cross-correlated. The cross-
sectional method is appropriate when there are no cross-correlated errors but there is
an increase in variance in the event period. The share time series method with a t-test




The parametric tests typically assume that abnormal returns are normally distributed.
Alternative approaches are available which are non-parametric in nature. These
approaches are free of specific assumptions about the distribution of returns.
Common nonparametric tests for event studies are the sign test and the rank test.
> Sign test
The sign test transforms a security's abnormal returns into sign values. It assumes
that the probability of a positive abnormal return is equal to the probability of a
negative abnormal return. Under the null hypothesis of a median AR equal to zero, in




the standard deviation S(G) = j—(~y= Glt )2
y T ,=1 vN ,=i
where N is the number of securities, and Git is the sign of the difference
between ARiand median (ARt), which is +1, -1 or 0 for positive, negative,
or zero values of ARt respectively.





where N+ is the number of securities where the abnormal return is
positive
N is the total number of securities
> Rank test
A shortcoming of the sign test is that it may not be a good specification if
the ARt distribution is skewed. Corrado (1989) proposes a non-parametric rank test.
The framework is as follows.
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Define Kit as the rank of the abnormal return of security i for event time period T. It
is standardized by dividing by one plus the number of non-missing returns in time
period T, which is shown as Uu . The test statistic for the null hypothesis of no
abnormal return on event day 0 is
In the studies of Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Maynes and Rumsey (1993), the
rank test is found to be more powerful than the sign test. Corrado argues that the
superior advantage of the rank test is that there is no requirement that the share
returns or market model errors are normally distributed.
It is rare to use these non-parametric tests in isolation and they are typically used in
conjunction with the parametric tests. Thus, they provide a robustness check on the
conclusions based on the parametric tests. Gampbell and Wasley (1993, 1996) even
find that the rank test is more reliable and powerful than other standard parametric
tests.
5.4 Hypothesis
In this section we develop the hypotheses about the relation between acquiring
shoulders' return around the takeover announcement and various factors.
5.4.1 Deal Characteristics
a/. Cross-border/domestic takeover
Hai: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns are more likely to be different around
/
N is the number of securities
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the announcements of cross-border takeovers than around the announcements of
domestic takeovers.
Given the trend of globalization of the world economy, one would expect that
acquiring companies believe that the potential benefits ofmoving to an international
operation would be greater than its cost. Theoretically, beyond the usual benefits that
domestic takeovers may bring about, cross-border takeovers may lead to further
benefit. Under certain international market conditions, shareholders may benefit from
international corporate diversification through cross-border takeovers. One benefit
may be lower risk and a lower cost of capital in partially segmented international
capital markets (Davis (1991)). An international operation could increase operating
efficiency by internalizing transactions within one company (Choi and Tsai (2002)).
Moreover, to some extent, international markets for corporate control may be less
competitive than domestic ones (Choi and Tsai (2002)), so there is a lower chance of
overbidding and so potential for greater post-merger gains.
However, some argue that capital markets and the market for corporate control are
not segmented internationally. Thus, one would not expect abnormal returns to
shareholders to be systematically different in domestic and cross-border takeovers
(Harris and Ravenscrafit (1991), Danbolt (2004)). There is disagreement as to
whether benefits extend to corporate diversification (Fatemi (1984), Michel and
Shaked (1986)). In addition, the integration of cross-border takeovers is always
challenging due to complex issues such as information asymmetries and culture
differences, which may write off or reduce the potential gains. An increase in hubris
and agency problems in cross-border takeovers could lead to culture clashes and
lower bidder returns (Denis et al. (2002))
The existing evidence with regard to acquiring firms is limited and rather
controversial. Hite et al. (1987) found that firms gain in acquisitions of US domestic
divestitures. Gadad (1998) finds the evidence, with regard to UK acquiring firms in
cross-border takeovers, to be inconclusive. Markides and Ittner (1994) and Cakici et
al. (1996) find positive abnormal returns to acquiring shareholders in cross-border
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acquisitions. On the other hand, Datta and Puia (1995), Waheed and Mathur (1995),
Eun et al. (1996) and Danbolt (1995) report negative abnormal returns. Servaes and
Zenner (1990, 1994) and Sudia (1992) find no abnormal returns.
d}. Legal Differences
Ha2: Acquiring shareholders are more likely to gain different abnormal returns
around the announcements of takeovers from countries with a non-English common
law system, than from those with a English common law.
Variations in the gains across acquiring countries occur in cross-border takeovers
(Eun et al. (1996) and Cakici at al. (1996)). Martynova and Renneboog (2006) argue
that differences in laws and their enforcement may explain some part of the variation.
Corhay and Rad (2000) also find that the different legal and institutional regulations
of the EU, compared with the US and the UK, influence the cross-country
distribution of foreign acquisitions. This is consistent with recent work on how
corporate governance varies between countries. In the study by La Porta et al. (2000,
2002), it is found that the characteristics of corporate governance vary with the
nature of the legal system across countries. Those countries with English common
law legal origins provide greater investor protection than do other countries. Thus,
acquisitions from low to high investor protection countries may expect gains in
efficiency, as stronger corporate governance standards of target firms may extend
over acquiring firms with weaker standards. Correspondingly, the market may have a
positive reaction to the acquisition from countries with low standards.
However, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) argue that legal systems can
affect firm financing and growth. Legal environment and takeover regulations are
important determinants of takeover gains (Rossi and Volpin (2004)). The countries
with strong investor protection and better legal environment may be associated with
strong market confidence, which leads to better market reaction.
Some empirical studies research the effect of legal differences. Starks and Wei (2004)
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find that the abnormal returns to acquiring shareholders are increasing in the quality
of the home country corporate governance. Also, Martynova and Renneboog (2006)
observe a significant positive announcement effect for acquiring firms that have a
relatively strong legal origin, such as English, German and Scandinavian law, while
abnormal returns to those acquiring firms with French legal origin are not different
from zero.
CI3 Cultural Differences
Ha3: Acquiring shareholders are more likely to gain different abnormal returns
around the announcements of takeovers from countries with large cultural distances,
than from those with small ones.
Many agree that national culture influences performance abroad. Some argue that
cultural differences create organizational challenges that impede integration and
increase acquisition costs (Cartwright and Price (2003), Hofstede (1980)).
Differences between national cultures are known as cultural distance (Gomez-Mejia
and Palich (1997)) between the acquired and acquiring firm. Such differences are the
source of uncertainties that increase the cost of integration. Given their implicit
nature, culture differences seem to go unidentified throughout the M&A process, and
this causes target firms to take a longer time to reach their efficient state. Jemison
and Sitkin (1986) report that higher levels of cultural distance are always associated
with greater conflict over decisions. This suggests that the higher costs which are
associated with greater cultural integration may lead to poorer performance.
On the other hand, others believe that differences between the national cultures of
acquiring and acquired firms benefit the acquiring company by expanding the
knowledge base available to establish distinctive competencies worldwide (Ghoshal
(1987), Mayrhofer (2004)). Rather than emphasizing costs of cultural difference, the
latter perspective emphasizes the learning benefits provided by cultural differences.
Studies of the relationship between cultural differences and acquisition performance
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have produced conflicting findings. Morosini, Shane, and Singh (1998) found a
significant positive relationship between cultural distance and post-acquisition
performance both among the 52 companies in their study and in field interviews with
managers. However, Conn et al. (2005) examine UK takeovers in foreign countries
and find that the high levels of cultural difference cause significant losses to UK
acquiring firms over 36 months after a takeover announcement. In Gomez-Mejia and
Palich's (1997) study of performance in Fortune 500 firms between 1985 and 1994, it
is found that neither culturally related nor culturally unrelated diversification were
associated with firm performance.
CI4 Related/unrelated takeover
Ha4: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns are more likely to be different around
the announcements of related takeovers than around the announcements of unrelated
takeovers.
Unrelated takeovers are normally expected to create operational and/or financial
synergies by the way of risk diversification. However, Martynova and Renneboog
(2006) argue that diversifying acquisitions are more likely to occur when bidding
firms suffer from agency conflicts and free cash flow problems. Previous studies
provide evidence that the aggressive management of such firms often acquires
unrelated business for the purposes of empire building by expending shareholder
value, or that managerial hubris leads bidding firms to over-pay for unrelated targets.
Moreover, some disadvantages are always associated with diversified takeovers, such
as bargaining problems within the firm (Rajan et al. (2000)), and rent-seeking
behaviour by divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). These
disadvantages of diversification may outweigh the expected gains from synergies and
lead to wealth destruction for the shareholders ofboth acquiring and target firms.
There is less agreement about the benefit of diversification for target firms in
empirical studies. In some studies, shareholders of acquirers have been found to
benefit from diversification by unrelated takeovers (Solnik (1974), Davis (1991)).
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Gregory and McCorriston (2005) find that abnormal returns in same-SIC takeovers
are an insignificant -3.6% five years after takeovers, while unrelated takeovers with
different principal SIC codes create a significant 21.8% abnormal return over the
same period. But in a short-window study around the announcement, Martynova and
Renneboog (2006) report that acquiring firms have significantly higher wealth effects
in a business expansion within the core industry than that in business diversification:
0.63% vs. 0.36%, respectively. The share price of bidders engaged in intra-industry
takeovers experience a significant run-up of 1.4% over the two-month period prior to
the event day.
a<j High-Technology
Ha5: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns are more likely to be different around
the announcements of high-tech takeovers than those of non-high-tech takeovers.
Since the 1990s, high-tech firms have become the new dynamic drivers in the
economy, as the high technologies brought technological advancement, efficiency
gains, and job growth. From mid-1994 to mid-1999, an information technology
index11 has increased twice as fast as the S&P 50012. M&A activities have increased
with acquirers seeking the growth potential offered by high-tech firms. Compared
with lower-growth firms, the distinct high-growth opportunities of high-tech
takeovers are normally expected to create value for the acquiring firms. Moreover,
Kohers and Kohers (2000) argue that the alliance with firms relating to high
technologies may increase the competitiveness of the acquiring firms. Thus, merging
with these attractive growth opportunities may lead to positive reactions from
investors and shareholders of acquiring firms.
However, high-tech operations have an uncertain nature, and firms' value depend
heavily on the future outcomes or developments in unproven, uncharted fields
(Kohers and Kohers (2004)). Moreover, for some high-tech firms, higher cash flows
are not expected in the near future, which makes such firms riskier than others in
" A capitalization-weighted index of 77 information technology companies within the S&P 500
12 Business Week (14th June 1999)
180
M&As. These factors may lead to much speculation about the true worth ofhigh tech
firms. Such uncertainty in high-tech operations may make acquiring firms overpay
for the growth prospects. In particular, investors and acquiring shareholders may be
wary of the future merits of the takeover and whether the potential growth will be
worth the cost (Kaplan (1989)). This may cause negative abnormal returns to
acquiring firms.
Kohers and Kohers (2000) examine mergers in various high-tech areas between 1987
and 1996 and find significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns of 1.26% in
the two days around takeover announcements. In particular, a high cumulative
abnormal return of 1.58% is found after 1993. For long-term performance, Gao and
Sudarsanam (2003) study UK high-tech acquisitions in the 1990s. Their finding is
that high-tech acquisitions greatly underperform industry peers of similar size and
book-to-market ratio by -6% one year after takeovers, and -37.72% three years after
takeovers.
art. Payment
FIa6: Acquiring shareholders are more likely to gain different abnormal returns
around the announcements of takeovers with stock payments than around those with
cash payments.
Method of payment is always considered as an important signal from a transaction.
Martynova and Renneboog (2006) argue that it indicates the quality of the target firm
or potential synergy value. If the offer consists of stock, the acquiring firms are
signaling that they wish target shareholders to remain involved in the new firms and
to share their risk. Alternatively, when the managers of an acquiring firm are
convinced that the true value of their firm's shares are worth more than the current
share price, they prefer to finance the deal with cash instead of equity. They plan to
pay off the target shareholders so they do not share future value increase of the new
firms. Hence, the market may interpret the payment as a signal about current
managements' views about the under- or overvaluation of the firms. The share prices
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of acquiring firms are expected to change upwards (downwards) when cash (equity)
is offered.
However, some researchers argue that acquiring firms with excess cash always
overbid for targets and destroy value (Goergen and Renneboog (2004)). Free cash
flow is frequently used for managerial empire building (Servas (1991), Lang et
al.(1991)). Moreover, given that most bidders have limited cash and liquid assets,
cash offers generally require debt financing. As a consequence, high leveraged
acquirers are constrained in their ability to issue debt and as a consequence use stock
financing more frequently. Moreover, cash offer in M&As could bring about higher
premiums when compared with share exchange. In other words, due to the existence
of different tax treatments, the acquirer must pay a higher acquisition price in the
case of cash offer to offset the tax burden of the target shareholders. This proposition
has long been addressed and confirmed by earlier studies. In such cases, stock
payment may bring higher acquiring returns than cash payment.
Empirical tests provide evidence which supports both arguments. The findings of
Martynova and Renneboog (2006) show that the abnormal returns around takeover
announcements for acquirers making cash payments are higher than those for
announcements involving stock payments: 0.6% vs. 0.0%. Even six months after a
takeover announcement, they find that cumulative average abnormal returns of cash-
bids are not significantly different from zero (-0.9%), whereas those of equity-bids
and mixed offers are significantly negative: -2.2% and -2.8% respectively. However,
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find that, over short and long windows from 4 days
to 120 days around takeover announcements, the shareholders of acquiring firms
gained more cumulative average abnormal returns in stock bids than in cash bids
(2.57% vs. 0.9%, and 2.72% vs. -1.44%).
a 7 Multiple bidders
Hay: Acquiring shareholders are more likely to gain lower abnormal returns around
the announcements of takeovers involving multiple bidders than around those
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involving a singer bidder.
Competition among bidders may affect the gains to acquiring firm shareholders.
Without competition between potential acquiring firms for a target firm, the acquirer
should offer a price just high enough to obtain the number of shares the bidder
desires. However, if alternative acquirers exist, one could expect to see the offer
price bid up. Consequently, a larger share of the merger returns go to the target
shareholders and a smaller share is kept by the successful acquirer (Jarrell and
Poulsen (1989)).
Supporting this perspective, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) find significantly higher
abnormal returns to target shareholders if multiple acquirers bid for a target. The
returns to acquirer shareholders are significantly positive in single-bidder contests
and insignificantly different from zero in multiple-bidder contests. Comparing tender
offers in three decades during 1963-1986, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) report that
contested biddings have a significantly negative effect on the abnormal returns to
acquiring firms around takeover announcements in the 1980s. This is similar to
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) who argue that "white knight"-type bidders explain
most of the negative average returns to acquirers they find in the 1980s.
a8. Attitude
Hag: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns are more likely to be different around
the announcements of hostile takeovers than around those of friendly takeovers.
The attitude towards the bid is also an important issue in M&As. The market has a
different reaction to hostile and friendly bids. Hostile takeovers are evaluated
positively, as the acquiring firm may be very confident about the potential synergy
value. However, high offer prices usually occur in hostile transactions because of the
"aggressive negotiation" between the management of the two firms (Tse and Soufani
(2001)). Martynova and Renneboog (2006) argue that the market revises downward
the acquirers' share price because of a fear of too high a premium which would not
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be paid off by the potential synergy value.
Various studies separate an examination of the abnormal returns into friendly and
hostile bids. Due to acquisition premia, the target shareholders gain in both cases. No
conclusive finding is drawn for acquiring firms. Tes and Soufani (2001) evaluate the
data of UK takeovers between 1990 and 1996. Comparing friendly and hostile
takeovers, they discovered that the abnonnal returns to acquiring finns in hostile
transactions are higher than those in friendly ones, these being 3.28% and 1.66% in
the month of takeover announcement. However, Martynova and Renneboog (2006)
study the Europe takeover market over the period 1993-2001 and find that, on the
event day, the share price endures a small negative price correction for acquiring
firms involving hostile takeovers, while the announcement of a friendly takeover
results in significantly positive abnormal returns of 0.8%.
ay Premium
Hag: Acquiring shareholders are more likely to gain lower abnormal returns around
the announcements of takeovers with high premium than those with low premium.
The hubris hypothesis predicts that managers are usually overconfident, which leads
to overpayments for target firms. This may cause the underperfonuance of acquiring
firms following takeovers (Malmendier and Tate (2005)). Moeller and Schlingemann
(2005) also suggest that lower bidder returns could be the result of higher premia
required by the target's controlling shareholders to give up their shares. Thus, higher
premia may lead the market to negatively react to the takeover announcement.
Moeller et al. (2005) compare the overpayment between large firms and small firms.
They find that the mean premium for acquisitions by large firms is significantly
higher than that for acquisitions by small firms. Specially, by measuring the
overconfidence of managers, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find evidence that
overconfident managers make more acquisitions and that abnormal returns are lower.
184
5.4.2 Target Governance Characteristics
hi. Post-takeover CEO Departure
Hbi: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are related to the release of the news about the target CEOs' departure.
One of the functions of M&As is to discipline ineffective managers of target firms.
Following this corporate governance logic (Denis and Denis (1995)), acquiring firms
remove poorly performing managers of target firms following takeovers. It is an
important step toward maximizing shareholder wealth, although it is still open to
question whether management turnover leads to improved firm performance. Thus, if
CEO departures from target firms are announced following takeover announcement,
this argument suggests that the market reaction will be positive.
However, another important issue in the process of integration is employee resistance
(Schoenberg and Seow (2005)). The change of ownership for target firms in M&As
is, more often than not, associated with changes in the characteristics of the target
firms. A clear sign of employee resistance is a high rate of staff turnover in target
firms. Buono and Bowditch (1989) and Cartwright and Cooper (1996) report the
negative employee reactions caused by such changes. Datta (1991) and Larsson and
Finkelstein (1999) find that management style compatibility plays a key role in
determining employee resistance. Studies on management style compatibility
discover that differences in the philosophies, values and behaviour of the top
management teams can lead to feelings of uncertainty and alienation amongst target
firm managers (Cartwright and Cooper (1996)). In turn, it can result in employees
reducing their commitment towards cooperation, which may lead to lower job
performance and ultimately, to lower acquisition performance (Datta (1991)). In
particular, in cross-border takeovers, acquiring firm executives may recognise that
they lack the local market knowledge or the level of cultural understanding to
manage the new firm effectively. This may motivate the acquirers to retain
executives of target firms. Hence, the market is expected to have a negative reaction
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to the departure of the target firm's CEO.
Few researchers examine the share price effects of top executive departure
announcement in the context of takeovers. But some interesting and conflicting
results are found in non-takeover contexts. Denis and Denis (1995) examine the
nontakeover-related top management changes announced over the period 1985-1988.
It is found that announcements ofmanagement changes are associated with abnormal
returns that are significantly positive for those departures defined as forced
resignations. Normal retirements appear to cause no market reaction. The UK study
by Dayhya et al. (1998) finds that the market reacts positively to the news of 67 non-
routine CEO or chairman departure announcements reported between 1989 and 1992.
However, Debman and Lin (2002) examine 331 CEO departures from UK listed
firms between 1990 and 1995 and find that the market reacts negatively to the
announcement of their top executive departures.
Board Size
Hb2: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are positively related to the board size of target firms.
Since corporate strategies of a firm are formulated and implemented by the board of
directors, it is possible that the characteristics of the board are directly related to the
decision made and their outcomes. Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
suggest that large boards can be less effective than small boards. When boards get to
be too big, agency problems increase and the board becomes more symbolic and less
a part of the management process. Generally, this leads to deterioration in firm value
and so the firm is more likely to become a target (Eisenberg et al. (1998)). When
acquiring firms take over such firms, a positive market reaction is expected.
Kini et al. (1995) find that board size shrinks after successful tender offers for under-
performing firms, which supports the argument that "reducing board size is a priority
to improve troubled companies" made in the study by Yermack (1996). Yermack
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(1996) examines the relation between Tobin's q and board size in a sample of US
firms, after controlling for other variables that are likely affect q. The results suggest
that there is a significant negative relation between board size and q. In line with his
findings, Eisenberg et al. (1998) report that a similar pattern holds for a sample of
small and midsize Finnish firms. This evidence shows that board size and firm value
are negatively correlated. Constantinou and Constantinou (2003) examine the effect
of board structure on UK bidder shareholders' wealth and find an inverse U shape
relation between abnormal returns to acquirer shareholders and target board size.
This suggests that the benefits from increased monitoring through larger boards are
outweighed by problems associated with informational asymmetries.
bj Board Composition
Hb3: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are positively related to the proportion of outsiders on the target board.
Usually, board composition is another important feature of corporate governance. In
the UK corporate boards normally have a mixture of executive (inside) and
nonexecutive (outside) directors. According to Cosh and Hughes (1997), outsiders
are usually employed for prestige, for their experience or contacts, or for their
specialised knowledge. The reputation capital is the emphasis of outsiders because
their payment and employment in a firm is positively related to their reputation
(Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983)). Target directors, in particular outsiders,
have pecuniary incentives to promote shareholder interests. Hence, outsiders tend to
be more objective in evaluating the costs and benefits of an acquisition decision. The
more outsiders are on the board the higher the probability of a profitable rather than
non-profitable acquisition. Outside directors are more likely to take decisions
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. This may lead to a positive market
reaction.
Mixed empirical evidence regarding the board structure and takeovers has been
provided. Cotter et al. (1997) find that, when a target board contains a majority of
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outside directors, abnormal returns to the target are 20% higher than a similar firm
with no majority of outside directors on its board. In contrast, Constantinou et al.
(2003) find a negative and significant relationship between nonexecutive dominated
target boards and target shareholder's wealth at the announcement of takeover bids.
An insignificant relationship between abnormal returns at the announcement and the
fraction of independent nonexecutive directors on the acquirer's board is recorded in
the study of Byrd and Hickman (1992). O'Sullivan and Wong (1998) also find that
board composition in the UK has no significant effect on the outcome of takeover
bids.
b4. Blockholder Ownership
Hb4: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are related to the proportion of target shares owned by blockholders.
Blockholders are always considered as a corporate governance mechanism
(McConnell and Servaes (1990), Duggal and Millar (1999)). Blockholders could
serve as effective monitors of firm managers, so that they might act to alleviate
agency problems. Further, blockholders could discourage poor decisions made by
entrenched managers. However, other arguments hold that blockholders do not act as
effective monitors. Pound (1988) argues that blockholders can make the problem of
management entrenchment worse by endorsing incumbent managers. Also, Kohers
and Kohers (2000) suggest that blockholders always have myopic investment
objectives, which encourages them to sell the stock of an underperforming firm
rather than to actively attempt to make value-enhancing changes through attentive
monitoring. Moreover, blockholders could ask for a higher premium which leads to a
reduced return to the acquiring firm.
In the study of Kohers and Kohers (2000) on high-tech takeovers, their results show
that higher blockholder ownership is associated with lower abnormal returns over
two days around takeovers for acquiring firms.
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5.4.3 Target Firm Characteristics
cj Pre-takeover performance ofTarget Firms
Hci: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are related to the pre-takeover performance of the target firms.
The motivations for takeover vary from the business extension to disciplining the
target's ineffective managers. Acquiring firms target different finns for different
reasons. Generally, a good accounting performance by a target firm shows the high
quality of the firm, which may bring high operational synergy to acquirers (Goergen
and Renneboog (2004)). In addition to the possibility of operational synergy,
takeovers may offer the possibility of obtaining managerial synergy. This occurs if
the acquiring firm has managerial ability that is superior to that of the target firm,
where managerial performance is measured in terms of company performance prior
to the takeover (Holl and Kyriazis (1997)). Hence, the market is more likely to have
a positive reaction to such a takeover. However, if the pre-takeover performance of
the target is a loss, then the market may doubt whether acquiring firms could
improve this situation, which may lead to a negative market reaction around the
takeover announcement.
The findings in the study of Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show a weak positive
relation between target pre-takeover performance (measured by the return on equity)
and the short-term abnormal returns to target firms, while no significant association
is found for abnormal returns to acquiring firms.
C2. Pre-takeover Leverage ofTarget Firms
Hc2~. Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are related to the pre-takeover leverage of the target firms.
Previous studies show that debt can mitigate agency problems between stockholders
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and managers (Jensen (1986, 1989), Harris and Raviv (1990)). Debt holders have a
legal standing to review managerial decisions and to have management replaced
through the courts if the firm is insolvent (Betker (1995)). Harris and Raviv (1990)
argue that debt increases managerial work effort and then leads to better decisions
(Maloney et al. (1993)). Thus, the announcement of an acquisition of a target firm
with a reasonable amount of debt may be a good signal of the quality of the target
firm. The market reaction may be positive. However, some argue that if the target
firm has a high level of debt, the market may doubt the ability of acquiring firms that
repay these debts in the future. In this situation, the announcement returns for
acquirers may be negative.
Maloney et al. (1993) examine mergers (1962-1982) and acquisitions (1982-1986)
and find higher announcement returns to acquirers with higher leverage. Moeller and
Schlingemann (2005) investigate acquisitions from 1980-2001 and find no
significant effect of leverage measured by the firm's total debt over its market value.
In addition, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report that financial distress (interest
coverage) does not have any influence on the abnormal returns of the acquiring firm
around the takeover announcement.
Cj Market-to-book Ratios ofTarget Firms
Hc3: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are related to the market-to-book ratios of target firms.
Fama and French (1992) suggest that firm size and book-to-market ratio combine to
explain a large proportion of the variation in average stock return. The ratio of book-
to-market is one important variable to show the growth opportunity of the firm.
Generally, a target with a high market-to-book ratio has a relatively strong growth
potential (Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Kohers and Kohers (2000)). Such firms may
be able to provide substantial growth benefit to bidders, once the target is given
access to the financial support or other resources of an acquiring firm. Thus, the
market may perceive that the growth opportunities of acquirers that take over growth
targets (with high market-to-book ratio) are more valuable than those of acquirers
190
acquiring value targets (with low market-to-book). Hence better market reactions are
expected. In contrast, some argue that the acquisition of value-firms leads to higher
bidder and target returns. The nature of high risk and the uncertain future of growth
targets may make the market less confident. Plus, the market is anxious that the
acquirer will overpay for the growth target. These would lead to lower market
reactions.
In empirical tests, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that the acquisition of firms with
low market-to-book ratios generates relatively high abnormal returns for the
acquiring shareholders, whereas the acquisition of firms with high market-to-book
ratios generates substantial negative abnormal returns. Moreover, Goergen and
Renneboog (2004) find that market-to-book ratios of targets are significantly and
negatively related to abnormal returns to acquiring shareholders around takeover
announcements.
5.4.4 Bidding Firm Characteristics
d\ Market-to-book Ratios ofAcquiring Firms
Hd]: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are related to the market-to-book ratios of acquiring firms.
As mentioned above, the market-to-book ratio is considered as an important issue
that can explain the main variation in average stock return (Fama and French (1992)).
The potential growth opportunity of a firm may be shown by the market-to-book
ratio. Acquiring firms with high market-to-book ratios are mainly growing and eager
to extend themselves. Mergers and acquisitions are an important strategy. Compared
with other ways, taking over other firms can quickly extend a firm's market and/or
reduce its supply costs. Acquisitions could bring better returns to the acquiring firm,
especially the growth acquiring firm, when a takeover is announced.
Some previous studies argue that growth acquirers suffer from hubris and
consequently overpay for their target (Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), Rau and
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Vermaelen (1998)). The high bid price and weak foundation may not bring the
synergy they expected. For the value acquiring firms, their strong core businesses
make the market more confident about their takeover. Thus, markets may react more
positively to takeovers by value acquiring firms than to those by growth acquirers.
Conn et al. (2005) examine the UK takeover market and find that value acquirers
outperform growth acquirers in the announcement period: 0.71% vs. 0.42%.
d2. Size Difference
Hd2: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are related to the size difference between target firms and acquiring firms.
The relative size of the target to the bidding firm is a variable that may be expected
to explain returns to the shareholders of acquiring firms. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)
argue that, as the target increases in size relative to that of the acquirer, the impact of
the acquisition would be more readily obvious in the returns to the acquiring firms.
The main reason is that target firms that are large relative to their acquirers are able
to provide greater synergies in takeovers than relatively small targets can offer
(Kohers and Kohers (2000)). Thus, if acquisitions are on average wealth-increasing
projects for acquiring firms and the target is large relative to the acquiring firm, a
positive relationship should be expected.
However, some researchers have noted that information asymmetry in the market is
stronger for small firms than for larger firms (Atiase (1985), Freeman (1987)).
Kohers and Kohers (2004) argue that the market responds more strongly to takeover
announcements of smaller target firms due to the higher levels of information
asymmetry. Thus, if takeover announcements relieve information to a great extent for
small target firms than for larger target firms, a better market reaction would be
expected.
In empirical tests, Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) examine a sample of 211
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takeovers announced from 1963 to 1979 and find a positive significant relationship
between relative size and the returns to acquirers. Kohers and Kohers (2000) focus
particularly on the high-tech industries and revealed a positive relation between
bidder excess returns and the size of target relative to that of the acquirer. However,
the later study of Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1987) reports no significant
relationship between relative size and returns to acquirers in cash offers that occurred
during 1973 to 1983, which were dominated by merger transactions as opposed to
tender offers. Cosh et al. (2001) examine 142 UK takeovers completed over the
period 1985-1995 and find that the relative size has an insignificantly positive effect
on bidder announcement share returns.
<7? Pre-takeover Performance ofAcquiring Firms
Hd3: Acquiring shareholders' abnormal returns around the takeover announcement
are positively related to the pre-takeover performance of the acquiring firms.
Pre-takeover performance is always considered as an important factor that influences
returns to acquiring firms (Rau and Vennaelen (1998), Kohers and Kohers (2001)).
The market has a tendency to extrapolate the acquirer's past performance into the
future. If the acquiring firm tends to exhibit relatively strong performance prior to the
takeover announcement, it may enhance the confidence of the market about the
acquirer's ability to generate value through the merger or acquisition. Thus, the
market is more likely to have a positive reaction to such takeovers.
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) examine whether the operating performances of
acquiring firms are linked to the acquirer's stock price reaction. Their findings show
a significant and positive relation between operating performance and abnormal
returns to the acquirers' shareholders over the period of takeovers.
All together, Table 5.1 summarises all above hypotheses on relationships between
acquirers' abnormal returns and their determinants.
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Table 5.1 Summary of Determinants


























whether the target was taken or acquired SDC +/-
by foreign firm
whether the acquirers were from countries SDC +/-
with English common law system applied
in UK
whether a big difference exists between SDC +/-
acquiring countries and target countries
according to Hofstede's index
whether the acquirer and target firm in the SDC +/-
M&A are related
whether the takeover occurred in high- SDC +/-
tech industries
whether the payment is stock, cash or a SDC +/-
combination of cash and stock
whether multiple bidders emerged (an SDC
auction)
whether the contest was classified as SDC +/-
hostile or friendly
the premium paid for the target firm SDC
Target Governance Characteristics
whether the news of target CEO departure Annual Report +/-
was released around the takeover & FT &
announcement New Release
the number of directors in the board of PWC +
the target firm
the proportion ofnon-executive directors PWC +
in the board
the percentage of equity owned by PWC +/-
blockholders
Target Firm Characteristics
the pre-takeover performance of target SDC & +/-
firms measured by accounting ratios and DataStream
stock performance
the pre-takeover leverage of target firms SDC +/-
the market-to-book ratios of target firms DataStream +/-
Acquiring Firm Characteristics
the market-to-book ratios of acquiring DataStream +/-
firms
the logarithms of the ratios of the asset of
the target to the asset of the acquiring SDC +/-
firm
the pre-takeover performance of target SDC & +
firms measured by accounting ratios and DataStream
stock performance
PWC: PriceWaterHouse Cooperate Register




This chapter provides a brief literature review on both the target's and acquirer's
shareholders returns over different time periods: prior to the takeover, around the
takeover announcement and after the takeover. For the short-term effect of takeovers
on shareholders wealth, there is considerable evidence of large significant abnormal
returns to the target firm shareholders. But the findings on the side of acquiring firms
are inconclusive. This study differs from others in that it concentrates on the special
features of the most recent M&A wave and considers the effect of the intensity of
M&A activities. The study seeks to highlight market reaction to acquiring firms upon
the announcement of a takeover, comparing domestic and cross-border takeovers and
their timing within the rise or slump of the M&A wave.
The common methodologies of event studies are reviewed in this chapter. Compared
with other methods, the market model always performs well or at least as powerfully
as the best alternative. So we employ the market model to do the empirical tests later.
Meanwhile, to examine the robustness of our results, we use parametric and non-
parametric statistical tests to test significance in the later empirical analysis.
In addition, we have reviewed the literature on the potential determinants of
shareholder returns. Based on the theory and empirical results of part studies, we
develop hypotheses on their relationships with returns to acquirers' shareholders
around the takeover announcement. In Chapters 6 and 7, we report the results of our
empirical tests of these hypotheses.
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Chapter 6 An Empirical Analysis of the Wealth Effect of M&A:
A Comparison between Cross-border and Domestic takeovers
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, we reviewed the literature and stated various hypotheses, concerning
the effect of the cross-border dimension to M&A activity on shareholder returns.
This chapter empirically tests these hypotheses. An empirical comparison between
cross-border and domestic takeovers is constructed. We investigate the market
reactions for acquiring firms involved in takeovers during the period of 1998-2002.
One purpose is to provide new evidence regarding the announcement returns of
acquiring firms in the UK fourth M&A wave, which experienced both a surge in
international corporate activities as well as general globalization of the world
economy.
The bulk of previous research on M&As is confined to US and UK acquiring firms
and most studies have concentrated on M&As in a single country. No direct study
exists regarding international M&As into the UK in the 1990s. A worldwide study
could contribute to this literature, as it allows us to evaluate the impact of a wide
range of institutional settings and legal rules on the pattern of M&A activity.
Compared to US and UK acquiring firms, acquiring firms from other countries can
be characterized by weaker investor protection and less developed capital markets
(La Porta et al. (1998)), and by more concentrated ownership structures (Faccio and
Lang (2002)). The analyses presented in this chapter consider these potential
differences.
In the recent M&A wave during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the UK industrial
economy had some distinct characteristics, such as a boom in telecoms, a dramatic
increase in cross-border takeovers, and well-developed corporate governance
mechanisms. Because of these distinctive economic characteristics, the results of
previous studies may not apply to this period. There have been relatively few studies
which have directly compared cross-border acquisitions to their domestic
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counterparts. Therefore, under these types of conditions, there is a need to re¬
examine acquiring shareholders' returns in such circumstances. This chapter
distinguishes the wealth effects of acquiring firms between domestic acquisitions and
cross-border acquisitions into the UK, in an attempt to explore the performance
differences between these two takeover directions. It also provides detailed
information on takeover activities between the UK and 15 countries, such as the
effects of differences in legal systems and in culture. We also investigate how the
shareholders' wealth effects vary according to deal characteristics, target and
acquiring firm characteristics, target corporate governance characteristics, including
announced departure of the target CEO. These factors are expected to explain a
significant part of the variation in the shareholder wealth effects across takeover
deals. However, as far as we know, no previous research considers all of these
explanatory factors. Hence, this study would fill this gap in the literature.
The analysis of the returns of 212 acquiring firms during takeover announcements
reveals a number of interesting findings. In our sample, acquiring firms experienced
significant losses around the takeover announcement during 1998-2002. The
international acquiring firms did not suffer significant losses, while UK domestic
acquirers experienced significant negative returns. Cross-border takeovers and
acquirers' gains are found to be positively related. Acquiring a high-tech firm did not
bring better announcement returns to acquiring firms. Consistent with previous
research, we find that multiple bidding and high premia would reduce the returns of
acquiring firms, while payment in stock significantly and positively affects the
acquirers' gains during the takeover announcement.
Moreover, the proportion of nonexecutives in target firms is positively associated
with the returns to acquiring firms. Also, acquirers have better announcement returns
when bidding for targets with better pre-takeover performance.
A further contribution of this chapter is to examine the effect of the news release of
the target CEO departure on acquiring shareholders' returns. This has not been
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considered in the literature before. We find that, when the rumour or news of target
CEO departure is released, acquiring shareholders have higher gains.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the data and
methodology. The results of univariate tests and multivariate tests are reported in
sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. Section 6.5 addresses the robustness of the tests
and section 6.6 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Data and Methodology
6.2.1 Sample Design and Methodology
Our sample consists of domestic or foreign public companies that acquired UK
1 ^
public target firms during the period 1998-2002. The daily return index for each
acquiring firm is collected from DataStream. For further investigations on the
determinants, we collect data on deal characteristics, target governance
characteristics, and target and acquiring firm characteristics. Compared with the
sample in previous chapters, we lose five acquisitions for the lack of their stock
return data. The final sample, therefore, contains 212 takeovers for which we have a
complete data set.
To calculate the abnormal return for each firm, the market model is still the most
commonly applied model, although controversy surrounds the specification of the
appropriate benchmark model for estimating the expected return. As we analyzed in
the previous chapter, the market model is usually at least as powerful as the best
alternative (Armitage (1995)). Thus, for the empirical tests, we employ the market
model to calculate abnormal returns.
ARit=Ru-(a + (3Rmt)
Where: Rit = the rate of return on security i over period t,
Rmt = the rate of return on DataStream total market index for the country of
which i is a member in time period t
13 It shows a theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a period, assuming that dividends are re-invested
to purchase additional units of an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date.
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This chapter adopts an analysis period stretching from day t-30 to t+30. Previous
studies find that firms' share prices tend to rise prior to takeover announcement.
Adopting a month pre-bid analysis period allows us to establish whether the pattern
of stock performance leading up prior to the takeover differs between domestic and
cross-border takeovers. The estimation period is from t-46 to t-300.
The level of statistical significance of the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns
is tested using the cross-sectional and skew-adjusted t-test. Additionally, we employ
non-parametric tests: the sign test and the rank test. The level of statistical
significance using non-parametric statistics is generally similar to those using a t-test.
6.2.2 Sample Description
In this chapter, the whole sample includes 212 transactions that took place between
1998 and 2002. Table 6.1 shows the distribution of the sample. 146 out of 212 are
UK domestic acquiring firms and 66 are foreign acquiring firms from 14 countries.
The most frequently observed country of origin for the acquiring firm was the US
which accounts for 10.85% of total M&A activities in our sample. Firms from France
and the Republic of Ireland are the second and third most frequent acquiring foreign
firms in the UK, accounting for 3.77% and 2.83% respectively.
Figure 6.1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for acquirers
over different windows within 30 days before and after the event (day 0). The details
about the average abnormal returns (AARs) and CAARs for acquiring countries are
exhibited in the first column of Table 6.2. For the whole sample, acquirers
experience consistent negative daily returns around the takeover announcement from
day -1 to day +1, which are all statistically significant (-0.30%, -0.92% and -0.48%
respectively). The announcement day returns for acquiring shareholders is -0.92%
with a t-statistic of -2.25, and it is very close to the study of Draper and Paudyal
(1999), who find a significant negative abnormal return of -0.82%. In addition,
CAARs are negative and statistically significant for event windows around and after
the announcement. The loss amounts to a significant -3.88% over the (-30, +30)
window. This indicates that acquirers do not perform well around the takeover
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announcement. Our findings are consistent with the previous studies by Dodd (1980),
Travlos (1987), Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) and Draper and Paudyal (1999),
which find a small but significant negative abnormal return at the announcement of
the bid.
Table 6.1













South Africa 3 1.42%
Sweden 1 0.47%
Switzerland 3 1.42%
United States 23 10.85%
United Kingdom 146 68.87%
Total 212 100.00%
Figure 6.1
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) of 212 acquiring firms
Around the M&A Announcement
This figure shows the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions by 212
acquiring firms of UK targets as well as the CAARs over different windows within 30 days
before and after the event (day 0). The benchmark used in the market model is the total
market index for each acquiring country; the model parameters are estimated over 255 days
starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement.
% of acquiring returns
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When analyzing the performance of individual countries, shown in Table 6.2, we
find that acquirers from Switzerland and UK have significant negative returns on the
announcement day (-2.14% and -1.31% respectively). In particular, UK acquiring
firms have significant negative CAARs over most post-announcement windows. In
the two-month period around announcement, UK acquirers lost up to significant
-6.31% of their market capitalisation.
However, not all acquiring countries are losers. On the announcement day, acquirers
from Sweden have the highest significant return of 5.89% while those from Denmark
and Italy have significantly positive returns of +2.22% and +1.64% respectively.
Moreover, the CAARs of Australian acquirers are significant at 3.95% over the pre-
announcement window of (-10,-1), but this turns to a significant loss of -8.49% over
the post-announcement window of (-1, +30). Swedish acquirers have the inverse
experience, a loss prior to the announcement but gains after the announcement.
Table 6.3 reports the results of the performance of acquirers from different industries.
Following the classification of Fama and French14, we break the whole sample down
into twelve sections15. On the announcement day, energy acquirers suffered a
significant loss of -6.27%. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) also find similar results
that energy acquirers have a significant loss of -1.91% over (-1, 0). It seems that
markets had negative reactions when the energy takeovers were announced.
Another section suffering loss is "business equipment", which is defined by Fama
and French as "computers, software, and electronic equipment". Acquirers in this
section experienced a significant negative return of -5.09% over the window of (-1,
+1) around the takeover announcement. The loss amounts to a significant -9.31%
over the window of (-1, +30). In addition, the "money" section has significant losses
14 Kenneth French's website! http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html
15 Consumer NonDurables — Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys; Consumer Durables — Cars, TVs,
Furniture, Household Appliances; Manufacturing — Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Office Furniture, Paper, Com
Printing; Energy — Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products; Chems — Chemicals and Allied Products;
Business Equipment — Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment; Telecom — Telephone and Television
Transmission; Utilities — Utilities; Shops — Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops);
Health —Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs; Money — Finance; Other — Mines, Construction, Building
Material, Transport, Hotels, Bus Services, Entertainment.
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of -0.91% on the takeover announcement day, and the "others" section has
significant losses of -2.46% over (-1, +1).
However, acquirers in the "utilities" and "health" industries have a significant gain
over the window of (-10, +30) at 8.3% and 9.97% respectively.
6.3 Univariate Analysis ofAnnouncement Performance
In this section, we focus on univariate analyses of AARs and CAARs for acquiring
firms realized around the announcement of taking over UK target firms. We then
relate the AARs and CAARs to the hypothesized determinants, which include deal




The increase in cross-border takeovers is one of the major features of the recent
M&A market. Table 6.4 and Figure 6.2 show a comparison of the market reaction
around the takeover announcement in the context of cross-border and domestic
takeovers.
Domestic takeovers resulted in a significantly negative return of -1.31% on the
announcement day, while the returns to foreign acquirers are not significantly
different from zero around the takeover announcement. The CAAR of foreign
acquirers is significantly higher than that of UK domestic acquirers, 0.32% vs. -
4.65% over (-1, +30). The CAAR over (-30, +30) for UK acquirers is lower than the
return to foreign acquirers. The difference is 7.80%, which is statistically significant.
The results show that UK acquiring firms experienced negative and significant
abnormal returns around and in the post-takeover announcement period, which is
significantly lower than the returns for foreign acquirers.
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Table 6.4 Acquirers' AARs and CAARs in Cross-border and Domestic Takeovers
Total Cross-border Domestic Difference
N=212 N=66 N=146
Event t- t- t-
Day AR(%) value AR(%) value AR(%) t-value value
t-1 -0.30*a -1.65 -0.65**3 -2.13 -0.15 -0.66 -0.50 -1.25
t -0.92**a -2.25 -0.04 -0.07 -1.31***3 -2.46 1.27b 1.20
t+1 -0.48*a -1.90 0.15 0.31 -0.77***3 -2.60 0.92* 1.67
(-30,-1) -1.08 -0.94 0.54b 0.35 -1.81 -1.20 2.35 0.95
(-10,-1) -0.40 -0.74 -0.13 -0.18 -0.53 -0.73 0.40 0.33
(-1,+D -1.70***a -3.02 -0.53 -0.67 -2.23***a -3.04 1.70 1.40
(-1 ,+30) -3.10**a -2.41 0.32 0.17 -4.65***a -2.81 4.97* 1.79
(-10,+30) -3.21**a -2.19 0.82 0.41 -5.03***3 -2.64 5.85 1.27
(-30,+30) -3.88**3 -1.97 1.49 0.56 -6.31***a -2.44 7.80*b 1.84
a: Significant in skew-adjusted t test
b: Significant in non-parametric statistics test-sign test and rank test.
*** indicatesp<0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10 (2-tail)






The significantly negative returns to acquirers in domestic acquisitions are consistent
with previous studies (Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), Conn et al. (2005)). The
insignificant positive returns in cross-border acquisitions are not surprising given the
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mixed findings in previous studies by Mathur et al. (1994), Cakici, Hessel, and
Tandon (1996) and Choi and Tsai (2002). The significantly better performances of
cross-border takeovers, compared with domestic takeovers, are consistent with one
side of our hypothesis and gives partial support for the existence of imperfections in
markets which give multinational firms a competitive advantage over local firms.
In further research of international M&As, we separate foreign acquirers by their
investment origins. Table 6.5 and Figure 6.3 report the results.
Figure 6.3 AARs and CAARs of Acquirers From Developed Countries (DC), Less
Developed Countries (DC), European Countries and Non-European Countries
Developed countries (DCs)include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom (the above are European Countries), United States, Canada(North American Countries),
Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Africa (other Developed Countries). Less developed
countries (LDC) include all other non-developed countries.
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> Developed / Less-developed Countries
Using a classification by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development), we divide the sample into acquirers from developed countries (DC)
and less developed countries (LDC). The second set of columns in Table 6.5 show
that three acquiring firms are from LDCs. Returns for acquirers from LDCs are
significantly negative on one day before and one day after the announcement, -1.33%
and -3.83% respectively. Over the window of (-1, +5), acquirers from LDCs have a
significant loss of -5.35%, which is lower than returns of 0.17% to acquirers from
DCs. Choi and Tsai (2002) find similar results that the LDC acquirers underperform
DC acquirers. This indicates that acquirers from developed countries have better
returns than those from less-developed countries. However, LDC acquirers start
gaining after the takeover announcement. CAAR over (-10, +30) is 5.42% and
significantly higher than returns of 0.6% to those acquirers from DCs. This indicates
that, prior to the takeover announcement, DC markets are more confident about
acquiring firms in the UK, and LDC markets show very positive post-announcement
reactions.
> European / Non-European Countries
The sample is also divided into European and non-European groups. The third set of
columns in Table 6.5 show that European acquirers have no significant returns
around announcement, but non-European acquirers have a significant loss of -1.01%
on the day before announcement. Prior to the announcement, the loss amounts to -
1.29% over (-5, -1). Generally, European acquirers have better performance than
non-European acquirers. But the differences are not statistically significant. Our
results are consistent with the recent argument that European countries have become
very active M&A markets and the strong development of the single European market
in recent years (Martynova and Renneboog (2006)).
• Legal differences
To examine the impact of the acquirer country's legal system, the sample is split
according to whether the acquirer country's system is an English common law
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system, a French civil law system, a Germanic civil law system or a Scandinavian
civil law system (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheifer and Vishny (2000)).
For bids by legal origin, Table 6.6 exhibits marked differences in acquirer returns
around and following the announcement. The acquiring firms of Scandinavian legal
origin experienced very large wealth effects around and after the event day.
Acquirers from countries with the Scandinavian legal system earned a very
significant announcement day return of 3.14%. Other acquirers from English, French
and German legal systems experienced announcement day returns of -0.97%, -0.33%
and -2.85%, respectively, with a significant loss only for those from English legal
systems. Following the takeover announcement, the acquiring firms of Scandinavian
legal origin have significant CAAR of 15.49% over the window of (-1, +30), while
acquirers with an English legal origin have significant negative returns of -3.91%
over the same window.
These results support the argument of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheifer and
Vishny (2000) that the quality of law enforcement is the highest in Scandinavian and
German civil law countries, and lower in English common law and French civil law
countries. This indicates that better law enforcement gives investors stronger legal
rights and may lead to better stock performance.
• Culture differences
To measure the impact of national cultural differences between the acquirers'
countries and the UK, we follow the study of Conn et al. (2005) and employ a
composite index based on Hofstede's (1980) numerical classifications of four
national culture dimensions16. As in the previous chapters, the composite index is the
summation of these four differences between the acquirer's country and the UK in
each of the culture dimensions. As before, we classify any country with a score of 28
(the median) or less as having low cultural differences, and any country with a score
ofmore than 28 as having high cultural differences.
16 The four dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality and masculinity.
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Table 6.7 shows that the announcement day returns for acquiring firms from
countries with high cultural differences is insignificant at -0.13%, while acquisitions
with low cultural differences results in significantly negative returns of -1.05% for
acquirers. Moreover, over the windows around and post-announcement, the CAARs
of acquiring firms from countries with low cultural differences are significantly
negative and significantly lower than those for acquirers from countries with high
cultural differences. For example, acquirers from countries with low cultural
differences have a significant negative return of -4.20% over the window of (-10,
+30), which is significantly lower than that for acquirers from countries with high
cultural differences. These results support our hypothesis that markets expect the
benefit of acquirers gaining knowledge from acquiring firms from different cultural
environments.
When we focus on cross-border takeovers, over the window of (-10, +30), the CAAR
is significantly higher for acquirers from countries with high cultural differences than
low cultural differences. This is not surprising given the mixed results in previous
work (Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998), Schweiger and Goulet (2000)). Morosini,
Shane, and Singh (1998) also found a significant positive relationship between
cultural distance and post-acquisition performance. Although the culture-
performance relationship is more complex than is assumed, as suggested by
Teerikangas and Very (2006), our results support that cultural differences benefit the
acquirers by enabling acquirers to gain knowledge provided by UK targets to
establish distinctive competencies worldwide.
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• Related/unrelated takeovers
Our sample of 212 takeover announcements includes 117 takeovers in related
industries and 95 conglomerate takeovers. Table 6.8 compares the AARs and
CAARs of the acquiring firms in non-related takeovers with those in related M&As.
The first set of three columns in the tables present the results for the full sample.
Moreover, we compare AARs and CAARs of foreign and domestic acquiring firms.
The results are exhibited in the second and third set of columns in tables. The fourth
column shows t-values of the difference between the returns to foreign and domestic
acquiring firms in terms of related and non-related takeovers.
On the announcement day, related takeovers have a significant loss of-1.57%, while
the returns of non-related takeovers are not significantly different from zero. In the
period of (-1, +1), related takeovers have a significant loss of -2.64%, which is a
significantly higher loss than that of non-related takeovers. Following the takeover
announcement, acquiring firms involved in related takeovers keep experiencing a
significant loss. This result is consistent with the study by Gregory and McCorriston
(2005) and is in line with our hypothesis that better performance is expected for
unrelated takeovers that gain benefits from diversification.
When splitting our sample into cross-border and domestic takeovers, we find a
similar situation in domestic takeovers. Around the announcement day (-1, +1),
CAAR of UK domestic acquirers in related takeovers is -3.21%, while domestic
acquirers involved in non-related takeovers have a significant loss of -1.06%. The
difference is statistically significant by using the non-parametric test. In addition, we
find that, compared with foreign acquirers in non-related takeovers, UK domestic
acquirers in non-related takeovers suffered significant losses: -8.14% vs. 4.49% over
(-30, +30). This indicates that, around the announcement, acquirers in foreign
markets have higher expectation of business expansion in the UK than domestic
acquirers.
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• High-Technology
During our research period of 1998-2002, the global market went through a boom
and collapse of the telecom sector, which is highly related to high-tech industries.
The results in Table 6.9 show that, for the whole sample, high-tech acquirers suffer
serious losses compared with non-high-tech acquirers.
On the announcement day, the AAR of high-tech acquirers is a significant -2.55%,
which is significantly lower than the -0.37% of non-high-tech acquirers. Also,
CAARs of high-tech acquirers are lower than that of non-high-tech acquirers across
most windows. A significant difference exists in the periods around and following
takeover announcement. For example, over the window of (-1, +30), returns to
acquirers involved in high-tech takeovers was -6.99%, while acquirers involved in
non-high-tech takeovers had CAARs of -1.78%. The results are in line with the
findings of Gao and Sudarsanam (2003), suggesting that markets have a negative
reaction to high-tech takeovers. This is consistent with our hypothesis that high risk
and an uncertain future made high-tech takeovers less attractive.
Further, we look at high-tech takeovers in cross-border and domestic M&A activities.
We find that, on the announcement day, significant losses are mainly in domestic
high-tech takeovers, which experience a significant -3.87%. Over the short periods
following the takeover announcements, CAARs are also significant and negative,
which amounts to -10.90% over (-1, +30). Domestic high-tech acquirers have
significantly lower returns than cross-border high-tech acquiring firms around the
announcement (-1, +1), -6.23% vs. -1.23%. This result is in line with the study of
Gao and Sudarsanam (2003) that UK high-tech acquirers underperform compared
with non-high-tech acquirers. This suggests that UK stock market investors may be
more conservative and cautious than foreign stock market investors.
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• Payment
Generally, asymmetric information between the acquirers' management and outside
investors may influence the choice of payment in the acquisition and the consequent
market reaction to the announcement. Table 6.10 exhibits that, in acquisitions of
targets financed by cash, AAR is a significant 1.05% on the announcement day,
while AAR is a significant -2.12% for those equity-financed acquirers. The superior
performance over (-1, +1) for acquirers in cash transactions is similar to the finding
of Martynova and Renneboog (2006). This indicates that markets have positive
reactions to the announcement of cash transactions. But such a situation doesn't last
long. For the cash-financed acquisitions, the CAARs over the periods following
announcement are significantly negative and reach -3.14% over (-1, +30). Acquirers
that offered mixed payment have significant losses over two-months around the
announcement, while the returns to equity-financed acquirers are not significantly
different from zero over the same period.
When the samples are divided into cross-border and domestic takeovers, UK
domestic cash-financed acquirers mainly lost across all windows, compared with
equity-financed acquirers, e.g. -11.20% vs. 1.43% over (-30, +30). For cash-financed
bids, the CAARs of foreign acquirers are significantly higher than those of domestic
bidders over the two-month period around takeover: 0.76% vs. -11.20% over (-30,
+30). In particular, the significant gain is in the periods prior to takeover
announcements: 1.84% vs. -7.64% over (-30, -1). If these changes prior to
announcement are due to information leakage, this suggests that markets take the
cash payment as a positive signal that foreign acquirers are confident about the
takeover and the potential synergy that a UK target may bring in the future, and that
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• Auctions
Competing bids for the same target firm always affects the gain of bidding firms.
Table 6.11 shows a comparison ofAARs and CAARs in the context of a single bidder
and multiple bidders. Acquiring firms involved in multiple bidding for a target always
have lower abnormal returns bidders in the sample though there are not always
significant. For example, on the announcement day, the single bidders have higher
returns than those acquiring firms in multiple-bidding contests, -0.86% vs. -1.76%.
Over the research period of (-1, +30), the CAAR to acquirers involved in multiple bids
is significantly lower than that for single-bidding acquirers: -9.48% vs. -2.65%. The
results are similar to the findings of Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and are consistent with
our hypothesis that multiple bidding would bid up the price of the target, which would
cause unfavourable market reactions when there are multiple bidding firms.
When we break the samples down into cross-border and domestic takeovers, a similar
situation is found for domestic takeovers. Furthermore, single acquirers in cross-
border takeovers tend to outperform those in domestic takeovers. In cross-border
takeovers, single bidders experienced returns of 0.81% over (-1, +30), which is
significantly higher than the return of -4.12% for those single bidders in domestic
takeovers over the same period. Acquirers in multiple biddings experienced negative
returns in both groups, and the returns in domestic takeovers are significantly worse
than those in cross-border takeovers. Over the period of (-10, +30), the CAAR of
multiple bidders in cross-border takeover is -3.99%, while multiple bidders in
domestic takeover have a significant -20.78%. The difference is significant at the 10%
level. This suggests that the effect of multiple bidding is stronger in domestic
takeovers than cross-border takeovers. Because of information asymmetry, acquirers
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• Attitude
After the boom of hostile takeovers in the 1980s, firms learnt certain lessons.
"Aggressive negotiations" in hostile takeovers always lead to high bid prices, which
may not be covered by the synergies generated later. In the recent M&A wave,
friendly bids have become dominant. We partition all takeovers into two groups
based on the target firm's attitude towards to the bid: hostile or friendly. The results
are reported in Table 6.12. When friendly bids are made, acquiring firms'
shareholders have a significant negative announcement return of -0.96%. The event
return is not significantly different from zero for those acquirers that made a hostile
bid. Over the two-month research window of (-30, +30), the CAAR on hostile
bidders is -5.56%, while friendly acquirers have the significant -3.80%. The
difference is not statistically significant.
We compare the market reaction to takeover attitude in cross-border and domestic
takeovers. Generally, no significant difference is found between returns to hostile
acquirers and friendly acquirers in both subsamples. Compared with hostile acquirers
in cross-border takeovers, hostile UK domestic acquirers have significantly lower
returns one day before the announcement: -1.06% vs. 0.57%.
• Premium
Premium is an important issue that effects the market reaction to takeover
announcement. Higher premia are considered as a signal that the acquiring firm may
end up paying too much for the target. Table 6.13 compares the AARs and CAARs
of acquirers that paid a higher premium and those that paid a lower premium in
cross-border and domestic takeovers. We classify any acquirer with a premium in the
highest quartile as paying a "high premium", and any acquirer with a premium in the
lowest quartile as paying a "low premium".
As we expected, acquirers that paid a high premium generally have lower AARs and
CAARs than those that paid a low-premium, although the difference is not
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statistically significant. For foreign acquirers, the CAAR over (-10, +1) is
significantly lower for the high premium group than for the low premium group. It is
consistent with our hypothesis that acquiring firms have lower returns after paying a
higher premium, as suggested by Malmendier and Tate (2005). Such a difference is
not significant for domestic acquirers. The difference in AARs between the high and
low premium groups tends to occur before the announcement for cross-border
acquirers (-2.31% vs. 0.41% on t-1), but after the announcement for domestic
acquirers (-1.21% vs. 0.47% on t+1).
Summary
In this section, the results show that cross-border takeovers outperformed domestic
takeovers, especially in the period following takeover announcement. This supports
our hypothesis that acquiring firms benefit from international corporate
diversification. Acquiring firms with positive returns were mainly from European
countries. Further, we find that acquiring firms from countries with a Scandinavian
civil law system experienced positive returns around and after takeover
announcement, while acquirers in English common law systems had a significant
loss over the same periods. This suggests that acquiring firms have better returns
when the countries have better investor protection ((La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Sheifer and Vishny (2000)). Also, acquirers from countries with high cultural
differences had better stock performance than those from low cultural difference
countries, indicating that markets emphasize and value the learning benefits provided
by cultural differences. Related takeover and high-tech takeovers brought significant
losses to acquirers around and following the takeover announcement. Acquiring
firms had better returns when the transaction was financed by equity. In line with our
hypothesis and most previous studies, our results show that multiple biddings led to
significantly lower returns to acquiring firms. No significant difference of acquirers'
gains is found between hostile and friendly takeovers in this study. These findings
are more significant in domestic takeovers. In addition, we find that, in cross-border
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6.3.2 Target Governance Characteristics
• Post-takeover CEO departure
To correct ineffective management of a target firm is one of functions of M&A
activity. We examine the effect of the news of target CEO departure on the abnormal
returns of acquiring firms around the takeover announcement. To capture the rumour,
we check if the departure of a target CEO was either officially announced or released
by the media during the period from ten days prior to announcements to takeover
completion date. In such cases, these acquirers are defined as "acquirers with target
CEO departure".
In our sample, 68 out of 212 acquirers are identified as having released news of the
departure of the target CEO during the research period. The results in Table 6.14
show that the average announcement day return for acquirers without target CEO
departure is significant at -1.02%. Also, the CAARs for acquirers without target CEO
departure are generally significantly negative around and following the takeover
announcement. However, over the same windows, the returns for acquirers with
target CEO departure are not significantly different from zero. This is consistent with
the argument that markets have a more positive reaction to acquiring firms where it
has been announced that the CEO of the target firm they are acquiring will depart
following the takeover, although the differences we observe are not significant.
For cross-border takeovers, the average return for acquirers without target CEO
departure is significant at -1.33% over (-1, +1) around the announcement day, which
is significantly lower than those with target CEO departure. A similar situation is
observed for domestic takeovers, though the difference between returns for acquirers
with target CEO departure and without target CEO departure is not statistically
significant. The returns on cross-border acquirers are generally higher than that for
domestic acquirers. In the period of (-1, +1), the CAAR of acquirers with target CEO
departure is significantly higher in cross-border takeovers than that in domestic
takeovers: 2.20% vs. -1.37%. This shows that, in the context of cross-border
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takeovers, markets give a positive reaction for those acquirers with target CEO
departure. Markets may consider that, especially for foreign acquiring firms, the
ability to control the target outweighs the benefit that acquiring the target CEO may
bring to the new firms.
• Board Size
The relation between board size and corporate performance is still very controversial.
Table 6.15 shows the stock performance of acquiring firms based on a comparison of
bidding for a target with a board in the largest and smallest quartiles. For the whole
sample, CAARs are negative for those acquirers that bid for a small-board target
over most research windows, which are always lower than returns on acquirers that
bid for a big-board target. But the differences are not statistically significant. A
similar situation is found in both cross-border takeovers and domestic takeovers.
Compared with cross-border acquirers, domestic acquirers experience significant
losses around and following announcements, when bidding for a target with a small
board. The CAAR of domestic acquirers is -13.03% over (-30, +30), which is
significantly lower than that of foreign acquirers.
• Board Composition
In addition to board size, we examine the effect of target nonexecutives (outsiders)
on acquirers' returns. These outsiders are considered to have more incentives to
maximize shareholders' interest, and ensure that a good deal takes place. Table 6.16
shows the AARs and CAARs of acquirers based on a comparison of the lowest and
highest quartile of outsiders on their target board.
For the whole sample, CAARs of acquirers are substantially lower across all
windows for bidding targets with the lowest versus highest quartile of outsiders on
their board. For example, over the window of (-10, +30), the CAAR of acquirers
bidding for targets in the highest quartile of outsiders on the target's board is 0.77%,
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while the CAAR for bidding targets with the lowest quartile of outsiders on the
target's board is -4.73%. The difference is statistically significant. The results
strongly support our hypothesis that outsiders promote the shareholders' interests and
make sure that the right decision is made, which leads to positive market reactions.
When the samples are separated into cross-border and domestic takeovers, we find a
similar situation mainly in domestic takeovers. Also, when acquiring targets within
the lowest quartile of outsiders on their board, domestic acquirers have significantly
lower CAARs than foreign acquirers: -9.75% vs. 6.33% over (-1, +30). This shows
that the UK market may be less confident about the transactions, if target firms have
poor corporate governance, which may lead to a "bad" deal.
• Blockholder Ownership
We also examine the returns to acquiring firms based on a comparison of their
targets with the highest and lowest quartile of blockholder ownership. The results are
reported in Table 6.17.
For the whole sample, CAARs of acquiring firms are significant and negative across
most windows when bidding targets are within the highest quartile of blockholder
ownership. But CAARs of acquirers bidding for target within the lowest-quartile of
blockholders are not different from zero. The difference is found to be statistically
significant by non-parametric tests over windows of (-30, -1) and (-30, +30).
When the samples are split into domestic and cross-border takeovers, a similar
situation is found for domestic takeovers. Our results suggest that acquiring firms
might have to pay a high premium to targets with high blockholder ownership, which
leads to very negative returns for acquiring firms. Also, when bidding for targets
with the highest quartile of blockholder ownership, the returns for foreign acquirers




The results of tests in this section show that some target governance characteristics
are related to the returns of acquiring firms around the takeover announcement.
When the rumour or news of target CEO departure was released around takeover
announcements, acquirers normally had better performance. Those acquirers without
target CEO departure experienced significant and negative returns around and
following takeover announcement. This is consistent with our hypothesis and
indicates that markets have better reactions for those acquiring firms that dismiss the
target CEO. In addition, acquiring firms had significantly higher returns around
announcement when their target boards had a higher proportion of nonexecutives.
This implies that target outsiders may be expected to be more objective in evaluating
the costs and benefits of an acquisition decision and make a good deal happen, which
is in line with our hypothesis. However, target blockholders sometimes have myopic
investment objectives, as suggested by Kohers and Kohers (2000). They may even
ask for higher premia, which leads to the loss of the acquiring firm. Our results
provide evidence that, when bidding for targets with high blockholder ownership,
acquirers' returns were significantly negative, and also significantly lower than those
of firms bidding for low blockholder-owned targets. There are no significantly
different returns for acquirers between bidding for targets with the board in the
biggest and smallest quartile. Again, the findings are more significant in domestic
takeovers.
6.3.3 Target Firm Characteristics
• Pre-takeover performance
We examine the effect of target pre-takeover performance on the returns for bidding
firms around the takeover announcement. The industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) is
employed to measure the performance of each target firm one year prior to the
takeover announcement. The top group is target firms that are in the best quartile of
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IAROA, while the bottom group includes targets within the lowest quartile of
IAROA. The results are reported in Table 6.18.
On the announcement day, the average AR is significant at -1.09% for acquirers
where the target is in the lowest performance quartile, while the average AR is not
significantly different from zero for acquirers that bid for the best-performing targets.
Generally, CAARs of acquirers are significant and negative around and following the
announcement, when acquiring firms bid for target firms in the lowest quartile of
IAROA. But the difference between the CAARs of acquirers for the best- and worst-
performing targets is not statistically significant.
When comparing the cross-border and domestic takeovers, we find that, in cross-
border takeover over the period of (-5, -1), the returns for foreign acquirers that bid
for the best-performing targets are significantly higher than those for acquirers that
bid for the worst-performing targets: 1.19% vs. -2.37%. This supports our hypothesis
that markets are more confident on bidding for the better-performing targets. But we
find no such significant difference in domestic takeovers. Moreover, when bidding
for targets with the top pre-takeover performance, the returns for foreign acquirers
are always higher than those for domestic acquirers. The difference is statistically
significant over the window of (-10, -1) and (-10, +30). A similar situation is found
over (-30, -1) and (-30, +30) when bidding for the worst-performing targets.
• Pre-takeover Leverage
Table 6.19 exhibits comparisons ofmarket reactions for acquiring targets in extreme
quartiles of leverage. The acquiring firms experienced consistently and significantly
negative returns over the two-month research period (-30, +30), when bidding for
target firms in the highest leverage quartile. But the difference between the high and
low groups is significant only over (-10, -1): -1.42% vs.1.56%. This is consistent
with our hypothesis that the high level of debt makes the market doubt if the
transaction is worthwhile or if the debt could be paid offby the synergies in the
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future. This mainly exists in cross-border takeovers prior to the takeover
announcement.
Compared with foreign acquirers, domestic acquiring firms make significantly larger
losses when they bid for the highest-leverage-quartile targets: -3.21% vs. 0.26% over
(-1, +1). But foreign acquirers have significantly lower returns than domestic
acquirers over (-1, +1): -4.17% vs. -1.29%, when bidding for targets in the lowest
leverage quartile.
• Book-to-market Ratios ofTargets
The potential growth opportunities of target firms are very important for acquirers.
We use the market-to-book ratio to measure the growth potential of target firms,
which may explain the variance of stock returns to acquirers (Fama and French
(1992)). Following Conn et al. (2005), targets are classified as "value" if their
market-to-book ratio is in the lowest quartile, and as "growth" if in the highest
quartile.
The results in Table 6.20 show that acquirers bidding for growth targets experience
significant and negative returns over the two-month period around the takeover
announcement. The non-parametric statistics tests show that the returns for acquirers
bidding for growth targets are significantly lower than those for acquirers that bid for
value firms: -2.92% vs. -0.64% but only over (-10, -1). This suggests that markets
place higher values on the takeovers of value firms and may think that growth targets
are more risky or that acquirers pay too much for growth targets. In addition, we find
no significant difference between cross-border takeovers and domestic takeovers.
Summary
We find no significantly different returns for acquiring firms between bidding for
targets in the best quartile and the worst quartile of pre-takeover performance.
Acquiring firms had significant positive returns when bidding for targets with pre-
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takeover leverage in the highest quartile, and it is significantly higher than those
bidding for targets with leverage in the lowest quartile. This is mainly observed in
cross-border takeovers prior to the takeover announcement. In addition, acquiring
firms experienced very strong and significant negative returns when bidding for
growth targets, and these returns are significantly lower than those earned by
acquirers bidding for value targets shortly prior to the takeover announcement.
6.3.4 Acquiring Firm Characteristics
• Book-to-market Ratios ofAcquirers
We examine the effect of acquirer types on the returns of acquirers around the
announcement period. Table 6.21 reports the results. For the whole samples, both
growth and value acquiring firms have significant and negative returns on the
announcement day: -1.76% and -1.26% respectively. A significant difference is
found on the day before the announcement: -0.66% vs. -0.02%. This supports our
hypothesis and suggests that markets place less value on growth acquirers than value
acquirers. No significant difference is found for CAARs between the two groups.
When we separate the cross-border and domestic takeovers, the results show that the
foreign value acquirers have significant and positive returns in the run-up period and
the announcement period: 2.08% over (-10,-1) and 2.47% over (-1, +1). The returns
of foreign value acquirers around the announcement date are significantly higher
than those for UK domestic value acquirers: 2.47% vs. -2.37% over (-1, +1). This
refines the above findings that foreign markets are more confident about takeovers
by value acquirers.
Moreover, we find that domestic growth acquirers experience significant and
negative returns around and following the announcement periods, e.g. -4.02% over (-
1, +1) and -6.60% over (-1, +30). Growth acquirers have the significantly lower
returns than value acquirers over (-10, +30): -6.44% vs. 1.29%. Our findings are
similar to the results of Conn et al. (2005). These suggest that the UK market is
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uncertain as to whether takeovers by growth acquirers may lead to some
disadvantage, such as the hubris and overpayment of growth acquirers (Sudarsanam
and Mahate (2003), Rau and Vermaelen (1998)). Additionally, domestic growth
acquirers have significant lower returns than foreign growth acquirers over (-1, +30):
-6.60% vs. 4.41%.
• Size differential rate
The size difference between target and acquirer is always considered as an important
variable that affects the returns of the acquiring firms (Jarrell and Poulsen (1989),
Kohers and Kohers (2000)). We divide the whole sample into three groups based on
the ratio of the total asset of target-to-acquirers (R): R<0.1, 0.1<R<0.5, R>0.5.
The results in Table 6.22 show that when the ratio of target to acquirers is greater
than 0.5, the AR of acquirers is significant and negative at -1.73% on the
announcement day. Such significant losses are across all research windows and
amounts up to -9.94% over (-30, +30). No significant returns are found for other
groups of acquiring firms with R<0.1 and 0.1<R<0.5. This is consistent with our
hypothesis and shows that markets have negative reactions to acquiring firms that bid
for relatively bigger targets. This suggests that markets may be less confident about
acquirers integrating with big targets, which implies greater complexity of acquiring
bigger targets.
When we break down the sample to cross-border and domestic takeovers, similar
results are found in domestic takeovers. In contrast, foreign acquirers with R>0.5
experience significant gain of 4.85% over (-1, +30) and 4.64% over (-30, +30).
Generally, these returns are significantly higher than that for domestic acquirers with
R>0.5. This result suggests that foreign markets have positive reactions to the
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• Pre-takeover Performance
We examine the impact of acquirers' pre-takeover performance on their returns
around the takeover announcement. The industry-adjusted cash flow margin (IACFM)
is employed to measure acquirers' performance one year prior to the takeover
announcement. Table 6.23 contains the results.
For the whole samples, both the best- and worst-performing acquiring firms
experienced significant and negative returns around the takeover announcement. But
the difference is not statistically significant across all windows. A similar situation is
found in both cross-border takeovers and domestic takeovers.
Comparing cross-border with domestic takeovers, domestic best-performing
acquirers have significant and negative returns of -2.62% over (-10, -1), which is
significantly lower than those for the foreign best-performing acquirers. Moreover,
the worst-performing acquirers in cross-border takeovers generally have higher
returns than the worst-performing domestic acquiring firms, e.g. 2.75% vs. -11.90%
over (-1, +30). This provides more evidence about the better performance of foreign
acquiring firms compared with UK domestic acquirers.
Summary
Generally, growth acquiring firms underperformed value acquiring firm around the
takeover announcements. The statistically significant difference is found one day
before the announcement. This is consistent with our hypothesis that markets are
more confident on acquisitions made by value acquirers than growth acquirers.
Acquirers' pre-takeover performance seems to have no significant effect on their
stock performance around takeover announcements. Acquiring firms had a very
strong significant and negative return when the ratio of size difference between target
and acquirers is large than 0.5. Compared to foreign acquirers, these findings are
more significant for UK domestic acquirers.
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6.4 Cross-sectional Analysis of Announcement Performance
To further test the relation between detenninants and abnonnal returns of acquiring
firms, we perform cross-section regression analyses in this section. In our sample, 21
acquiring firms were involved in more than one takeover during our research period
of 1998-2002. To avoid the overlap problem, we keep only the early acquisition for
each acquirer in the regressions. The resulting sample analysed in this section
consists of 191 acquiring firms.
Median regressions are employed in our analysis, because this regression overcomes
various problems that OLS is confronted with. If the data is heteroscedastic, median
regression estimators can be more efficient than mean regression estimators. Also,
median Regression allows for estimation where the typical assumption of normality
of the error term might not be strictly satisfied (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). And last
but not least, OLS is sensitive to extreme outliers, which can distort the results
significantly.
Median regression estimates the median of the dependent variable, conditional on the
values of the independent variable. This is similar to least-squares regression, which
estimates the mean of the dependent variable. Said differently, median regression
finds the regression plane that minimizes the sum of the absolute residuals rather
than the sum of the squared residuals.
The dependent variable in each regression is the market-adjusted return for the
acquiring firms over the window of (-10, +30), in order to catch the effect of the
news of target CEOs' departure which is measured ten days prior to the
announcement. Independent variables are grouped into four categories: deal
characteristics, target governance characteristics, target firm characteristics and
acquiring firm characteristics.
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6.4.1 The whole sample
Table 6.24 shows the regression results based on the whole sample. Each regression
model includes "cross-border or not", "legal difference" and "culture difference"17.
The coefficient of the "cross-border" dummy is statistically significant and positive,
which show that acquirers' gains are higher in cross-border acquisitions than in
domestic acquisitions. In other words, foreign investors, on average, expect
significantly more value creation from the firm's decision to undertake a cross-
border takeover compared to a UK domestic takeover, even after controlling for
other factors expected to affect acquirer returns. This result further supports the
finding of the unvariate tests and it is consistent with the study of Markides and Ittner
(1994), Cakici et al. (1996), Choi and Tsai (2002).
Moreover, legal difference and cultural difference have significant and positive
effects on acquirers' returns. This suggests that acquirers from countries with non-
English common law gained higher returns than acquiring firms from English
common law countries. The positive effect of cultural difference in our study is
consistent with the finding of Morosini, Shane, and Singh (1998). This result is
consistent with our hypothesis, suggesting that learning benefits provided by cultural
differences outweigh the costs of cultural difference.
We also find that CAARs around the takeover announcement are significantly related
to deal characteristics. In line with the study of Kaplan (1989) and Kohers and
Kohers (2004), high-tech takeovers are strongly negatively associated with CAARs
of acquirers, indicating that the high risk and unclear feature of high-tech
acquisitions make markets less confident about high-tech takeovers. The significant
and positive coefficient on payment shows that acquirers' gains are significantly
better in stock-financed transactions. This is consistent with one side of our
hypothesis that the acquirer must pay a higher acquisition price in the case of cash
17
In the correlation test, we find that "cross-border or not", "legal difference" and "culture difference" are highly
significantly correlated. Hence, we put only one of them into each regression.
245
Table 6.24 Regression Analysis of CAAR of 191 Acquiring Firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
(Constant) -13.79 (-1.65) -6.51 (-0.70) -9.23 (-1.16)
Cross-border 10.94*** (4.19)
Legal dif. 10 94*** (2.90)
Culture dif. 10.06*** (3.26)
Related or not -1.74 (-0.73) -0.06 (-0.02) -1.85 (-0.82)
High-tech -9 53*** (-3.62) -4.99* (-1.73) -4.39* (-1.75)
Payment 5.03 (1.49) 2.84 (0.79) 5.32* (1.70)
Auction -10.18** (-2.23) -7.19 (-1.45) -5.87 (-1.32)
Attitude 0.01 (0.00) 2.52 (0.47) 2.68 (0.58)
Premium -0.07** (-2.31) -0.03 (-1.07) -0.04* (-1.45)
CEO depat. 1 y2*** (3.09) 5.64* (2.03) 6.71** (2.78)
Board size 0.08 (0.17) -0.44 (-0.89) -0.44 (-1.03)
Outsiders 17.50** (2.13) 13.91 (1.56) 15.53** (1.99)
B lockholders-own -2.24 (-0.38) -9.47 (-1.48) -7.58 (-1.38)
Target Pre-perfm 2.77** (2.31) 0.40 (0.30) 0.24 (0.21)
Target Pre-levg -9.86 (-0.56) 5.42 (0.29) 6.40 (0.39)
Target-MTBV -0.42 (-0.13) 1.91 (0.54) 1.47 (0.47)
Acqr-MTBV 1.27 (0.40) 3.22 (0.93) 3.55 (1.19)
Size dif. 0.48 (0.40) -0.19 (-0.15) 0.46 (0.42)
Acqr Pre-perfm' 0.89 (0.69) -0.68 (-0.48) -0.18 (-0.15)
R Square 0.075 0.065 0.062
*** indicates/K0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10 (2-tail)
In median regressions, the dependent variable is the acquirers' cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) over the window of (-10, +30). Independent variables are following variables. Cross-border takes
a value of 1 if the "acquirer nation code" of an acquiring firm in SDC is not UK, and is 0 otherwise. Legal
difference takes a value of 1 if the acquiring firm was from a non-English common-law country, and is 0
otherwise. Culture difference takes a value of 1 if the summation of differences between the Hofstede's
index score of the UK and the Hofstede's index score of the acquiring country is above the median of 28,
and is 0 otherwise. Related takeover is also an indicator that is 1 when the target and acquiring firms have
same four or three-digit SIC, and is 0 otherwise. High-tech is an indicator that is 1 for firms involved in
high-tech industries, and is 0 otherwise. Stock payment is an indicator that is 1 if the acquiring firm paid the
deal by stock, and is 0 otherwise. Auction is an indictor that takes a value of 1 ifmore than one bidder had
an interest in the target firm, is 0 otherwise. The indictor variable, attitude, is 1 if the takeover is a hostile
takeover, and is 0 otherwise. Premium is the premium paid for the target firm. CEO departure takes a value
of 1 if the news of target CEO departure is released around the takeover announcement, and is 0 otherwise.
Board size is the number of directors in the board of the target firm. Outsider is the proportion of
nonexecutive directors in the board. Blockholder ownership is the percentage of equity owned by
blockholders. Target firm pre-takeover performances are measured by the industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA)
one year prior to the takeover announcement. Target firm pre-takeover leverages are measured by the total
debt to total asset one year prior to the takeover announcement. Target MTBV is the market-to-book ratio
for the target firm. Acquirer MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the acquiring firm. Size difference is the
logarithms of the ratios of the asset of the target to the asset of the acquiring firm. Acquiring firm pre-
takeover performances are measured by IAROA one year prior to the takeover announcement.
246
offer to offset the tax burden of the target shareholders, which lead to better market
reaction to stock payment.
In line with the previous studies of Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and
Poulsen (1989), multiple biddings are negatively and significantly related to
acquirers' returns, which is consistent with our hypothesis. High premia are
associated with a worse market reaction, which is consistent with Malmendier and
Tate (2005), Moeller and Schlingemann (2005).
In addition, coefficients of "CEO departure" are significantly positive, which is
consistent with our hypothesis. This indicates that acquirers experience higher
returns if the target CEO departs following takeover announcement. The rumour or
the news of the target CEO's departure affects returns of acquirers around the
takeover announcement. That is, the market reaction is positive when an acquiring
firm dismisses the CEO of its target firm. Takeover is considered to have an
important role in replacing the ineffective target managers.
Other variables relating to target governance are found to have significant relations
with acquirers' returns. The coefficients of "outsiders" are significant and positive,
suggesting that the more nonexecutive directors target firms have, the greater the
gain acquiring firms have around the takeover announcement. These results support
our hypothesis that, as a relatively independent party, the nonexecutive directors play
a very important role to make sure the right decision is made including a right merger
or acquisition (Harford (2003)).
Moreover, model 1 shows that CAARs around the takeover announcement are
significantly and positively related to target pre-takeover performance. This result
supports our hypothesis and the argument of Goergen and Renneboog (2004) that




In this section, we repeat the regression based on cross-border takeovers rather than
the whole sample. The first set in Table 6.25 shows the results. No significant
relationship is found between acquirers' returns and these variables.
6.4.3 Domestic Takeovers
We re-examine the regression based on domestic takeovers in this section. The
results for domestic takeovers are reported in the second set in Table 6.25.
The coefficient of "payment" is significant and negative, which is opposite to the
result based on the whole sample and the cross-border takeovers. This supports the
other side of our hypothesis, which indicates that stock payment negatively affects
acquirers' returns around the announcement. This finding provides evidence that the
UK market takes stock payment as a signal of overvaluation of the firm and share
prices of acquiring firms change downwards. Moreover, we find a significant
positive relation between "CEO departure" and acquirers' returns. This finding
refines the result based on the whole sample.
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Table 6.25 Regression Analysis of CAAR of Acquiring Firms
in Cross-border and Domestic Takeovers
Cross-border takeovers Domestics takeovers
CAR(-10,+30) CAR(-10,+30)
N=59 N=131
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
(Constant) -7.69 (-0.29) -7.65 (-0.88)
Related or not -6.06 (-1.24) -2.76 (-0.94)
High-tech -12.14 (-1-43) 1.44 (0.35)
Payment 8.24 (1.33) -12.67** (-2.17)
Auction -15.08 (-1.27) 4.42 (0.64)
Attitude -0.77 (-0.05) -0.05 (-1.46)
Premium 0.00 (0.01) 0.27 (0.52)
CEO depat. 7.76 (0.98) 4.43* (1.69)
Board size -1.03 (-1.18) 2.80 (1.13)
Outsiders 28.72 (1.29) 8.78 (1.04)
Blockholders ownership 3.45 (0.11) -9.46 (-1.57)
Target Pre-perfm 1.95 (0.42) 0.24 (0.19)
Target Pre-levg 58.65 (1.03) -20.77 (-1.10)
Target-MTBV 6.51 (0.46) -4.88 (-1.39)
Acqr-MTBV -0.90 (-0.06) 2.73 (0.89)
Size dif. 4.12 (1.10) -1.64 (-1.32)
Acqr Pre-perfm 0.10 (0.02) 1.85 (1.31)
R Square 0-242 0-023
*** indicates/K0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicatesp<0.10 (2-tail)
In median regression, the dependent variable is the acquirers' cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) over the window of (-10, +30). Independent variables are following variables. Related takeover is
also an indicator that is 1 when the target and acquiring firms have same four or three-digit SIC, and is 0
otherwise. High-tech is an indicator that is 1 for firms involved in high-tech industries, and is 0 otherwise.
Stock payment is an indicator that is 1 if the acquiring firm paid the deal by stock, and is 0 otherwise.
Auction is an indictor that takes a value of 1 if more than one bidder had an interest in the target firm, is 0
otherwise. The indictor variable, attitude, is 1 if the takeover is a hostile takeover, and is 0 otherwise.
Premium is the premium paid for the target firm. CEO departure takes a value of 1 if the news of target
CEO departure is released around the takeover announcement, and is 0 otherwise. Board size is the number
of directors in the board of the target firm. Outsider is the proportion of non-executive directors in the board.
Blockholder ownership is the percentage of equity owned by blockholders. Target firm pre-takeover
performances are measured by the industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) one year prior to the takeover
announcement. Target firm pre-takeover leverages are measured by the total debt to total asset one year
prior to the takeover announcement. Target MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the target firm. Acquirer
MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the acquiring firm. Size difference is the logarithms of the ratios of
the asset of the target to the asset of the acquiring firm. Acquiring firm pre-takeover performances are
measured by IAROA one year prior to the takeover announcement.
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Summary
For the whole sample, a strong and significant positive relation between cross-border
takeovers and acquirers' returns in multiple regressions are consistent with our
hypothesis about the benefit of international takeovers. Legal difference and culture
difference have a significant and positive effect on acquirers' returns. These findings
are in line with previous studies of Choi and Tsai (2002), Rossi and Volpin (2004)
and Mayrhofer (2004). We also find that acquirers' returns have a significant and
negative association with high-tech takeovers, multiple bidders and premium.
Moreover, target CEO departures are found to have significant positive effects on
acquirers' returns, which is consistent with our hypothesis and indicates that markets
have positive reactions to disciplining takeovers. Stock payment, target outsiders and
target pre-takeover performance are also significantly and positively related to the
gains of acquiring firms.
For cross-border takeovers, we find no significant association between variables and
foreign acquirers' gains. For domestic takeovers, the stock payment is found to have
a significant negative relation with domestic acquirers' gains, indicating that the UK
market may consider more about overvaluation problem of the firm. The significant
and positive association between target CEO departures and acquirers' returns is
found only in domestic takeovers.
6.5 Robustness tests
Some studies exclude from their sample those acquiring and target firms that are
classified as financial services, because financial service firms are heavily regulated.
Here we conduct robustness tests by separating the data of firms in financial services
from non-financial services and the results are reported in Table 6.26. During the
period following takeover announcements, the returns to acquirers in financial
services are lower than those not in financial services. But the difference is not
statistically significant across all research windows.
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Table 6.26 Acquirers' AARs and CAARs
by Finance and Non-finance Business Section
Non Differe
Total Finance Finance nee
N=212 N=39 N=173
Event Day AR(%) t-value AR(%) t-value AR(%) t-value t-value
t-1 -0.30*a -1.65 0.14 0.36 -0.41*a -1.95 0.55 1.35
t -0.92**a -2.25 -0.91*3 -1.70 -0.92*a -1.89 0.01 -0.20
t+1 -0.48*a -1.90 -0.29 -0.49 -0.53*a -1.86 0.24 0.48
(-30,-1) -1.08 -0.94 -0.85 -0.45 -1.13 -0.85 0.28 -0.06
(-10,-1) -0.40 -0.74 -0.25 -0.27 -0.44 -0.69 0.19 0.17
(-1.+1) -1.70***a -3.02 -1.05 -1.12 -1.84***a -2.81 0.79 0.63
(-1 ,+30) -3.10**a -2.41 -5.42a -1.54 -2.58*3 -1.89 -2.84 -0.77
(-10,+30) -3.21**3 -2.19 -5.81a -1.56 -2.62*3 -1.65 -3.19 -1.16
(-30,+30) -3.88*3 -1.97 -6.41 -1.40 -3.31 -1.51 -3.10 -0.66
a: Significant in skew-adjusted test;
b: Significant in non-parametric statistics test-sign test and rank test;
*** indicates/?<0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicates/K0.10
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides a study of announcement effects on acquiring firms that bid for
UK targets. The stock market reaction upon the announcement of a merger reflects
the changes in the expected future value accrued to the shareholders involved. We
examine the difference between cross-border and domestic takeovers acquiring UK
companies in 1998-2002. Our analysis reveals several major interesting findings.
Firstly, for the whole samples, acquiring firms experienced losses in takeovers into
the UK during 1998-2002. We find a significant negative return of -0.92% on the
announcement day. The losses accumulate to a significant -3.88% over (-30, +30).
Further, cross-border M&As trigger higher wealth effect to acquirers' shareholders
than do domestic takeovers. Over the two-month period of (-30, +30), the average
return to foreign acquirers is 1.49%, which is significantly higher than the average
return to UK acquirers of -6.31%. It indicates that the advantage of cross-border
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takeovers into the UK may lead to a higher market expectation and higher
announcement returns for foreign acquiring firms. These results reinforce the
literature on the benefits of international operations and are at odds with the recent
diversification discount literature.
When partitioning our sample based on the legal origin of the acquiring firms, we
find that acquirers from Scandinavian law origins earn the highest abnormal return,
whereas acquirers from English common law suffer significant losses. The evidence
suggests that the difference in level of corporate governance regulations across
countries of different legal origins has a large impact on acquirers' gains in takeovers,
which is consistent with the argument of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheifer and
Vishny (2000). Moreover, a significant and positive relationship is found between
acquirers' returns and culture difference, implying that markets place more value on
the learning benefits provided by cultural differences rather than the costs of cultural
difference (Ghoshal (1987), Mayrhofer (2004)).
Secondly, as one of the distinguishing features of the recent M&A wave, high-tech
takeover is rather disappointing for acquirers' shareholders. The high-tech
acquisitions trigger a lower abnormal return than non-high-tech acquisitions: -4.28%
vs. -0.81% over (-1, +1). This indicates that markets are not confident about the high
risk and uncertain future of high-tech takeovers. An acquirer's loss is also found to
be related to multiple bidders and a higher premium, in line with most previous
studies. Moreover, markets react more positively to acquirers which use stock to pay
for merger or acquisition. But the situation is inverse in UK domestic takeovers,
implying that, for UK acquirers, the choice of the means ofpayment act as a signal to
the market about the overvaluation of the firm (Martynova and Renneboog (2006)).
Thirdly, there is evidence that target governance is related to the abnormal returns of
acquiring firms. We find that the rumour or the news about target CEO departure
positively affects acquirers' returns. It indicates that the market has a positive
reaction, when acquiring firms dismiss the target CEO. In addition, the proportion of
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nonexecutives in target firms is positively associated with acquirers' gains, which
suggests that good target governance leads to a good decision and even a good deal.
Finally, we demonstrate that target pre-takeover performance is positively associated
with the announcement returns of acquiring firms. When bidding for targets in the
worst pre-takeover performance quartile, acquirers have worse abnormal returns
around takeover announcements. This suggests that the worst-performing targets
may be more risky, which makes markets doubt the wisdom of acquiring firms
taking over such targets.
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Chapter 7 Wealth Effect: A Comparison
Between the Takeover Active Period and Less Active Period
7.1 Introduction
Although mergers have been studied extensively, there are only very few papers that
have investigated the relationship between economic conditions in merger waves and
shareholder wealth. This is surprising because the overall economic conditions
substantially influence all kinds of business decisions and activities, including
mergers and acquisitions. However, we know comparatively little about the impact
of general economic conditions on the characteristics ofmerger participants in waves,
whether takeovers in active periods are different from those in less active periods,
and whether M&A waves generate value. In particular, the recent M&A wave has
distinctive characteristics, such as the highest transaction value in M&A history, the
boom of telecoms and globalization. This wave slumped with the collapse of stock
markets in 2000. This makes these questions especially interesting. By investigating
these questions, this chapter attempts to add a new dimension towards the
understanding of the effects of takeovers on shareholders' wealth.
In this chapter, we study the recent M&A wave between 1998 and 2002. We
demonstrate differences between the characteristics of takeovers that occur during
the rising period of the M&A wave and those that occur during the slumping period.
We also try to answer specific questions about whether takeovers on the rising side
are more or less likely to create value for acquiring firms than those on the slumping
side of the M&A wave. Because of the concentration of takeover activity in merger
waves, understanding M&A waves and how takeovers in the active period are
different from others in the less-active period will further our knowledge of the
sources of value in takeovers. The comparison of takeovers between two different
periods would have implications for the way M&As are studied. The research also
addresses the broader research question of what determinants affect the acquirers'
gains in takeovers.
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The results in our study show no significant relation between the intensity ofmerger
activity and acquiring shareholders' wealth around the takeover announcement. But,
prior to takeover announcement, acquirers' returns are significantly lower when
merger activities were increasing than when they were decreasing. As in the previous
tests, we find that cross-border takeovers, the legal system and cultural differences
and target CEO departure are significantly and positively related to the returns of
acquiring firms around the takeover announcement. However, being a high-tech
takeover, having multiple bidders and target blockholder ownership has a negative
effect on the acquirers' gains. We also find weak evidence that, on the slumping side
of the M&A wave, target pre-takeover performance and acquirers with high market-
to-book ratio are positively associated with acquirers' returns.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides the background,
followed by a description of the sample and methodology in section 7.3. The findings
of univariate tests and multivariate tests are presented in section 7.4 and 7.5
respectively. Section 7.6 concludes this chapter.
7.2 Background
Previous studies document clear clustering of takeover waves within industries and
these heightened merger activities are often tied up with various technological,
economic or regulatory shocks to these industries (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996),
Mulherin and Boon (2000) and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)). M&A
activities in the UK peaked in 1968, 1972, 1984-1989 and the 1990s (Sudarsanam
(2003)). Similar trends occurred in different countries.
The UK fourth M&A wave started in 1993. Like all previous waves, it came along
with an economic boom in the 1990s. This wave is unprecedented both in terms of
transaction value and the number of M&A deals. With the rise of this wave, the
booming market creates more opportunities. Kohers and Kohers (2000) argue that
the UK fourth wave appeared to have been motivated by the search for synergies and
companies enhancing their competitiveness through increased focus on the core
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business or acquisition of technologies. An international nature is a striking feature
of this M&A wave. The substantial proportion of cross-border takeover reflects the
growing globalisation of products, services and capital markets. The global market
creates more opportunities and allows input supply at lower costs. Meanwhile,
international acquirers may exploit benefit in tax and market efficiencies such as a
cheaper labour market. For those takeovers in high tech industries, a decrease of
R&D cost may make M&A an attractive strategy for the companies. These issues
may bring acquiring firms better operation and more market efficiencies and
investors would have an expectation of higher returns in the future. So the stock
market would be confident for these takeovers in the fourth M&A wave.
However, in such an environment, overvalued equity is overwhelmingly used by
bidders to buy real assets of undervalued or less-overvalued targets. Jensen (2004)
argues that overvaluation pushed managers to make takeover bids even if these deals
did not create synergies or other benefits. When a company's market value is above
the future performance expected by management, it is encouraged to undertake
acquisitions. Martynava and Renneboog (2006) suggest that, at the peak of the
takeover wave, the bidders' shareholders do not realize that their firm may be
overpaying. Moreover, the global environment is characterised by optimism during
the dotcom bubble of the 1990s. Many acquisitions, especially high-technology
acquisitions may have been driven by managerial optimism and hubris (Gao and
Sudarsanam (2003)). These biases may have compounded the problem of valuation
risk associated with acquisition leading to overpayments for targets, which would
cause shareholder value loss to acquiring firms.
Following the collapse of the stock market in 2000, the takeover market become a
little more orderly as the overoptimistic managers regained some common sense.
Managerial hubris and managerial self-interest may be limited. The less
overvaluation of target firms decreased managerial discretion, leading to a lower
probability of making poor acquisitions. Hence, the strategies of M&As were more
rationally considered and acquirers were more cautious in the action of takeovers.
Moreover, the trend of globalisation kept pushing international takeovers to a new
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peak, so that acquirers could take better advantage of such global resources. In such
cases, better market reaction to takeover announcements would be expected.
The rising period and the slumping period of the M&A wave have very different
conditions. Although a large number of event studies concerning the effect ofmerger
announcements have been made, no paper has distinguished between returns in
periods when M&A activities are rising and periods when they are falling. In this
chapter, we examine the market reaction to takeover announcement in the fourth UK
wave and compare the situation in the period when M&A activities were rising with
those in the period when it was falling, in order to investigate whether the intensity
of the takeover market has an effect on acquirers' returns around the takeover
announcement.
7.3 Sample and Methodology
In this chapter, we use the same sample of 212 takeovers as in the last chapter. We
also divide the period 1998 to 2000 into the same two periods as in Chapter 4. Thus,
the rising part of the wave relates to January 1998 to May 2000, characterised by the
boom stock market and a high merger activity era, while the falling part relates to
June 2000 to December 2002, characterised by the slumping stock market and a low
merger activity era.
In the following section, we use univariate and multivariate tests to compare
acquirers' returns around takeover announcements in these two periods of the merger
wave and examine the relationship between the acquirers' returns and numerous
determinants. Both parametric18 and non-parametric19 statistical tests are performed
in this study.
Table 7.1 exhibits the sample which we divide into two subsamples. 137 out of 212
takeovers took place in the boom period, while only one-third of the sample, 75
18 Cross-section t-test and skewness-adjusted t-test are employed in the tests of significance.
19 Unlike the parametric tests, the non-parametric tests do not make the assumptions that returns are normally
distributed. Here, the sign test and rank test are employed in the later tests of significance.
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takeovers, occurred in the slumping period. This provides more evidence that M&A
activities are coincident with the capital market (Key (1997), Tse and Soufani
(2001)). The stock market boom has been associated with a frenzied takeover activity.
Economic boom stimulates company growth and leads to higher corporate
profitability. Additionally, active stock markets allow firms to have more overvalued
equity or other ways to finance takeovers. But following the collapse of the stock
market, the takeover market was adverse. The number of transactions shrank to only
half of that in the boom period.
Table 7.1 The Distribution of 212 Acquiring Firms
according to their Countries
Jan 1998- June 2000-
Total May 2000 Dec 2002
Countries Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc.
Australia 4 1.89% - - 4 5.33%
Bermuda 1 0.47% 1 0.58% - -
Canada 1 0.47% - - 1 1.33%
Denmark 3 1.42% 3 1.73% - -
France 8 3.77% 5 2.89% 3 4.00%
Germany 5 2.36% 1 0.58% 4 5.33%
Ireland Rep 6 2.83% 5 2.89% 1 1.33%
Italy 2 0.94% 1 0.58% 1 1.33%
Netherlands 4 1.89% 2 1.16% 2 2.67%
Singapore 2 0.94% 1 0.58% 1 1.33%
South Africa 3 1.42% 1 0.58% 2 2.67%
Sweden 1 0.47% - - 1 1.33%
Switzerland 3 1.42% 3 1.73% - -
United States 23 10.85% 17 9.83% 6 8.00%
United Kingdom 146 68.87% 97 56.07% 49 65.33%
Total 212 100.00% 137 64.62% 75 35.38%
Table 7.2 reports average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAARs) for acquiring firms involved in takeovers in the rising
and slumping periods of the merger wave. Generally, the acquirers in the rising side
did not significantly outperform those acquirers in the slumping side, indicating that
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the bidder returns appear to be consistent in both merger activity eras. But, in the
price run-up period of (-10, -1), acquirers in the declining stage of the wave
experienced significant gains of 0.80%, while the return to bidders in the rising side
of the wave is -1.06%. The difference is statistically significant at the level of 10%
by using a non-parametric test. This result suggests that, just prior to the takeover
announcement, markets have a more positive reaction to acquirers on the slumping
side than those on the rising side of the merger wave. This is in line with the study of
Jensen (2004) that overvaluation in the stock market boom encouraged managers to
make takeovers that may not create profit in the future, bringing a loss to acquirers'
shareholders. It also provides weak evidence that following the collapse of the stock
market in 2000, managers and investors were more calm and rational. The problem
of limited information processing, managerial hubris and managerial self-interest
became less common. Such an environment is more likely to lead to the high
possibility of making good acquisitions. Hence, markets value M&A more highly as
a reasonable strategy for acquirers to approach external growth. However, around
and following the takeover announcement, we find no significant difference between
the returns for acquirers on the rising side and the slumping side of the M&A wave.
Table 7.2 Acquirers' AARs and CAARs on the Rising Side
and the Slumping Side of theM&A wave
Difference












t-1 -0.30*a -1.65 -0.37*3 -1.67 -0.17 -0.53 -0.20 -0.52
t -0.92**a -2.25 -0.48 -0.96 -1.71**a -2.46 1.23 0.97
t+1 -0.48*a -1.90 -0.44 -1.36 -0.55 -1.38 0.11 0.21
(-30,-1) -1.08 -0.94 -1.08 -0.71 -1.07 -0.65 -0.01 0.00
(-10,-1) -0.40 -0.74 -1.06 -1.56 0.80b 0.87 -1.86 -1.62b
(-1.+1) -1.70***, -3.02 -1.30*3 -1.86 -2.43***a -2.56 1.13 0.96
(-1 ,+30) -3.10**a -2.41 -2.81, -1.63 -3.64**a -1.98 0.83 0.31
(-10,+30) -3.21**a -2.19 -3.50*3 -1.80 -2.68 -1.26 -0.82 -0.66
(-30,+30) -3.88**a -1.97 -3.52 -1.32 -4.55*3 -1.66 1.03 0.25
a: Significant in skew-adjusted test
b: Significant in non-parametric statistics test-sign test and rank test.
*** indicatesp<0.0l, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicates/?<0.10
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Figure 7.1 Acquirers' AARs and CAARs on the Rising Side
and the Slumping Side of the M&A wave
7.4 Univariate Analysis of Stock Performance
In this section, we compare AARs and CAARs of two subsamples around takeover
announcement with respect to deal characteristics, target governance characteristics,
and target and acquiring firms' characteristics. We conduct univariate tests to
determine whether the acquirers' returns are significantly related to these
characteristics. In the following tables, the results for the full sample are presented in
the first set of three columns. The second and third sets of columns show the results
for acquirers on the rising and slumping sides of the merger wave. The fourth column
reports the t-value for the difference to determine if the acquirers' returns are
different between takeovers which occurred on the rising side and those on the
slumping side in terms of the characteristics studied in this chapter.
7.4.1 Deal Characteristics
• Cross-border /Domestic takeovers
Table 7.3 shows the comparison ofAARs and CAARs of acquiring firms involved in
cross-border takeovers and domestic takeovers in both subsamples. On the rising-
side of the M&A wave, no significant differences for AARs are found between
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foreign acquirers and domestic acquirers. But, on the slumping-side of the M&A
wave, AARs on the day after the announcement for domestic acquirers is
significantly lower than that for cross-border acquirers: -1.27% vs. 0.80%.
For the CAARs across all windows in both subperiods, we find that generally cross-
border takeovers result in higher returns than domestic takeovers. Especially on the
slumping side, the CAAR of foreign acquirers is significantly higher than that for
domestic acquirers: 0.10 % vs. -3.77% over the window of (-1, +1). This is
consistent with the findings of Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) and Choi and Tsai
(2002). This suggests that, even when the M&A wave slumped, the confidence of
foreign markets involved in cross-border takeovers was still strong, which coincided
with the rising trend in international takeovers.
Furthermore, we find that cross-border takeovers on the slumping side bring
significantly higher price run-up returns to acquirers than those on the rising side of
wave: 1.97% vs. -1.50% over (-10, -1). This suggests that prior to takeover
announcements, foreign markets have higher expectations of cross-border takeovers
in the slumping period than they do in the boom period.
• Legal differences
To examine the impact of the legal system, we divide acquiring firms into two
groups. One is the group from countries with non-English common law systems (the
Scandinavian, Germanic and French civil law systems), the other is the group from
countries with the English common law system. Table 7.4 shows the results.
For the whole sample, acquirers from non-English common law systems have better
performance than those from English common law systems. The CAARs for
acquirers from English common law systems are constantly significant and negative
around and following takeover announcement. The difference in CAAR between the
two legal systems is statistically significant following the takeover announcements of
(-1, +30). The loss of acquirers from the English common law system amounts to
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-3.91% over (-1, +30), which is significantly lower than returns of 2.66% for
acquirers from the non-English common law system. The results provide evidence
that investors gain better protections in Scandinavian and Germanic civil law system,
which is suggested in the study of La Porta et al. (2000, 2001).
Significant negative CAARs for acquirers from English law systems are found in
both periods of the merger wave. Only on the slumping side is the difference in
returns to acquirers from English and non-English law systems statistically
significant over windows following announcement, e.g. 5.15% vs. -5.15% over (-1,
+30). This provides more support to the above findings, and such a situation
appeared only after the collapse of the stock market.
• Cultural differences
Table 7.5 documents the comparison of returns to acquirers from countries with high
and low cultural differences from the UK.
For the whole sample, acquirers in countries with high cultural differences
outperform those in low-culture-difference countries. Looking at the two subperiods
of the merger wave, the situation appears to be quite similar. But significant
differences between CAARs of acquirers from countries with high and low culture
differences are found only on the slumping side of the merger wave. For example,
over the window of (-10, +30), the CAARs of acquirers in high-culture-difference
countries are significantly higher than that of those in countries with low cultural
differences: 6.11% vs. -4.70%. Our results are consistent with the significant positive
relationship between cultural distance and post-acquisition performance found by the
study of Morosini, Shane, and Singh (1998). Given the complexity of culture issue,
Ghoshal (1987) and Mayrhofer (2004) suggest that markets may emphasize the
learning benefits provided by cultural differences. Such a situation is more
significant in takeovers on the slumping side than on the rising side of the merger
wave.
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• Related/unrelated takeover
Table 7.6 compares AARs and CAARs of related takeovers with unrelated takeovers.
We find that related takeovers generally result in significantly lower returns for
acquiring firms than unrelated takeovers around the takeover announcement of (-1,
+1). Such a situation is mainly found on the rising side, rather than on the slumping
side. On the rising side, the AAR on the announcement day for acquirers involved in
related takeovers is significant at -1.53%, which is significantly lower than that for
acquirers involved in unrelated takeovers. The CAAR over (-1, +1) for acquirers
involved in related takeovers is significantly lower than that for acquirers involved in
non-related takeovers: -3.04% vs. 0.43%. This indicates that, in the boom period of
takeover and of the stock market, markets have higher expectations for non-related
takeovers which may create more synergies by diversification (Solnik (1974), Davis
(1991)). No significant differences for AARs and CAARs are found on the slumping
side of the M&A wave.
For related takeovers, the CAARs are higher for acquirers on the slumping side than
those on the rising side. The difference is statistically significant over the pre-
announcement window of (-10, -1). For unrelated takeovers, a significant difference
between two periods of the merger wave is found over (-1, +1): 0.43% vs. -3.10%.
These results suggest that, after the stock market collapse, markets seem to lose
confidence about non-related takeovers relative to related takeovers. The
disadvantages of diversification may become notable and outweigh the expected gain
from synergies (Martynova and Renneboog (2006)).
• High-Technology Takeovers
The boom in high-tech industries is one major feature during the rising-side of the
M&A wave. We examine the impact of high-tech takeovers on acquiring
shareholders' wealth in the two periods of the M&A wave. The results are reported
in Table 7.7.
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Generally, high-tech acquirers underperform non-high-tech acquiring firms in both
periods. Losses are mainly during the slumping period of the M&A wave, especially
around and following takeover announcements. High-tech acquirers in the rising side
have an AAR of -1.03% on the announcement day, while the AAR is significant:
-5.51% for high-tech acquirers on the slumping side. Considering CAARs, those of
high-tech acquirers are significantly lower on the slumping side than on the rising
side of the merger wave, e.g. -8.32% vs. -2.27% over (-1, +1). This suggests that the
market's reaction for high-tech takeovers became worse after the collapse of the
stock market in 2000. In particular, after the bubble of the "new economy" burst, the
uncertain future and unproven outcomes lead to much speculation about the true
worth of high tech firms (Kohers and Kohers (2004)), which is shown in market
reactions to high-tech takeovers.
• Payment
The market reaction is related to the choice of payment in M&A activities (Goergen
and Renneboog (2004)). When the stock markets were globally booming and M&A
activities were also increasing, overvalued equity is more likely to be used in deals
(Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). Table 7.8 shows ARRs and CAARs of
acquiring firms when employing cash, stock and mixed payment in transactions.
On both the rising and slumping sides of the M&A wave, the announcement ARRs
of cash-financed acquisitions are significant and positive, while equity-financed bids
and mixed cash and equity bids have negative returns for acquiring firms. It is not
surprising that cash payment always shows the confidence of acquirers about the true
value of targets (Martynova and Renneboog (2006)), especially in boom periods of
the equity market, so that markets give a positive reaction.
On the rising-side of the M&A wave, equity-financed acquisitions led to higher
returns to acquiring shareholders than cash-financed bids in the periods following the
bid announcement, such as 1.67% vs. -1.32% over (-1, +30). But the situation
reverses after the collapse of the stock market. On the slumping side, the equity
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financed bids are less superior compared with cash financed bids after the
announcements, e.g. -6.90% vs. -5.92% over (-1, +30).
In particular, the market reactions to equity payment are significantly higher before
May 2000, than afterwards, such as 0.02% vs. -6.42% over (-1, +1). This provides
more evidence for the above conclusion that in the boom period of the stock market
and the takeover market, acquirers have greater returns when employing equity as
payment, rather than in the slumping period.
• Auctions
We examine the effect ofmultiple bidding on the returns of acquiring firms in two
M&A activity eras and the results are exhibited in Table 7.9.
For the whole sample, acquirers involved in multiple bidding always underperform
single bidders. However, the difference is statistically significant only on the rising
side of the M&A wave. Over windows just prior to and following the announcement,
multiple bidders on the rising side experience a significant loss, which amounts to -
10.79% over (-1, +30), which is significantly higher than the returns of -2.18% for
single bidders. A similar situation is found in the slumping period, but the difference
is not statistically significant. The results are consistent with the findings of Bradley,
Desai and Kim (1988), suggesting that multiple biddings are more likely to lead to
overbidding, which makes acquiring firms lose.
• Attitude
Table 7.10 exhibits comparisons of AARs and CAARs of acquirers involved in
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For the whole sample, friendly takeovers experience significant losses around and
following the announcement. But no significant difference in AARs or in CAARs of
acquirers is found between hostile takeovers and friendly takeovers. Such a situation
appears in both M&A activity eras.
• Premium
A high premium is considered to lead to overpayment by acquiring firms. In Table
7.11, we compare ARRs and CAARs for extreme quartiles of premia paid. Generally,
for the whole sample, acquirers that paid a high premium underperform those that
paid a low premium. But the difference is not statistically significant in any windows.
This is found both on the rising side and on the slumping side of the M&A wave.
For the acquirers in the highest premium quartile, acquirers' returns on the rising side
are significantly lower than those on the slumping side over (-10, -1): -4.11% vs.
2.67%. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that a high premium could lead
to a serious loss for an acquiring firm, and such a situation is more notable shortly
prior to announcement on the rising side of the merger wave. This indicates that
managers of acquiring firms may be more aggressive and more likely to overpay
targets in a boom period (Malmendier and Tate (2005)).
Summary
International M&A activities increased strongly even after the stock market
collapsed in 2000 (Martynova and Renneboog (2006)). Foreign acquiring firms
outperformed UK domestic firms on the slumping side of the merger wave. It seems
that markets always show favourable reactions to international takeovers into the UK.
Also, the superior performance of acquirers from countries with non-English
common law systems (high legal differences) and high cultural differences appear
mainly on the slumping side of the merger wave. This indicates that on the down side,
markets had higher expectation about takeovers when having better investors'
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protection provided by Scandinavian and Germanic civil law systems and the
learning benefits from culture difference.
On the rising side of the M&A wave, the underperformance of related takeovers is
more significant, suggesting that, in the boom period, the market favoured
diversification takeovers rather than focused takeovers. High-tech acquirers
experience significantly lower returns than non-high-tech acquirers, especially on the
slumping side of the merger wave, which indicates that the market reaction to high¬
tech takeovers was even worse following the slump of the "new economy". Around
and following takeover announcement, equity payment brings significantly higher
returns to acquiring firms on the rising side than on the slumping side of the wave.
Moreover, the significant difference in acquirers' returns between single and multiple
bidding appears on the rising side, which indicates that multiple bidders may be more
aggressive in the boom market and lead to significantly lower returns. No significant
difference is found between the returns for friendly acquirers and for hostile
acquirers. A high premium brings worse returns to acquirers prior to the
announcement on the rising side than on the slumping side.
7.4.2 Target Governance Characteristics
• Post-takeover CEO departure
Table 7.12 provides the relation between acquirers' returns and target governance by
comparing targets with and without a rumour of CEO departure around the takeover
announcement. On the announcement day, acquirers without target CEO departure
have significant losses of -1.02%, while acquirers with target CEO departure have
returns that are not significantly different from zero. On the day after the
announcement, the ARR of acquirers without target CEO departure is significant at
-0.90%, which is significantly lower than that for those with target CEO departure.
These results show that, around the takeover announcement, markets give a negative
reaction to acquiring firms where the target CEO is expected to be retained. This
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indicates that, to some extent, the failure of correcting target management is related
to the negative market reaction to acquiring firms. No significant difference in AARs
was found between the two stages of the merger wave.
Considering CAARs, acquiring firms suffer a significant loss around and following
the announcement when there is no rumour or news released about the departure of
target CEO. But, in both subperiods of the M&A wave, no significant difference is
found between CAARs for acquiring firms with and without target CEO departure.
In particular, acquirers without target CEO departure on the slumping side have
significantly higher returns than those on the rising-side of M&As over (-10, -1):
1.13% vs. -1.16%. This suggests that markets have a worse reaction to acquisitions
that bid for targets without CEO departure on the rising side than on the slumping
side. But no significant difference is found for acquirers with target CEO departure
between the two periods of the M&A wave.
• Board Size
We examine the effect of target board size on acquirers' returns by comparing the
acquirers' returns when the bidding target's board size is in the highest quartile with
those when target's board size is in the lowest quartile. The results are presented in
Table 7.13.
For the whole sample, we find no significant difference in AARs and CAARs of
acquirers when they bid for targets with board size in the highest compared with the
lowest quartile. A similar situation is found on the rising side of the merger wave.
However, on the slumping side, acquirers bidding for targets with the highest-
quartile board size earn higher returns than those acquiring targets with the lowest-
quartile board size across all windows. The difference is statistically significant over
the (-30, +30) window. Acquirers bidding for targets with the highest-quartile board
size earn a return of 4.41% over (-30, +30), while acquirers bidding targets with the
lowest-quartile board size have a significant loss of-10.01% over the same period.
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Moreover, acquirers taking over targets with board sizes in the highest quartile,
acquirers on the slumping side earn significantly higher returns than those on the
rising side of the M&A wave over the windows of (-30, -1) and (-1, +1). In general,
the large board size leads to less effective management and lower firm value. Our
results, therefore, suggest that, after the overoptimism in the boom merger wave,
markets may be more rational and have a larger reaction to takeovers of such targets
with a large board size (Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992)).
• Board Composition
Table 7.14 shows the comparison of returns to acquirers when bidding for a target
within the highest-quartile and lowest-quartile of the proportion of outsiders on the
target's board.
For the whole sample, the returns are significantly lower for acquirers bidding for
targets in the lowest quartile than in the highest quartile of outsiders' proportion on
the board, and such a result is the same across most windows. When breaking the
merger wave into two periods, the same results are found on the rising side of the
M&A wave. For example, acquirers bidding for targets in the highest-quartile of
outsiders' proportion have returns of 1.36% over (-1, +30), which is significantly
higher than the returns of -6.18% for those bidding for targets in the lowest-quartile
of outsiders' proportion. However, no such significant difference is found on the
slumping side of the merger wave. The results suggest that the proportion of
outsiders on the board is positively related to the acquirers' returns, and the impact of
outsiders is greater in the boom period than in the slumping period of the merger
wave.
This is in contrast to the AAR results where on the day after announcement,
acquirers of targets in the highest quartile have significantly lower returns than those
of targets in the lowest quartile only on the slumping side of the wave. A smaller
proportion of outsiders improves acquiring firms' returns just after the announcement
on the slumping side but not on the rising side. But this effect disappeared after 30
days.
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• Blockholder Ownership
We examine the effect of target blockholders on acquirers' returns and the results are
shown in Table 7.15.
For the whole sample, acquirers' returns are lower when bidding for a target in the
highest-quartile than in the lowest-quartile by blockholder ownership across most
windows. The difference is statistically significant over the windows of (-30, -1) and
(-30, +30). The same results exist on the slumping side of the merger wave.
Acquiring firms have significant and negative CAARs when bidding for targets with
the highest-quartile blockholder ownership, while bidding for targets within the
lowest-quartile blockholder ownership bring positive returns to acquiring firms. The
difference is statistically significant across most windows, especially -18.87% vs.
8.14% over (-30, +30). But no such significant differences are found on the rising
side. As suggested by Kohers and Kohers (2000), some blockholders have myopic
investment objectives and are not really effective at monitoring. They always react
positively to higher premia, which may lead to a loss to acquiring firms. The
situation is more serious on the slumping side of the merger wave.
For acquiring targets with the highest-quartile blockholder ownership, we find that
CAARs of acquirers over (-30, -1) and (-30, +30) on the slumping side are
significantly lower than that for those on the rising side of the merger wave. But for
acquiring targets with the lowest-quartile blockholder ownership, CAARs for
acquirers across most research windows on the slumping side are significantly higher
than that for those on the rising side of the merger wave.
Summary
Both on the rising side and on the slumping side of the merger wave, the returns are
lower for acquirers without than for those with target CEO departure, but the
difference is insignificant. However, over the window of (-10, -1), the returns to
acquirers without target CEO turnover are significantly higher on the slumping side
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than on the rising side of the merger wave. This indicates that unfavourable market
reaction for acquiring firms that fail to change target management is worse in the
rising period than the slumping period of the merger wave. Moreover, significantly
higher returns are found for acquirers bidding for targets with a large board size than
with a small board size on the slumping side, but not on the rising side. This suggests
that after the over optimism in the boom period, markets may be more optimistic
towards takeovers of targets with poor governance, as a large board is usually
considered to be ineffective. However, more outsiders on the target board may be
better at monitoring the management and at correcting such a situation, and we find
significantly higher returns for acquirers bidding for targets with a high than low
proportion of outsiders during the rising part of the M&A wave. In addition, a high
proportion of blockholder ownership brings significantly worse returns to acquiring
firms on the slumping side, implying that high premia asked by blockholders may
lead to serious losses for acquiring firms.
7.4.3 Target Firm Characteristics
• Pre-takeoverperformance
Table 7.16 shows comparisons of acquirers' returns when bidding for the best- and
worst-performing targets. Generally, for each set of samples, acquirers bidding for
worst-performing targets underperform those that bid for the best-performing targets.
But statistical tests don't show any statistically significant difference between two
groups of targets.
• Pre-takeover leverage
Table 7.17 reports comparisons of acquirers' returns when bidding for targets in the
the highest and the lowest quartiles of leverage.
On the rising side of the M&A wave, bidding for targets in the lowest leverage
quartile results in higher returns to acquiring firms than those bidding for targets in
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the highest quartile over (-10, -1): 1.78% vs. -2.06%. When bidding for targets in the
highest leverage quartile, acquiring firms have significant and negative returns
around and following the takeover announcement: -2.29% over (-1, +1) and -5.21%
over (-1, +30). This suggests that markets react negatively to takeovers of targets
with high leverage, as too much debt may exert a greater burden and risk on
acquiring firms. But on the slumping side, the results are the opposite. Over the
window of (-1, +30), acquirers bidding for the lowest-leverage-quartile targets have
significant negative returns, which are significantly lower than those of acquirers
bidding for the highest-leverage-quartile targets: -9.97% vs. -0.27%.
• Market-to-book ratios of targetfirms
We examine the market reaction to takeovers of growth targets (targets in the highest
quartile of market-to-book ratio) and value targets (targets in the lowest quartile of
market-to-book ratio) in the two periods of the M&A wave.
The results in Table 7.18 show that in the rising period of the merger wave, the
returns to acquirers bidding for growth targets are significantly lower than those for
acquirers bidding for value targets across most windows. This finding is consistent
with Rau and Vermaelen (1998), suggesting that the greater risk associated with
growth targets may make markets less confident about takeovers.
Additionally, when bidding for value targets, acquirers experience significantly
higher CAARs on the rising side than on the slumping side of the M&A wave:
4.55% vs. -8.29% over (-30, -1) and 4.91% vs. -12.88% over (-30, +30). This
suggests that market reactions to acquirers bidding for value targets are quite
significantly affected by the intensity ofM&A activity and the stock market. When
stock markets are in a boom period, investors seem more confident and have higher
expectations about the takeover of value targets. Otherwise, they tend to worry more
about such takeovers.
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Summary
We find that acquiring firms experience lower returns when bidding for targets with
the worst than they do when bidding for targets with the best pre-takeover
performance. But the difference is not statistically significant. Moreover, on the
rising side, the returns are significantly lower for acquirers bidding for targets with
high leverage than low leverage shortly prior to takeover announcement. High
leverage in targets seems to lead to a worse market reaction. But the situation is the
opposite following takeover announcements on the slumping side. In addition,
acquiring firms experience significantly better returns when bidding for value targets
on the rising side. This suggests that markets show higher expectations of takeovers
of value targets in the boom M&A market. But no such difference is found on the
slumping side of the M&A wave.
7.4.4 Acquiring Firm Characteristics
• Market-to-book ratios ofacquiringfirms
Table 7.19 exhibits comparisons of growth acquiring firms, those with the highest
quartile of market-to-book ratios, and value acquiring firms, those with the lowest
quartile of market-to-book ratios in the two periods of the M&A wave. Both on the
rising side and the slumping side of the M&A wave, we find no significant difference
between the returns for value acquirers and for growth acquirers.
Over the window of (-30, -1), growth acquirers have significantly higher returns on
the slumping side than on the rising side of the merger wave: 4.13% vs. -3.59%. This
suggests that, prior to the takeover announcement, markets have a more positive
reaction to growth acquirers on the slumping side of the merger wave than on the
rising part of the wave.
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• Size difference
We examine the relative size effect on acquirers' returns. Table 7.20 shows the
results.
For the whole sample, we find that when bidding for targets with a large relative size
(R>0.5), acquiring firms experience consistently significant negative returns across
all windows. This suggests that markets have very negative reactions to acquisitions
with a large relative size difference. When breaking the sample into the two time
periods of the M&A wave, we found the same result for each era and no significant
difference exists between the two periods for those takeovers with R>0.5.
Moreover, acquirers with 0.1<R<=0.5 have higher returns on the slumping side than
on the rising side prior to the announcements: 2.39% vs. -1.15% over (-10, -1).
• Pre-takeoverperformance
Table 7.21 shows comparisons of the best- and worst-performing acquiring firms in
the two periods of the M&A wave.
For the whole sample, no significant difference is found between acquiring firms
with the best pre-takeover performance and those with the worst pre-takeover
performance. Similar situations appear on the rising side of the M&A wave. On the
slumping side of the M&A wave, we find the CAAR over (-1, +30) of the worst-
performing acquiring firms is significantly lower than that for those best-performing
acquirers: -11.76% vs. -2.08%. The results are in line with the finding of Moeller and
Schlingemann (2005). This indicates that the collapse of the equity market made
investors more cautious and react more negatively, when acquiring firms did not
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Summary
Prior to the takeover announcement, we find that growth acquiring firms have
significantly better performance on the slumping side than those on the rising side of
the merger wave. Acquiring firms experience significant loss in both periods of the
merger wave when bidding for targets with a large relatively size (R>0.5). On the
slumping side, we find that over periods following the announcement, the returns are
significantly lower for acquiring firms with the worst than for those with the best
pre-takeover performance. This indicates that markets have less confidence about the
worst-performing acquiring firms, especially after the collapse of the stock market.
7.5 Multivariate analysis
In this section, we do regressions to test the relation between acquirers' returns
around the takeover announcement and a set of potential determinants. In particular,
a new variable, a time dummy, is included in the regressions to distinguish the effect
of aggregate merger intensity on the returns to the acquiring firms. We define the
time dummy as 1 if the takeover took place in the boom period of January 1998 to
May 2000. If the takeover occurred in the slumping side of merger wave between
June 2000 and December 2002, the time dummy is 0. For each regression, "cross-
border or not", "legal difference" and "culture difference" are included.
7.5.1 The Whole Sample
Table 7.22 shows the regression results based on the whole sample. We find that no
coefficient of the time dummy is statistically significant. This suggests that
acquirers' returns have a similar mean value in the two subperiods. The intensity of
the takeover market has no significant effect on the returns to acquiring firms around
the takeover announcement.
In line with Chapter 6, the coefficients of "cross-border", "legal difference", "culture
difference" are significantly positive. This indicates that markets have a positive
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reaction to cross-border takeovers for the benefit of globalisation (Ghoshal (1987),
Mayrhofer (2004)). We also find a significant and negative relation between
acquirers' returns and other deal characteristics, such as high-tech takeover and
auction. This may be because of the higher risk associated with high-tech takeovers.
As multiple bidders always bid up the price of targets, it is not surprising that
acquirers involved in multiple bidding have lower returns.
In addition, target CEO departures are positively related to acquirers' returns in
model 1. This is consistent with one side of our hypothesis and indicates that markets
have a positive reaction to the rumours or news about target CEO departure. Also,
target outsiders are positively associated with the returns of acquiring firms around
the takeover announcement. The association is significant in model 1 and 2 if we
employ one-tail significant tests. This suggests that target outsiders may make sure a
deal occurs, which leads to higher acquirers' returns. The blockholder ownership in
targets has a significantly negative effect on acquirers' returns in model 2. This
indicates that blockholders may reject relatively low offers so that acquirers offer
higher premia, which increases the loss of acquiring firms.
7.5.2 Takeovers between January 1998 and May 2000
In this section, we repeat the regressions based on takeovers on the rising side of the
M&A wave only. The results in Table 7.23 show that none of the coefficients is
statistically significant.
7.5.3 Takeovers between June 2000 and December 2002
In this section, we examine whether the acquirers' returns on the slumping side of the
merger wave have significant relations with potential determinants. The results are
reported in Table 7.24.
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Table 7.22 Regression Analysis of CAAR of 191 Acquiring Firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
(Constant) -11.69 (-1.06) -7.84 (-0.91) -7.75 (-0.69)
time dummy -4.63 (-1.40) -4.04 (-1.61) -4.49 (-1.39)
Cross-border 8.34** (2.41)
Legal dif. 10.01*** (2.86)
Culture dif. 9.60** (2.29)
Related or not 0.90 (0.28) -0.40 (-0.17) -0.32 (-0.10)
High-tech -7.30** (-2.07) -5.97** (-2.23) -5.90* (-1.74)
Payment 4.08 (0.94) 4.28 (1.28) 3.74 (0.84)
Auction -9.07 (-1.46) -13.00*** (-2.68) -13.02** (-2.08)
Attitude 0.70 (0.10) 4.06 (0.80) 3.29 (0.51)
Premium -0.05 (-1.28) -0.03 (-0.92) -0.02 (-0.61)
CEO depat. 6.49* (1.93) 3.74 (1.46) 3.81 (1.14)
Board size 0.12 (0.20) 0.10 (0.21) 0.15 (0.24)
Outsiders 15.76 (1.47) 11.87 (1.41) 12.18 (1.13)
B lockholders-own -5.76 (-0.74) -10.65* (-1.79) -10.68 (-1.41)
Target Pre-perfm 2.16 (1.40) -0.17 (-0.14) 0.00 (0.00)
Target Pre-levg -5.83 (-0.26) 5.40 (0.31) 1.25 (0.06)
Target-MTBV -0.27 (-0.06) 0.47 (0.14) 0.14 (0.03)
Acqr-MTBV 2.94 (0.69) 4.36 (1.34) 4.86 (1.14)
Size dif. -0.41 (-0.27) -1.12 (-0.93) -1.15 (-0.74)
Acqr Pre-perfm -0.003 (0.00) 0.32 (0.24) 0.40 (0.23)
R Square 0.080 0.072 0.069
*** indicates/?<0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicates/><0.10 (2-tail)
In median regressions, the dependent variable is the acquirers' cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) over the window of (-10, +30). Independent variables are following variables. Time dummy
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if takeover is in the period from January 1998 to May 2000,
and is 0 otherwise. Cross-border takes a value of 1 if the "acquirer nation code" of an acquiring firm
in SDC is not UK, and is 0 otherwise. Legal difference takes a value of 1 if the acquiring firm was
from a non-English common-law country, and is 0 otherwise. Culture difference takes a value of 1 if
the summation of differences between the Hofstede's index score of the UK and the Hofstede's index
score of the acquiring country is above the median of 28, and is 0 otherwise. Related takeover is also
an indicator that is 1 when the target and acquiring firms have same four or three-digit SIC, and is 0
otherwise. High-tech is an indicator that is 1 for firms involved in high-tech industries, and is 0
otherwise. Stock payment is an indicator that is 1 if the acquiring firm paid the deal by stock, and is 0
otherwise. Auction is an indictor that takes a value of 1 ifmore than one bidder had an interest in the
target firm, is 0 otherwise. The indictor variable, attitude, is 1 if the takeover is a hostile takeover, and
is 0 otherwise. Premium is the premium paid for the target firm. CEO departure takes a value of 1 if
the news of target CEO departure is released around the takeover announcement, and is 0 otherwise.
Board size is the number of directors in the board of the target firm. Outsider is the proportion of non¬
executive directors in the board. Blockholder ownership is the percentage of equity owned by
blockholders. Target firm pre-takeover performances are measured by the industry-adjusted ROA
(IAROA) one year prior to the takeover announcement. Target firm pre-takeover leverages are
measured by the total debt to total asset one year prior to the takeover announcement. Target MTBV is
the market-to-book ratio for the target firm. Acquirer MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the
acquiring firm. Size difference is the logarithms of the ratios of the asset of the target to the asset of
the acquiring firm. Acquiring firm pre-takeover performances are measured by IAROA one year prior
to the takeover announcement.
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Table 7.23 Regression Analysis of CAAR of 119 Acquiring Firms
Involved in Takeovers on the Rising Side of the M&A Wave
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
(Constant) -1.59 (-0.05) 5.56 (0.19) 6.00 (0.19)
Cross-border or not 7.08 (0.74)
Legal dif. -3.17 (-0.29)
Culture dif. -3.41 (-0.30)
Related or not -2.00 (-0.23) -2.89 (-0.37) -2.55 (-0.31)
High-tech -4.94 (-0.49) -7.92 (-0.85) -7.61 (-0.77)
Payment -1.99 (-0.16) -2.64 (-0.22) -1.61 (-0.13)
Auction -11.09 (-0.59) 3.38 (0.19) 3.33 (0.18)
Attitude -0.69 (-0.03) 3.74 (0.20) 4.19 (0.21)
Premium -0.11 (-0.81) -0.11 (-0.96) -0.12 (-0.98)
CEO depat. 2.70 (0.29) 0.95 (0.11) 0.89 (0.10)
Board size -0.33 (-0.22) -0.22 (-0.16) -0.26 (-0.17)
Outsiders 6.38 (0.20) 9.01 (0-31) 8.98 (0.30)
Blockholders
ownership
6.65 (0.29) 2.47 (0.12) 1.61 (0.07)
Target Pre-perfm 0.16 (0.03) -3.32 (-0.76) -3.04 (-0.66)
Target Pre-levg -17.66 (-0.28) -37.36 (-0.65) -40.03 (-0.66)
Target-MTBV -0.09 (-0.01) -5.92 (-0.51) -6.63 (-0.58)
Acqr-MTBV 4.63 (0.33) 5.69 (0.48) 6.09 (0.45)
Size dif. 1.99 (0.51) 1.93 (0.54) 1.97 (0.52)
Acqr Pre-perfm 1.73 (0.32) 2.98 (0.62) 2.56 (0.50)
R Square 0.058 0.050 0.050
*** indicates/><0.01, ** indicatesp<0.05, and * indicates p<0A0 (2-tail)
In median regressions, the dependent variable is the acquirers' cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) over the window of (-10, +30). Independent variables are following variables. Cross-border
takes a value of 1 if the "acquirer nation code" of an acquiring firm in SDC is not UK, and is 0
otherwise. Legal difference takes a value of 1 if the acquiring firm was from a non-English common-
law country, and is 0 otherwise. Culture difference takes a value of 1 if the summation of differences
between the Hofstede's index score of the UK and the Hofstede's index score of the acquiring country
is above the median of 28, and is 0 otherwise. Related takeover is also an indicator that is 1 when the
target and acquiring firms have same four or three-digit SIC, and is 0 otherwise. High-tech is an
indicator that is 1 for firms involved in high-tech industries, and is 0 otherwise. Stock payment is an
indicator that is 1 if the acquiring firm paid the deal by stock, and is 0 otherwise. Auction is an
indictor that takes a value of 1 ifmore than one bidder had an interest in the target firm, is 0 otherwise.
The indictor variable, attitude, is 1 if the takeover is a hostile takeover, and is 0 otherwise. Premium is
the premium paid for the target firm. CEO departure takes a value of 1 if the news of target CEO
departure is released around the takeover announcement, and is 0 otherwise. Board size is the number
of directors in the board of the target firm. Outsider is the proportion of non-executive directors in the
board. Blockholder ownership is the percentage of equity owned by blockholders. Target firm pre-
takeover performances are measured by the industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) one year prior to the
takeover announcement. Target firm pre-takeover leverages are measured by the total debt to total
asset one year prior to the takeover announcement. Target MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the
target firm. Acquirer MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the acquiring firm. Size difference is the
logarithms of the ratios of the asset of the target to the asset of the acquiring firm. Acquiring firm pre-
takeover performances are measured by IAROA one year prior to the takeover announcement.
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Table 7.24 Regression Analysis of CAAR of 71 Acquiring Firms
Involved in Takeovers on the Slumping Side of theM&A Wave
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
(Constant) -7.20 (-0.70) -6.65 (-0.62) -4.80 (-0.26)
Cross-border or not 7.76*** (2.86)
Legal dif. 11.11*** (2.76)
Culture dif. 9.39* (1.96)
Related or not 1.63 (0.57) 1.78 (0.53) 3.13 (0.51)
High-tech -7.42** (-2.30) -7.02* (-1.94) -7.46 (-0.86)
Payment 7.88* (1.97) 5.64 (1.35) 3.83 (0.53)
Auction -11.30** (-2.30) -12.68** (-1.95) -16.35** (-1.73)
Attitude -7.92 (-0.97) -2.60 (-0.42) -1.57 (-0.13)
Premium -0.02 (-0.48) 0.02 (0.59) 0.01 (0.11)
CEO depat. 11.48*** (4.16) 7 39** (2.43) 6.99* (1.96)
Board size -0.45 (-0.77) -0.20 (-0.31) 0.11 (0.11)
Outsiders 1.29 (0.15) 1.38 (0.13) 0.92 (0.06)
Blockholders
-12.92* (-1-73) -12.46ownership (-1.54)
-18.21 (-1.21)
Target Pre-perfm 3.15** (2.53) 0.50 (0.33) 0.76 (0.32)
Target Pre-levg 2.32 (0.11) 1.46 (0.07) 7.84 (0.20)
Target-MTBV 6.92* (1.72) 3.84 (0.84) 5.81 (0.39)
Acqr-MTBV 5.32 (1.60) 6.56* (1.88) 5.53 (0.41)
Size dif. 0.27 (0.14) -1.26 (-0.56) -0.52 (-0.10)
Acqr Pre-perfm -0.58 (-0.47) -0.32 (-0.22) 0.25 (0.07)
R Square 0.216 0.217 0.206
*** indicates/?<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, and * indicates/;<0.10 (2-tail)
In median regressions, the dependent variable is the acquirers' cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) over the window of (-10, +30). Independent variables are following variables. Cross-border
takes a value of 1 if the "acquirer nation code" of an acquiring firm in SDC is not UK, and is 0
otherwise. Legal difference takes a value of 1 if the acquiring firm was from a non-English common-
law country, and is 0 otherwise. Culture difference takes a value of 1 if the summation of differences
between the Hofstede's index score of the UK and the Hofstede's index score of the acquiring country
is above the median of 28, and is 0 otherwise. Related takeover is also an indicator that is 1 when the
target and acquiring firms have same four or three-digit SIC, and is 0 otherwise. High-tech is an
indicator that is 1 for firms involved in high-tech industries, and is 0 otherwise. Stock payment is an
indicator that is 1 if the acquiring firm paid the deal by stock, and is 0 otherwise. Auction is an
indictor that takes a value of 1 ifmore than one bidder had an interest in the target firm, is 0 otherwise.
The indictor variable, attitude, is 1 if the takeover is a hostile takeover, and is 0 otherwise. Premium is
the premium paid for the target firm. CEO departure takes a value of 1 if the news of target CEO
departure is released around the takeover announcement, and is 0 otherwise. Board size is the number
of directors in the board of the target firm. Outsider is the proportion of non-executive directors in the
board. Blockholder ownership is the percentage of equity owned by blockholders. Target firm pre-
takeover performances are measured by the industry-adjusted ROA (IAROA) one year prior to the
takeover announcement. Target firm pre-takeover leverages are measured by the total debt to total
asset one year prior to the takeover announcement. Target MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the
target firm. Acquirer MTBV is the market-to-book ratio for the acquiring firm. Size difference is the
logarithms of the ratios of the asset of the target to the asset of the acquiring firm. Acquiring firm pre-
takeover performances are measured by IAROA one year prior to the takeover announcement.
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Consistent with the results based on the whole sample, we find that the returns of
acquiring firms are significantly and positively related to cross-border takeovers,
legal differences, cultural differences, the rumour of target CEO departure, target
pre-takeover performances, and target and acquiring market-to-book ratios. But the
high-tech takeovers, multiple bidders and target blockholders' ownership have a
significant negative relation with acquirers' returns.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter compares the returns of acquiring firms involved in two different
takeover activity eras. We find, in most research windows around the takeover
announcement, no significant difference between returns for acquiring firms on the
rising side and on the slumping side of the UK fourth merger wave. However, the
CAARs of acquirers over (-10, -1) are significantly lower on the rising side than on
the slumping side of the merger wave. This suggests that the market reactions shortly
prior to announcement were affected by the M&A activity eras. To some extent, the
results support the argument of Jensen (2004) that merger decisions are affected by
the overvaluation of the stock market, which is consistent with the high merger
activity era. In this period, the valuation risk related to an acquisition plus the
managerial over optimism and hubris is more likely to lead to overpayment for target
firms, which may lead to return losses for acquiring firms around the takeover
announcements. But multiple regressions show that the intensity of takeover activity
has no significant relationship with acquirers' returns.
The returns of acquiring firms around the announcement are significantly and
positively related to cross-border takeovers, suggesting that markets are more
confident about such international takeovers of UK targets and have a positive
reaction to such takeovers. Meanwhile, the significant positive associations between
acquirers' returns, "legal difference" and "culture difference" indicate that acquiring
firms would benefit from better investor protection and the learning benefits
provided by cultural differences in international M&As. Such situations are more
significant on the slumping side of the M&A wave. Moreover, high-tech takeovers
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lead to significant losses to acquiring firms, which become worse on the slumping
side of the merger wave. It is not surprising that the uncertain future and unproven
outcomes lead to much more serious speculation about the true worth of high-tech
firms, especially after the bubble of the "new economy" broke. We also find that
acquiring firms experienced loss around the takeover announcement, when multiple
bidders were involved. Multiple bidders may be more aggressive and bid up the price
of target firms. Then higher premia lead to larger losses for acquiring firms. We do
not find this on the rising side of the wave.
Acquiring firms have better returns if the rumours or news about target CEO
departure came out around the takeover announcement, especially on the slumping
side of the merger wave. This indicates that markets have a better reaction to
takeovers that correct the target management. Additionally, target blockholders'
ownership has a significantly negative relationship with acquirers' returns.
Blockholders with high ownership in target firms usually ask for a higher premium,
which leads to losses for acquiring firms. This situation appears even worse for
acquirers on the slumping side of the merger wave.
We also find a weakly positive but significant relationship between target pre-
takeover performance and acquirers' returns around takeover announcements on the
slumping side. Markets have more confidence about the takeovers of targets with
better performance prior to announcement. Moreover, we find weak evidence that
growth acquirers are positively related to acquirers' returns, which is on the slumping
side ofM&A wave as well. We do not find this on the rising side. This indicates that
markets have a better reaction to takeover by growth acquiring firms when M&A
activities are slumping.
In general, our findings are in line with the previous literature that acquiring firms
experience losses around the takeover announcement. This chapter has taken a step
forward into a previously unexplored dimension by splitting the sample according to
merger activity eras. The findings suggest that no significant relation exists between
the wealth effect of takeover announcements and the prevailing economic condition.
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However, just prior to the takeover announcement, acquiring shareholders' wealth is




This thesis is a pioneering piece of research on M&A in the UK that addresses the
distinctive features appeared in the recent M&A wave. This thesis has investigated
the determinants of post-takeover target CEO turnover and the announcement returns
to acquiring shareholders for takeovers of UK targets between 1998 and 2002. We
carried out two main comparisons: cross-border takeovers vs. domestic takeovers,
and takeovers on the rising side vs. those on the slumping side of the M&A wave.
This chapter summarizes several important contributions of this study to the existing
literature on corporate takeovers. In the following section we consider the
implications of the findings and in the final section we discuss some limitations of
the research and suggest further lines of work.
8.1 Contributions of the Research
8.1.1 The Disciplinary Role of Corporate Takeovers
The elimination of inefficient target management is a widely accepted motive among
financial economists for corporate takeovers. However, there is relatively little
empirical evidence to support this view. As far as we know, no research has been
done on the disciplinary role of recent corporate takeovers in the UK. This thesis
provides new UK evidence regarding the relation between the likelihood of post-
takeover target CEO turnover and pre-takeover performance from 1998 to 2002.
This study finds a weak but significantly negative relation between target CEO
turnover and various performance metrics, which indicates a disciplinary role for
corporate takeovers. This result is consistent with the evidence reported in Martin
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and McConnell (1991) and Denis et al. (1997) for the US takeover market. In
particular, such a constraint is more effective in the takeover active period of January
1998 and May 2000, which is in line with the finding of Mikkelson and Partch (1997)
and Denis and Kruse (2000). Further, in contrast to the evidence reported in Franks
and Mayer (1996) for UK targets over the sample period 1985-1986, we find a
positive relation between hostility and the likelihood of post-takeover target CEO
turnover, implying a discipline motive for hostile takeovers in recent UK takeover
market.
In addition, this study is the first to examine the effect of the rumour of target CEO
departure on acquirers' returns around the takeover announcement. We find that
acquirers had better gains if the rumour or news about target CEO departure was
released in markets around the takeover announcement. This suggests that markets
see the departure of a target CEO as a value enhancing event.
8.1.2 The Wealth Effect of Takeovers on Acquiring Shareholders
The shareholders' wealth effect of corporate M&As has been researched and
analyzed for several decades. Although most studies reach the same conclusion that
target shareholders have gains, the wealth effect on the acquiring shareholders is still
inconclusive. Although hundreds of studies have been published on the assessment of
shareholders' gains in takeovers, little research has taken the prevailing
characteristics of the economic activity in different periods into consideration. This
study differs from previous studies in that it addresses the different economic
features in different periods of recent M&A activity and adds a new dimension
towards the perceptive of the impacts of takeover transactions on acquiring
shareholders' wealth.
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For the whole sample, acquiring firms generally experienced losses when acquiring
UK target firms between 1998 and 2002. A small loss of -0.92% occurred on the
takeover announcement day and reached -3.88% over the window of (-30, +30). This
finding is consistent with previous studies of Sudarsanam et al. (1996) and Draper
and Paudyal (1999) which finds a small but negative return for acquiring firms
around the takeover announcement. Further, we find that acquiring shareholders who
engaged in international takeovers have significantly higher announcement returns
than those who engaged in domestic takeovers. Moreover, acquiring shareholders
have higher returns in the less active takeover period than the active takeover period.
8.1.3 International Transactions
Globalisation is the key feature of the new competitive landscape within which the
M&A waves have taken place in recent years. Globalisation is occurring through the
international expansion of markets, through the impact of new communication
technologies, and through growing economic interdependence with capital and trade
flows across borders. During the 1990s, the share of cross-border M&As stood at just
about one-third of the world total, in terms of both value and the number of deals
(UNCTAD 2000). Globalization is following a trend and even after the collapse of
the stock market in 2000, international transactions were still increasing worldwide.
On the surface, the scale and speed of international takeovers are breathtaking. But
cross-border takeovers face more risks than domestic takeovers, including internal
risks: cultural, moral and language, and external risks: market conditions, politics
and regulation. Thus considering this key feature, globalization, the comparison of
cross-border and domestic takeovers provides insight into the recent M&A activities
and highlights the role played by international transactions. Most studies focus on
M&As in a single country, but no direct research has been done on the international
takeovers into the UK in recent years. This study is the first to investigate acquiring
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firms from 15 countries that were involved in taking over UK target firms.
This study of target CEOs finds a significant negative relationship between cross-
border takeovers and post-takeover target CEOs turnover. That is, a significantly
lower target CEO turnover rate follows cross-border takeovers than domestic
takeovers. For each takeover, there is a challenge to reconcile the different systems
and cultures of two merged companies. In international transactions, effective liaison
becomes necessary and the target CEO always plays a key role given their familiarity
with the target business. Also, their knowledge of local market conditions and
regulations may benefit new owners, which helps to secure their job. This supports
the argument of Child et al. (2001) that CEOs appointed from outside the target
generally bring about more change than will insider CEOs who hold continuing
appointments.
Moreover, this study on acquiring shareholder wealth observes that UK domestic
acquiring firms had significant negative abnormal returns around the takeover
announcement, while foreign acquiring shareholders did not experience a significant
loss. Cross-border takeovers brought better abnormal returns to acquiring
shareholders than did domestic takeovers. This result is not surprising given the
range of possible benefits of international operation and diversification. Additionally,
investment into the UK with a favourable business environment may lead to high
market expectation around the takeover announcement.
Furthermore, a number of challenges exist in cross-border takeovers. This study
mainly examines two important issues in cross-border transactions: the legal system
differences and culture differences. The effect of cultural differences can be present
as early as the stage of negotiating an acquisition (Goulet and Schweiger (2006)), but
such differences may be perceived more clearly during the period of announcement
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and post-takeover management. The evidence in this study shows that cultural
differences have a significant negative influence on target CEO turnover following
takeovers. It provides further support that target CEOs are more valued in cross-
border takeovers. Further, by using four different dimensions of Hofstede's index, we
discover that when acquiring firms were from masculine countries that stressed
future performance, target CEOs are more likely to remain in the new firms,
presumably for the need of integration and/or the improvement of future business.
Our study on acquiring shareholder wealth observes a significant positive relation
between cultural difference and acquirers' returns. This suggests that some cultural
differences can be a source of attraction rather than stress. As Child and Faulkner
(1998) suggested, cross-national cultural differences can provide complementary
resources and learning benefits for international strategic alliance partners. We also
find that acquirers from the Scandinavian law system had the highest gains and
acquirers from the French law system earn least around the announcement. This
implies that acquirers' gains differ between countries with different legal systems, as
suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheifer and Vishny (2000).
8.1.4 The Intensity ofM&AActivities
M&A activities occur in waves over time. Research offers several explanations for
this activity: managerial hubris, market overvaluation and industry shock and so on.
Some financial economists argue that the coincidence exists between economic
performance and M&A activities (Golbe and White (1993), Shleifer and Vishny
(2001), Tse and Soufani (2001)). Bruner (2004) argues that the economic turbulence
from industry shocks is always present. Kay (1997) finds that every stock market
boom has been associated with frenzied M&A activity. Thus, there are reasons to
believe in a possible close relationship between general economic performance and
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takeover activities, but very little research takes it into account.
The UK fourth M&A wave started in the early 1990s and came along with the
economic boom in the 1990s. The high transaction value and the large number of
takeovers distinguish this wave from previous M&A waves. The high technology,
media and telecoms industries boomed during this wave and boosted the bubble of
the "new economy". Friendly, strategically-motivated takeovers and dramatically
increased international transactions characterized this wave. After the bubble burst in
2000, this M&A wave slumped. No UK research on the effects of announcements on
acquirers' returns and on target CEO turnover has considered economic conditions in
the boom and in the slump periods of the merger wave. This study fills this gap and
attempts to find whether the effect of takeovers on target CEOs and acquiring
shareholders' wealth are different in these two periods by establishing comparisons
between the takeover active period (the rising side) and the takeover less active
period (the slumping side) of the M&A wave.
It is found that target CEO turnover rates are much lower on the slumping side of the
M&A wave than that on the rising side. Such a decrease occurred mainly amongst
target firms with poor pre-takeover performance. On the rising side of the M&A
wave, CEO turnover rate is significantly lower for targets in the highest pre-takeover
performance quartile than for those in the lowest per-takeover performance quartile.
Such a turnover-performance relation only existed in takeovers on the rising side of
the M&A wave. This implies that disciplinary takeovers are more likely to take place
in the intensive takeover period, which is consistent with Mikkelson and Partch
(1997) and Denis and Kruse (2000). However, the significant negative relation
between target CEO turnover and cross-border takeover is confined only to the
slumping side of the M&A wave.
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This study finds no significant relation between the intensity of takeover activities
and acquirers' returns around the announcement. However, over the window (-10,-1)
before the announcement, acquirers' returns are significantly lower on the rising side
than that on the slumping side of the M&A wave. This indicates that in the takeover
active period, the combination of the valuation risk, managerial over optimism and
hubris may lead to serious overpayment, which may bring significant losses to
acquiring firms. Hence, markets did not show the favourable reaction prior to the
announcement. Moreover, the positive relation between acquirers' returns and cross-
border takeovers is significant on the slumping side of takeovers. It shows that
foreign markets have confidence about such cross-border takeovers into the UK.
8.1.5 The Internal Governance Mechanism
Some financial economists argue that relative to the 1980s, internal governance
mechanisms became more prominent and more effective in the 1990s (Holmstrom
and Kaplan (2001) and Kini et al. (2004)). In the UK, a series of reports20 lead to
more focus on the development of internal corporate governance mechanisms. These
improved mechanisms are expected to monitor managers better and to increase the
probability that decisions are made for maximizing firm value. However, very few
studies consider the effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms in the field
ofM&A research in the UK. To address this gap in the literature ofM&As, this study
examines the effect of several internal corporate governance mechanisms: the target
board, nonexecutives (outsiders) and blockholders.
Our study of target CEO turnover finds that on the slumping side of the M&A wave,
the probability of post-takeover target CEO turnover is negatively related to
blockholder ownership and the proportion of nonexecutives on the board. This result
20
Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report (1998), Turnbull (1999) and
Higgs Report (2003)
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is consistent with the view of Jensen (1986, 1988) that the corporate takeover market
acts as a "court of last resort". As these mechanisms became more effective in later
years, the takeover market's role as the source ofmanagerial discipline declined.
In addition, this study finds an impact of target governance on the announcement
returns for acquiring firms. Target blockholders' ownership has a significant negative
relation with acquirers' returns around the takeover announcement. This indicates
that blockholders with high ownership in target firms might ask for a higher premium
and this led to losses for acquiring firms. The situation is even worse on the slumping
side of the merger wave.
8,2 Implications of the Research
This thesis offers an up-to-date UK study of the corporate control market and the
effect of takeovers on acquiring shareholders' wealth in the context of globalization
in the UK fourth M&A wave. Based on the empirical results presented in previous
chapters, this thesis has three implications for acquiring firms.
First, according to empirical results, cross-border takeovers are significantly and
negatively related to the probability of target CEO departure following the takeover.
Although a weak but significantly negative relation is found between target CEO
turnover and various performance metrics of target firms, target CEOs may have
their knowledge of the local market and regulations that may be very useful for
foreign acquiring firms. The control of the target firm is important, but foreign
acquiring firms should bear in mind the benefit of target CEOs. It may be a good idea
to retain the target CEO in the new firm to help the integration of the target firm and
improve local business.
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Second, the results in Chapter 7 find that shortly prior to the takeover announcement,
acquirers' returns are significantly lower on the rising side than that on the slumping
side, although results in multiple regressions show no significant relation between
the intensity ofM&A activities and acquirers' returns around the announcement. This
suggests that markets have worse reactions to the takeover announcement in the
boom period than that in the slumping period of the M&A wave. The overvaluation,
managerial over optimism and hubris are always common in the takeover active
period, which may lead to the overpayment for the target firms. Hence, acquiring
firms may need to be more cautious when taking M&As in the boom period.
Third, this study finds a negative relationship between the probability of post-
takeover target CEO turnover and blockholder ownership, the proportion of
nonexecutives on the target's board in the takeover slumping period. This indicates
that the takeover was less needed to discipline the target CEO, when these
mechanisms became more efficient in the later period. This suggests that the
company needs to develop its internal governance mechanisms well, because these
mechanisms play very important roles in monitoring the management of the
company and ensuring that the right decisions are made. Perhaps the government
should impose more regulations and encourage companies to improve the efficiency
of their internal governance mechanisms.
8.3 Limitation and Further Research
This thesis investigates the fourth M&A wave in the UK, and there are some
limitations on data. However, these limitations and difficulties may encourage further
research that can be continued to carry on.
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First, M&A booms are always different from previous ones. Ignoring the unique
issues in each industry, several forces may have a large influence on shaping the
M&A wave: technology change, regulatory change, globalization, and demographic
change. For years, the existence ofM&A waves is one of the unsolved problems in
finance. There are needs to understand better why the M&A cycle occur. It would be
better to investigate the whole fourth M&A wave which started in the UK at the
beginning of the 1990s. It is extremely difficult to collect data on all takeovers back
to the early 1990s, especially personal information about CEOs and details of
corporate governance. So research on the whole M&A wave would be interesting and
may provide a relatively completed picture of the fourth M&A wave in the UK. It
would give a glimpse of the forces behind the M&A wave.
Second, this study explores a special M&A perspective: international transactions.
Cross-border effects are significant and the volume of such activities is more likely
to get bigger as countries and regional markets integrate into the global market. Such
cross-border takeovers can be motivated by a range of factors which are different
from domestic takeovers. When companies from different nations buy UK target
firms, they tend to introduce a series of challenges over time. Meanwhile, cross-
border takeovers raise difficult questions about strategy, valuation, deal design and
implementation. Hence, international transactions are much more complicated and
some cross-border effects may be explained by some other issues, such as
information asymmetry, tax differences and currency arbitrage. However, it is
difficult to access the data what is needed. For example, cultural differences may be
national cultural differences and/or organizational cultural differences. It is difficult
to collect a proxy for organizational culture. However, this may open more research
fields for international transactions and it may offer the key to successful
international takeovers.
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Third, internal governance mechanisms are the main concern in this study. It is
reasonable that internal governance mechanisms of acquiring firms may influence
their returns around the takeover announcement. This study examines firms bidding
for UK target firms, including both foreign acquiring firms and domestic acquiring
firms. For those foreign acquiring firms from 15 countries, it is extremely difficult to
collect data on foreign acquirers' boards and their management. The influence of
foreign acquirers' internal governance mechanisms should be examined in the future.
Moreover, the future research can focus on the interplay between targets' and
acquirers' internal governance mechanisms.
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PanelA.C pitaLeveragel(N tDebt/TotalAss t) Year-40.064**(2.40).102 *(3.85)1.01( .3 Year-30.067**(2.55).113 *(4.23)-1.22( .2 4 Year-20.088***(3.11)0.120 *(4.43)0.8( .419 Year-10.089***(3.07)0.117 *(4.29)-0.71( .477
NoCEO Turnover (N=74) 0.042(1.21) 0.045(1.34) 0.071*(1.98) 0.069*(1.85)
CEOTurnover (N=76) 0.104***(3.21) 0.113***(3.49) 0.118***(3.55) 0.122***(3.95)
t-stat
-1.31(0.19 ) -1.47(0.143) -0.96(0.341) -1.10(0.272)
NoCEO Turnover (N=38)
CEOTurnover (N=29)
0.108**(2.68) 0.110**(2.64) 0.122**(2.62) 0.128***(2.86)
0.098**(2.11) 0.111**(2.39) 0.126**(2.72) 0.105*(1.82)
t-stat
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Table5
















































































































































































Post-takeoverTurnovRat sfor217T rg tFirmsfSucc s fulT k rso r19982002fExtremeLeve agQua tiles















































































































































Total Value and Number of Deals for Each Month













January 1998 9,898.90 280 July 2000 15,419.20 314
February 1998 32,174.30 262 August 2000 17,404.80 283
March 1998 26,430.90 352 September 2000 22,130.40 279
April 1998 11,046.40 277 October 2000 8,718.10 234
May 1998 8,080.80 244 November 2000 10,853.80 254
June 1998 17,887.70 252 December 2000 38,474.90 264
July 1998 13,917.00 237 January 2001 9,456.00 218
August 1998 9,001.10 235 February 2001 13,042.20 247
September 1998 16,474.80 236 March 2001 20,419.80 246
October 1998 5,579.20 256 April 2001 19,517.30 236
November 1998 19,284.10 266 May 2001 36,240.70 268
December 1998 12,801.80 293 June 2001 8,201.50 205
January 1999 25,463.30 215 July 2001 8,711.40 236
February 1999 13,330.30 222 August 2001 7,603.70 182
March 1999 12,180.20 301 September 2001 1,522.00 143
April 1999 16,251.40 345 October 2001 8,249.90 218
May 1999 10,989.50 261 November 2001 6,262.30 226
June 1999 38,085.20 291 December 2001 11,101.80 159
July 1999 48,517.10 274 January 2002 5,855.80 185
August 1999 14,063.40 240 February 2002 3,534.50 173
September 1999 12,459.10 277 March 2002 20,465.80 202
October 1999 51,228.60 224 April 2002 19,663.80 195
November 1999 59,739.80 260 May 2002 7,561.30 210
December 1999 11,318.20 262 June 2002 21,088.60 163
January 2000 93,393.40 277 July 2002 6,150.10 187
February 2000 32,920.10 316 August 2002 8,418.00 162
March 2000 35,366.30 304 September 2002 3,820.00 186
April 2000 43,652.20 274 October 2002 15,836.30 188
May 2000 75,998.50 328 November 2002 6,460.90 168
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PanelB.CEOTur overatusingotalDebt/TotalAs tsthl ver geme ic
Year-4
53.70%
37.04%
3.026*(0.082)
57.14%
40.00%
2.06(0.15)
47.37%
36.84%
0.43(0.51)
Year-3
51.85%
35.19%
3.051*( .081)
54.29%
40.00%
1.43(0.23)
52.63%
36.84%
0.96(0.33)
Year-2
50.00%
38.89%
1.350(0.245)
48.57%
37.14%
0.93(0.33)
52.63%
36.84%
0.96(0.33)
Year-1
51.85%
37.04%
2.400(0.121)
57.14%
37.14%
2.81*(0.09)
47.37%
36.84%
0.43(0.51)
PanelC.
CEOTurnoverrat
usingEDITDA/InterestChargesthleve agemetric
Year-4
51.85%
42.59%
0.929(0.335)
60.00%
40.00%
2.80*(0.09)
31.58%
47.37%
0.99(0.32)
Year-3
51.85%
37.04%
2.400(0.121)
62.86%
31.43%6.94***(0.01)
31.58%
42.11%
0.45(0.50)
Year-2
51.85%
44.44%
0.593(0.441)
57.14%
48.57%
0.52(0.47)
36.84%
47.37%
0.43(0.51)
Year-1
53.70%
46.30%
0.593(0.441)
57.14%
42.86%
1.43(0.23)
36.84%
52.63%
0.96(0.33)
